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Abstract
Muslim legal theorists (al-'Usuliyyun) develop two sophisticated models of
textual communication: the mainstream model and the salafite one. The
mainstream model is based on four main pillars: (a) establishment (wad'), (b) use
(isti'mal), (c) interpretation (haml)and (d) signification (dalalab). This thesis aims
to explore and formulate this model, and to show how it is different from the salafite
one.
Chapter I offers a general background about the topic.
Chapter II deals with the distinction between wadwhich concerns language as
a given lexicon and grammatical system, and use, which concerns the speakers'
behaviour. My focus is to discuss how each utterance, as the legal theorists suggest,
pertains partly to wad' and partly to use. This is taken up through the discussion of
universal and particular wad', general and specific wad', use, intention and context.
Chapter III examines the distinction between fiqh, understanding and
interpretation and discusses context from the addressee's point of view. An account
of the mainstream model of interpretation is provided via examining five
communicative principles: the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his
Intention Manifest, the Principle of the Speaker's Truthfulness, the Principle of
'I'mal, the Principle of Immediacy and the Principle of Istishab.
Chapter IV includes a formulation of what I call 'Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual
theory of interpretation', which represents the Salafis' account of interpretation. My
formulation of this theory displays its coherence by delving into its underlying
philosophical principles. This involves relating it to his relevant ontological,
epistemological and theological outlook. Besides, the inquiry includes his theory of
cognitive relativism, his contextual theory of definition and his views on language,
meaningfulness, the wad'-use dichotomy, meaning-intention distinction and
signification. More important is his critical view of the distinction between literal
and non-literal meaning, and his model of interpretation.
Chapter V is concerned with two significational classifications: a semiotic
classification and a text-based classification. The former involves natural, rational
and wad'-based signification (which is divided into equivalence-signification
(dalalat mutabaqah), incorporational signification (dalalat tadammun) and
implicational signification (dalalat iltizam), the latter has two versions: the HanafI
version, which includes express meaning ('ibarat al-nass), alluded meaning
('isharat al-nass), inferred meaning (dalalat al-nass) and required meaning (iqtida'
al-nass), and the Shafi'i version, which includes the signification of 'what is said'
(dalalat al-mantuq), required signification (dalalat al-iqtida'), alluded signification
(dalalat al-'isharah), indicated signification (dalalat al-tanbih wa-l-'ima') and
implicated signification (dalalat al-mafhum). Implicated signification is divided
into two types: congruent implicature (mafhum al-muwafaqah), which is approved
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want them to mean, it follows that for successful communication, one must know the
speaker's intention. Working through this chain of arguments, Ibn Taymiyyah
reaches the conclusion that knowing ^ an utterance is not sufficient to understanding it
successfully. Instead two things should be considered, namely knowing (al- sam')
and reasoning (al- 'aql) and that using both these capacities in understanding utterances
is to use fiqh. 2
As to the technical sense of 'the principles of fiqh (henceforth PF), the most
straightforward definition of this term is the study of the rules by which legal
judgements can be derived from their specific arguments directly.3 The last restriction
(directly) is stated partly to exclude grammar (in its broad sense) as it is considered to
be one of the premises (al-mabadi') upon which the research in this field is based
(The other two are theology and fiqh). This exclusion underlies the fact that the legal
theorists are interested exclusively in aspects that might be said to be of pragmatic
character rather than the formal aspects of linguistic research on account of the fact that
the latter are considered to be part of the premises whereas the former are part of the
theorems (al-masa 'il) of the PF.
Thus, the linguistic concern of the legal theorists involves, as Imam al-Haramayn
al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) states, "the residue of the linguistic inquiry which has to do
with the legal purposes and has been ignored by the scholars of the Arabic
language".4 Most, if not all, of such an inquiry can arguably be involved in the
domain of pragmatics.
At this stage two points have to be mentioned:
1 Knowing is a rough translation of the term al-samwhich should be taken in this
context to mean the previous knowledge of both the wad' of that utterance (i.e. the
linguistic meaning) and all that which has been received about it (i.e. the external
context).




Firstly, one should not expect the PF to have been the Islamic classical counterpart
of pragmatics, although, as stated above, a considerable portion of its themes can
fairly be assumed to fall within the domain of pragmatics.
Secondly, despite the fact that PF deals with some legal and theological theorems,
which might be expected to be characterised by some metaphysical issues and
doctrines accepted as a matter of faith, the pragmatic thinking of the Muslim legal
theorists has the advantage of being noticeably based on an objective method. Of the
many pieces of evidence that are available in this context, I would choose the
following which shows that the legal theorists treat the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah
in principle as typical Arabic utterances rather than extraordinary or unique divine
messages:
Whatever acceptable utterance produced by a native Arabic speaker is
potential in the Qur'an... [and vice versa] and what is unique to Allah
has nothing to do with languages. 1
Nevertheless, we might meet several examples of what can be regarded, at first
glance, as being in disagreement with what has just been said. One such example is:
"the real question cannot be performed by Allah"; another is "whatever Allah says
must be held to be true" and the like. These maxims should, in actual fact, be taken as
important observations within the scope of a pragmatic account of how communication
works, for pragmatists are interested, as far as the interpretation of utterances is
concerned, in how beliefs, or, more precisely, the system of shared beliefs affects the
pragmatic interpretation of utterances rather than evaluating the beliefs proper.
Furthermore, if we take such maxims (the word 'maxim' here is employed in its pre-
theoretical sense) in the context of Ibn Taymiyyah's version of fiqh and the
communicative principles formulated by the legal theorists, we will have to interpret,
for instance, the interrogative sentences uttered by Allah as indirect utterances. That is
lAl-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 259, 260.
3
to say, they will be taken to have ulterior intentions. And this is indeed the common
account of such utterances in the works of the legal theorists and the commentators of
the Qur'aji.
So far the term 'pragmatic' has been used in a rather loose sense. Since I am not
dealing with a modern pragmatic theory where the term 'pragmatic' is given a
restricted technical sense, I will continue to do so. However, the general usage of this
term in this study is not incompatible with its broad sense in the field of pragmatics
where 'pragmatic' has to do with the study of language use and understanding or with
meaning in relation to speech situations.
At this point, I shall state in non-technical language what I regard to be essentially
the pragmatic insights in PF works. In the next chapters I intend to discuss them in
detail either directly or indirectly. These insights include:
i- The proper understanding of utterances cannot be achieved by merely
understanding the meaning of sentences, but by grasping accurately the speakers'
intentions. This view can be ascribed to the fact that the essential and ultimate goal of
the PF is, as stated earlier, to reach a correct interpretation of the intentions of Allah
and His Prophet.
ii- Communicative considerations and textual aspects are paramount in the
understanding of utterances, without, however, ignoring the formal structure of
language. This can be readily observed in the emphasis they place on the role of
context (in its broad sense) in language use and understanding.
iii- Utterances cannot be properly understood without using the intellectual
capacities of the hearer. This view might be due to the fact that languages are thought
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to be based upon what is shared between interlocutors such as innate linguistic and
cognitive knowledge and convention. 1
iv- Two types of knowledge are generally distinguishable: knowledge of language
as a set of wad's, and that of language as use. This can be easily derived implicitly
from the discussions of the distinction between what is called wad' al-lughah (the
establishment of language) and isti'mal (use).
v- A system consisting of a set of principles and a series of strategies which serves
as a guide to solve the communicative problem is required. This system operates by
virtue of two categories, namely 'the base' (al-'asl) and 'the subsidiary' (al-far').
vi- A distinction is made between what is understood explicitly and what is
understood implicidy and also between what is understood directly from the utterance
and what is inferred indirecdy from it. This boils down to saying that there is a fairly
subtle conception of the nature of meaning, which requires a fairly sophisticated
proposal (might be regarded as more than one) of how the interpretation of utterances
is reached.
vii- Since the proper understanding of utterances is anchored in relation to
communication in ideal set-ups, which implies the absence of what might be
considered by the hearer to be contradictory to what is being said in actual situations,
and the absence of such features as homonymy (al-ishtirak), figurative use (al-
majaz), polysemy (al-naql), ellipsis (al-idmar) and so on, and since this is hardly
ever the case in actual communication, it follows that what the hearer usually
understands is regarded as the most likely intended messages which the speaker
wishes to communicate rather than as the indubitable proper intentions of the
speaker.2 To put it Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's way (d. 606/1209), verbal signals are
ISee al-Qarafl, Sharh Tanqih, p.76.
2See al-RazI, 1/493-494.
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intended not to make the hearer absolutely certain but to make him think that he has
successfully interpreted them. '
The frequent occurrence of the term haml (interpretation) in the works of the legal
theorists and their preference of it to the word fahm (understanding) would explain (as
the name suggests) the fact that utterances are interpreted differently by different
recipients. After all, it should be borne in mind that verbal signals can, according to
the legal theorists, produce certainty if they are supported by sufficient contextual
evidence that can efficiently make the hearer certain that his interpretation of the
utterance is the sole possible one. The signification of the signals of this kind has
commonly been called in the PF's terminology 'deterministic signification' (dalalah
qat'iyyah) whereas the signification of the former 'probabilistic signification'
(dalalah zanniyyah).
viii- It is very often that, in particular utterances, addressees bypass the surface
meaning of an utterance and appeal to an ulterior interpretation of that utterance in
order to attain a proper understanding of the speaker's intention. An account of this
can roughly be stated as follows:
The surface meaning of a given utterance must be taken in principle as the intended
meaning of the utterance unless there is some contextual (context is being employed
here in its broadest sense) evidence (qarinah) to the contrary. If the literal meaning of
the utterance is incompatible with the contextual evidence, the hearer will have to
interpret (yu'awwil) the utterance in such a manner that it will become in agreement
with it.
Although this formation seems to oversimplify the Muslim legal theorists' account
for how communication works and overlook its explanatory ramifications, it might
'Al-RazI, 1/493.
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hopefully be regarded as sufficient in presenting a general glance at their conception of
indirect communication.
ix- Legal texts must be handled as a whole and not isolated from their internal
contexts. Thus, the Qur an must be treated as a complete text. The same is applicable
to the traditions of the Prophet. Furthermore, they must not be separated from their
external contexts, which involve the entire Sunnah in the case of the Qur'anic verses
and vice versa, as well as those things which are believed to be connected with the
intentions of Allah and His Prophet in the text in question. This includes the reasons
of the revelation of the text ('asbab al-nuzul), the Arabs' way of thinking, their
affairs, their customs and so on. This approach is advocated to avoid the pitfalls of
the sentence and text based analyses, which disregard the context of the subject
matter.
The sketch of the pragmatic thinking in the PF works outlined above can generally
be incorporated into the domain of general pragmatics. However, not every thing in
PF can be incorporated within this domain, owing to the fact that PF contains many
features that are more peculiar either to the Arabic language or to the Islamic culture
than to the universal structural features of language or to universal pragmatic issues,
which are cross-culturally applicable. Thus, the inquiry made by the legal theorists
into the pragmatic aspects of some particles (e.g. wa, fa and thumma), can be
regarded as a good example of language-specific pragmatics while the inquiry into
what has commonly been called 'performative expressions' (siyagh al-'uqud), e.g. 'I
thereby divorce you' ('and taliq), which are generally based upon the judgements of
the Islamic religion, can be deemed as good examples of culture specific pragmatics.
However, in the next chapters I shall focus much more on the issues related to general
pragmatics than those which are culture/language specific.
Having stated some of the Muslim legal theorists' insights into language and
communication, the point that should be stressed here is that the linguistic and textual
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communicative studies are generally conceived of as an act of worship, for they are the
key to a proper interpretation of the Qur'an whose verses are the main basis upon
which to formulate the law. Therefore, it is not strange that a lot of effort, time and
money have been spent in searching for the best and the most proper way to
understand the intentions ofAllah and His Prophet through the Qur'an and Sunnah. It
is true that Muslim scholars concern themselves with several branches of knowledge
such as philosophy, logic, medicine, cosmology, metaphysics, etc., for their own
sake, but they are much more interested in those topics which are related either directly
or indirectly to the knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunnah. It is for this reason that the
Islamic civilisation is best described as text-oriented civilisation. There has always
been controversy among Muslims about whether such topics as falsafah (i, e., Greek
philosophy) merits the efforts spent in pursuing them, but such a criticism has never
been raised against those who dedicated their life to the study of language and its
related disciplines.
Among those who are interested in language and communication, the legal
theorists are given a very special status. So, some scholars believe that introducing
such extra-linguistic elements as addresser, addressee and context into the domain of
interpretation makes the legal theorists more than just grammarians "nuhatun wa-
ziyadah"! or as 'Abd al-'Ali al-'Ansarl (d. 1225/1810) puts it, "more skilful than
'ahl al- 'arabiyyah (Arabic linguists )"A The legal theorists are described in this
manner because the interest of grammarians in terms of meaning is judged to be
restricted solely to the literal meaning of utterances, which the legal theorists consider
to be just one of a set of components that make interpretation possible. Thus, it can be
stressed that the interests of the Muslim legal theorists in terms ofmeaning are similar
1Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i, Svllam al-Wusul li-Sharh Nihayat al-Sul (Beirut:
'Alam al-Kutub, n.d.), 2/350.
^Al-'Ansari, 1/315 and see 1/251.
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to those of pragmatists, while the interests of the classical grammarians of Arabic are
roughly similar to the interests of modern semanticists.
It is clear that relying on wad' per se can lead to failure in interpretation, should
the speaker fail to produce an 'ideal discourse' (i, e., a maximally wad'-conforming
discourse). Since actual communication involves some problematic features like
ambiguity and metaphor, the interpreter has to be aware of some principles and
strategies to deal with such features. And it was indeed the task of the legal theorists
to provide a set of principles, strategies and rules of inference whose aim is to
constitute an approach to tackling the problem of interpretation.
1.2. The legal theorists' pragmatic approaches to communication
In PF, there are at least two different pragmatic approaches to textual
communication:
(i) The mainstream approach followed by the 'Ash 'aris, Hanafls and Mu 'tazills.1
(ii) The salafite approach followed mainly by the Hanballs, traced back to the early
generation and strongly advocated, defended and elaborated by Ibn Taymiyyah and his
pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350).
My task in this study will be to collect the scattered arguments of each of the above
two schools, formulate their views into models and examine their positions over
several communicative issues.
*It should be noted that most writers in PF are 'Ash 'aris, Hajiafis (who usually hold
Maturidi doctrines) or Mu'tazills. There are only very few works written in this field
by Zahiris and Salafls. For this reason alone, I refer to the view shared by Ash 'aris,
Hanafis and Mu 'tazilis or by most of them as the mainstream view.
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The mainstream legal theorists assume that any communication involves the
following:
(i) wad' (assignment of meanings to expressions), which is carried out by the
'established of the language;
(ii) dalalah (signification), which is a consequence of wad' and contextual
information.
(iii) isti'mal (use) i.e. the production of an utterance by a speaker with the
intention of a particular meaning.
(iv) haml (interpretation), i.e. the hearer's own understanding of the intention of
the speaker.
With the exception of non-wad '-based dalalah, the above constitutive factors are
thought to take place in a linear order: 1 wad' first, isti'mal second, and haml third
(cf. 2.3). Each part is associated with an anchoring point in the chain: wad' is
associated with the 'established, dalalah with wad' and context; isti'mal with the
addresser; and haml with the addressee (cf. figure 1.1).
Communication is, therefore, more than a matter of encoding and decoding of
utterances; it is, in fact, an integrated process in which both naql (the transmission of
knowledge) and 'aql (an intellectual input) play a role.
What distinguishes al-salafiyyah's communication model from its mainstream
rival is the neutralisation of the difference between wad' and use. The Salafis' main
contention is that conventions are not established in isolation from the communicative
situation, but are, rather, set up, and modified by them. Hence, words have elastic
rather than firmly fixed meanings so that they may change according to the verbal and
ISee Mullakhusru, 1/153.
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non-verbal contexts in which they are uttered. Accordingly, if an expression is
isolated from context, it will no longer be part of the language, simply because it
cannot be used to communicate in a well defined manner. * Hence, much of the
misconceptions in the mainstream account of majaz is due, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim, to the confusion between a theoretical or abstract language (al-kalam al-
muqaddar) and the language in use (al-kalam al-musta'mal)^
Figure (1.1)
The mainstream communication model
establisher wad'
The arrows indicate the chronological order. The rectangles represent the main constitutive processes
of communication. With the exception of wad' and the wad '-based signification, all the constitutive





The salafite communication model
Wad' is omitted because the distinction between wad' and use is neutralised. Signification is
established and modified in the actual use of the utterance. The habitual use of the utterance, which is
a contextual notion, is believed to play the role of the primordial wad' in the mainstream model.
However, there is another distinct approach followed by the Zahiris which is
based primarily on the non-pragmatic givens of the language and stresses the
predetermined conventions of the language which are encoded in the linguistic
structure of the texts as the essential, and perhaps the only requirements for
communication. Extra-linguistic contexts are generally ignored and the inferential
capacity of the hearer has almost no role to play in interpretation. This approach
which has long been defunct will not be discussed in the present study since our
concern is confined to the pragmatic thinking in the PF.
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are certain parallels between the
distinction drawn in modern linguistics between semantics and pragmatics and the
distinction drawn by the mainstream Muslim legal theorists between wad' and use.
Both wad' and semantics are about the study of meaning in isolation of context, wad'
is generally about the assignment of expressions to meanings, semantics is about the
study of meaning. Pragmatics, on the other hand, literally means the science of use
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and isti 'mal also means use. However, while semantics and pragmatics have come to
be recognised as separate branches of linguistics, only wadin the Islamic literature,
was recognised as an independent branch of the Arabic linguistic sciences. 'Adud al-
Din al-'Ijl (d. 756/1355) is said to be the first to have written on this subject outside
the PF, but his treatise (al-Risalah al-Wad'iyyah) "did not give rise immediately to a
separate science".1 According to Tash Kabri Zadah (d. 970/1561) who describes al-
'Iji's treatise as "a drop in the ocean of the science of wad' and a sip from its river",
the science of wad' had not yet become a written science (lam yudawwan)" in his
time.2 It was only in the eighteenth century, according to Weiss, that this body of
knowledge gained "the status of a recognized written science".3
Hitherto we have generally been dealing with some pragmatic notions in the PF
literature in an abstract way. In the next chapters I shall try to flesh out these notions
in a way which expresses the specificity of PF, while at the same time displaying
those features which demonstrate its general applicability.
1.3. Aims and scope of the study
As far as I can ascertain, this study is the first attempt to formulate the Muslim
legal theorists' models of textual communication. There has been no study that
examines the approaches followed by the Salafis or the mainstream from a pragmatic
viewpoint. In fact, there has been no attempt to explain the principles and the
^B.G. Weiss, "Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "wad' al-lughah"
and its Development", unpublished PhD thesis (The Faculty of Princeton University:
Dept of Oriental Studies, 1966), p. 92; 'Abd al-Hamld al-Zahrawi, " 'Ilm al-Wad"',
ed. 'Abd al-Tlah Nabhan, Majallat Majma' Dimashq, 70 (1995), 3/454.
2-Tash Kabri Zadah, Miftah al-Sa'adah, ed. Kamil Kamil BakrI and 'Abd al-Wahhab
'Abu 1-Nur (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Hadlthah, 1968), 1/130; see B.G. Weiss,
"Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "wad' al-lughah" and its
Development", p. 92; 'Abd al-Hamld al-Zahrawi, "Tim al-Wad'", p. 454.
-^B.G.Weiss, "Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "wad' al-lughah"
and its Development", pp. 92-93.
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strategies utilised by the medieval Sunni Muslim legal theorists in their account of how
communication works and how successful interpretation is achieved. Of course, a lot
of traditional work has been done about different Islamic sects and their different
positions over the interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. But these studies fall short
of delving into the underlying communicative principles that motivate their differences
over interpretation.
However, I must acknowledge that Weiss's thesis about 'wad' al-lughah and its
Development' was very beneficial and relevant to few points made in the second
chapter, to which reference will be made in due course.
I must also acknowledge that my knowledge of the basic elements of modern
linguistics and pragmatics was a great help to understanding the Islamic pragmatic
theories. In particular, the Gricean framework contributes considerably to my
formulation of the communication principles.
One of the primary aims of this study is to formulate and explore several PF's
pragmatic theories, principles and views, construct them in the form of models and set
them within a general uniform framework.
Another aim is to reveal a corpus of information and data, which, though highly
relevant to modern pragmatics, is still unknown. I have endeavoured to make this
corpus as accessible as possible to the reader who is acquainted with a basic
knowledge of pragmatics.
The study is not restricted to outlining, systematising and clarifying. In fact, it
goes beyond that so as to incorporate criticism, reconstruction and formulation of the
Muslim legal theorists' own insights.
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The issues discussed in the present work are synchronically rather than
diachronically approached, so the historical development of those issues will remain
beyond the scope of this study.
Although my interpretation of the ideas of the legal theorists is very often an active
ingredient in writing this work, I have tried my best to maintain their own technical
apparatus and theoretical conceptualisations of the key ideas involved in this work and
not to impose the essential elements of the current pragmatic theories on their
formation of the subject. This can be made possible only by the appeal to their own
technical terms and the application of these terms in exposing their insights.
In order to provide a relatively true and precise picture of the Muslim legal
theorists' insights into language and communication, I have consulted most of the
essential works of the Sunni legal theorists, which are available and relevant to my
topic. This includes al-Shafi'I's al-Risalah (d. 204/820), al-Basri's al-Mu'tamad (d.
436/1044), Ibn Hazm's al-'Ihkam (d. 456/1064), al-ShirazI's Sharh al-Luma' and
al-Tabsirah (d. 476/1083), al-Juwayni's al-Burhan (d. 478/1085), al- Sarakhsi's
'Usui (d. 490/1097), al-Ghazali's al-Mustasfa (d. 505/1111), al-Razi's al-Mahsul
(d. 606/1209), al-'Amidi's al-'Ihkam (d. 631/1233), Ibn al-Hajib's Mukhtasar al-
Muntaha l-'UsulI (d. 646/1248), al-Qarati's Shark Tasiqlh al-Fusul (684/1285), al-
Baydawi's Minhaj al-'Usul (d. 685/1286), Ibn Taymiyyah's Fatawa (d. 728/1328)
and Sadr al-Shari'ah's Sharh al-Tawdlh (d. 747/1346). The period covered in this
study starts with al-Shafi'i's al-Risalah (d. 204/820) and ends with Harun al-
Marjani's Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-Tawdlh (d. 1306/1889).
In addition to the PF's works, my references include also:
(i) some medieval Arabic grammar sources like Ibn Ya'ish's Sharh al-Mufassal
(d. 643/1245-6), and al-'Astrabadhi's Sharh al-Radl 'ala 1-Kafiyah (d. 688/1289);
(ii) some Arabic rhetoric sources like 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani's 'Asrar al-
Balaghah and Dala'il al-'I'jaz (d. 471/1078-9);
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(iii) Some Arabic logic sources like al-Ghazali's Mi'yar al-'Ilm fl Faun al-
Mantiq;
(iv) Arabic philology (al-Suyutl's al-Muzhir fi 'Ulvm al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha
(d. 911/1505)).
Finally, it is hoped that this work will be seen as a general introduction to what
might be called 'medieval Islamic pragmatics', since it introduces a number of the
Muslim legal theorists' pragmatic insights in a coherent form and constructs from the
data available several theories which lend themselves to a unified framework.
1.4. A note on terminology
The most important problem encountered in this work is finding exact English
equivalents to Arabic terms. In dealing with this problem, I have followed a pragmatic
rather than a predetermined approach in translating the technical terms. In many cases,
one has to choose one of two methods: intensional or extensional translation. I very
often intend to follow the former, although the latter is occasionally preferred.
One disadvantage of the intensional method is making the English counterpart of
an Arabic term look like a literal equivalent to it. Another is that the connotations and
the technical history of the term will be lost. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way
in the case of intensional translation to avoid the first disadvantage when the two
languages conceptualise the concept to be translated differently. If the term is, by
contrast, conceptualised indifferently, one still runs the risk of the second
disadvantage. However, in order to avoid this obstacle in the present study I have
used the original term either alone or with its English equivalent whenever necessary.
One of the most important disadvantages of the extensional method, on the other
hand, is that one has to apply, for the translation of a single Arabic term, as many
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different English words as the context requires whenever the Arabic term denotes
different senses in different contexts.
1.5. The structure of the study
As indicated earlier, this study deals with two models of communication: the
mainstream model and the salafite one. Since the two models overlap to a
considerable extent, I will make the more complex one, which is the mainstream
model the focus of attention. This will be reflected in the space allotted to it and to the
organisation of the study. Thus, with the exception of the fourth chapter which deals
with the salafite model, all the other chapters deal primarily with the mainstream views
on linguistic and communicative issues.
The present chapter provides the reader with a general background about the topics
to be discussed in this study, including an informal outline of the legal theorists'
pragmatic insights into textual communication.
The second chapter deals with the distinction drawn by the mainstream between
wad' and use which constitute the key to their model. Each utterance produced by a
speaker or interpreted by a hearer is processed with reference to these two notions.
So, it will be a concern of mine in this chapter to explain which aspects of an utterance
pertain to wad' and which aspects belong to use. Under wad' two distinctions will be
examined: the distinction between universal and particular wad' and the distinction
between general and specific wad'. Under 'use' two related notions will be
discussed: intention and context.
The third chapter investigates the notion haml (interpretation) which makes up the
third constitutive factor in the mainstream model. In this chapter, I will distinguish
between haml, understanding and fiqh, and discuss context from the addressee's point
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of view. An account of the mainstream model of interpretation is provided via
examining five communicative principles: the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to
Make his Intention Manifest, the Principle of the Speaker's Truthfulness, the Principle
of 'I'mal, the Principle of Immediacy and the Principle of Istishab.
The fourth chapter deals with the salafite model of communication. This is taken
up through a formulation of what I call 'Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual theory of
interpretation'. My formulation of this theory displays its coherence by delving into
its underlying philosophical principles. This involves relating it to his relevant
ontological, epistemological and theological outlook. Besides, the inquiry includes his
theory of cognitive relativism, his contextual theory of definition and his views on
language, meaningfulness, the establishment-use dichotomy, meaning-intention
distinction and signification. More important is his critical view of the distinction
between literal and non-literal meaning, and his model of interpretation.
The final chapter is concerned with two significational classifications: a semiotic
classification and a text-based classification. The former involves natural, rational and
wad'-based signification (which is divided into equivalence-signification (dalalat
mutabaqah), incorporational signification (dalalat tadammun) and implicational
signification (dalalat iltizam), the latter having two versions: the Hanafi version,
which includes express meaning ('ibarat al-nass), alluded meaning ('isharat al-
nass), inferred meaning (dalalat al-nass) and required meaning (iqtida' al-nass), and
the Shafi 'I version, which includes required signification (dalalat al-iqtida'), alluded
signification (dalalat al-'isharah), indicated signification (dalalat al-tanbih wa-1-
'Ima') and implicated signification (dalalat al-mafhum). Implicated signification is
divided into two types: congruent implicature (mafhum al-muwafaqah), which is
approved by the Hanafls and counter-implicature (mafhum al-mukhalafah) whose





The Muslim legal theorists did not unswervingly concern themselves with
differentiating between the formal and functional study of meaning or with the
distinction drawn in modern linguistics between semantic and pragmatic explanations.
This was probably because their main motive for inquiry was chiefly to set up the
general principles of an approach to comprehend the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. In
other words, the scholars of the PF, as Muslim legal theorists, felt obliged, by virtue
of their commitment to the commands of the Islamic religion, not only to try to
understand the religious texts as accurately as they could, but also to derive from them
the judgements concerning the life of the Muslims in this world and the hereafter.
The Western scholars of language, by contrast, started with investigations into the
philosophy of language, focusing mainly upon the structures of languages, i.e.
language as a system rather than as behaviour. When modern linguists, however, re¬
examined (particularly in the wake of the Saussurean distinction between langue and
parole and more influentially after Morris's semiotic trichotomy of syntax, semantics
and pragmatics) the ability of the traditional message-model of communication to
account for how communication works, they realised that its plausibility was
questionable. Consequently, they found themselves in a position where they had to
follow a fresh approach that takes into account pragmatic considerations, which had
almost generally been neglected by the preceding traditional linguists.
Nonetheless, it might be argued that the legal theorists were more or less aware of
the difference between the two levels of language and speech, but that they were much
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more interested in distinguishing between what they call wad' (establishment)1 and
isti'mal (use), which together with signification and interpretation are seen as the
main constitutive factors of communication. The rough similarity between the two
pairs (i.e. langue and parole on the one hand and wad' and use on the other hand) is
fairly striking and may not be overlooked in any serious study of this area of
investigation. Correspondingly, the relation that holds between language and wad',
for example, was, even though expressed in a rather vague way, noticed by
B.G.Weiss who states:
Lughah [language] and wad' are here, as elsewhere, closely related
terms; the knowledge of one is the same as the knowledge of the
other.2
This relation can be clarified, as Weiss briefly did, by invoking the notion
'knowledge'. The knowledge of wad', which involves both the wad' of vocabulary
and grammatical elements, including morphological and syntactic patterns, implies the
knowledge of language, in its capacity as a combination of lexicon and grammar, on
the grounds that language is nothing, in fact, but the 'established' expressions (al-lafz
al-mawdv')3 Similarly if we compare the Saussurean notion of 'parole' with the
notion of 'use' in Islamic legal thought, we will see on the whole a broad similarity
between them for both pertain to the performance of language in actual situations.4
[I could not find a single word to stand for the Arabic term wad', so I will use the
following three different English words to get the import of this term, the preference of
one of these terms over the other on a particular occasion depends on its relevance to
the context:
(i) 'to establish' (which represents the literal meaning of the Arabic word wad');
(ii) 'to assign' (in contexts like 'to assign a particular expression to a particular
meaning');
(iii) 'to designate' (in contexts like 'whether expressions are designed to be
designations for mental images or external-entities').
However, I will use the term wad' in its Arabic form whenever I find it more
appropriate.
^B.G.Weiss, "Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "wad' al-lughah"
and its Development", pp. 61-62.
^Al-Ruhawi, p. 51.
^For comparison see al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, pp. 20-22; Saussure, F.D.E., Cours de
Linguistique general (Paris: Payot, 1968), pp. 30-38.
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However, there is an important difference between the legal theorists' and the
Saussurean account of language which will be explained later (cf. 5.2).
2.2. Wad'
One discussion of the notion wad' in the PF literature will begin with a definition
whose purpose is to show the way in which the notion is used in the Arabic
intellectual tradition. According to Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285), wad' is
said to be
employed to make an expression as a sign for a meaning [...] (this is
what is called linguistic wad'), and to the use of an expression in a
particular meaning so currently that this meaning becomes more well
known than its other meaning(s) (and this applies to the legal (al-
shar'I) [...], general conventional ('urfi 'amm) [...] and special
conventional, or technical, ('urfi khass) wad').^
Al-Qarafi illustrates the latter class of wad' (i.e. the non-linguistic wad') by three
different examples, each of which represents one of the subclasses mentioned above:
The first example is salak (prayer), which in terms of the linguistic wad' means
du 'a' (call) in its general sense. This term was later given a special meaning, i.e. that
sort of religious ceremony practised by Muslims five times a day. This new meaning
represents the legal wad', for it had occurred by virtue of shari'ah (i.e. the revealed
law of Islam).
The second example is dabbak, which literally means 'a moving creature'. This
literal meaning is called 'linguistic meaning' (al-ma'na 1-lughawi) since it is the
meaning of an expression. Al-Qarafi reports that the word (dabbah) came to mean
(horse) as in Iraq or (donkey) as in Egypt in his time. This type of narrowing of
meaning is commonly called 'general conventional wad' (wad' 'urfi 'amm).
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p.20.
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The last example is jawhar (substance) qua a recognised theological term. Al-
Qarafi gives this example to show what is meant by the term 'special conventional
wad", which is applied to any operation of setting up a technical term in a given field
of knowledge.1
Having defined the term wad' in the way mentioned above, al-Qarafi adds that this
term is also employed, in connection with the controversy over whether or not the
figurative use of terms depends on wad', to the extent that the single use of a given
item by an Arab on a given occasion and only on that occasion is sufficient to
underpin its wad'.2 The word wad', therefore, comes to be applied to any usage that
has already been heard, on condition that it introduces into the language a new union
between an expression and a meaning. The word 'use' (isti'mal) in its technical
sense is, however, reserved for producing an expression, and intending its
designation (I shall return to the term later).
With reference to the distinction between language and speech, the question that
needs to be answered here is why is it that the legal theorists and Muslim thinkers in
general appeal to the term wad' instead of talking directly about language proper?
One possible answer to this question may partly be related to the well-known
belief that has been so influential in Islamic thought, i.e. 'every action must have a
maker and each created thing must have a creator'. Accordingly, language, as
everything else, must have been created by someone. What is so special about
Arabic, however, is that it has a unique status from the doctrinal point of view, which
is reflected by its presumed eloquence. The inimitability of Arabic is said to make the
way in which it is established and its creator (establisher, as it were) well worth
investigating. This can be regarded as a major underlying motive for the utilisation of
the notion wad' as a theoretical tool in any discussion of language and
^See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 20-21.
2Ibidp. 22.
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communication. However, it might be the case that the notion wad' is
methodologically designed to refer to the given lexical units and the abstract
grammatical patterns, which the speaker has to accept in order to make his
communication successful.
In spite of the controversy concerning who was the creator of language, Muslim
thinkers display a similarity of approach with regard to the extended treatment of the
notion wadOne of the influential matters agreed upon in this regard is that the
creator of language, whether it is man or Allah, is so wise that his creation is devoid
of anything which might render it useless. Thus, every linguistic element must have
been assigned to a given meaning. Therefore, for someone to understand a particular
discourse, he must have the knowledge of the wad' of the language in terms of which
the communication takes place.1 If the utterance is unambiguous, the knowledge of
wad' will be sufficient to enable the recipient to grasp it. If not, the intention of the
speaker will not be correctly understood except when there is some contextual
evidence associated with the utterance in question.^
2.2.1. Universal & particular wad'
The legal theorists make several classifications concerning the term wad'. Since
our concern with the notion wad' is mainly restricted to what is related to the
distinction between wad' and use, we will particularly concentrate on the difference
between universal and particular wad' as well as the difference between general and
specific wad' because of their strong connection with the wad'-use distinction.
In Islamic thought, the term 'particulars' (al-juz'iyyat) is applied, to expressions
referring to those things whose concepts are not in common to others. To put it 'Abu
ISee al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 1/339.
2See ibid.
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Hamid al-Ghazali's way (d. 505/1111): particular (al-juz'I) is that thing whose
conceptualisation in itself prevents other things from falling under its concept; such as
'Zayd' (as a proper name), 'this tree' and 'this horse'. 1 The conceptualisation of
'universal' (al-kulli), in contrast, does not prevent others from falling within its
concept like 'man', 'horse' and 'tree'. The phrase "in itself' is mentioned in the
definition of 'particular' to exclude such expressions as 'sun' which, in spite of being
singular in the external world, is not considered to be particular in terms of its
concept, for the speaker can form a universal concept of it in his mind. In other
words, it is the mental, not the external, existence that is regarded as the appropriate
criterion by which an expression can be said to refer to either a universal or particular
entity.
This view is closely related to the controversy over the manner in which
expressions are assigned to their meanings. The controversy took the form of
whether expressions were designations for the mental representations of their referents
in the real world or for the extra-mental entities themselves. Jalal al-Dln 1-SuyutI (d.
911/1505) reported that the latter was the view of 'Abu 'Ishaq al-ShirazI (d.
476/1083),2 whereas the former was the view of Fakhr al-Dln al-Razi and his
followers.^
Al-Razi argues that expressions change according to the changes in the mental
image rising in the speaker's mind. He provides two arguments to support his view.
The first, which concerns single items (al-mufradat), is that if you see a body
from a distance and you think of it as a rock, you will call it a rock. If you come near
to it and realise that it was an animal; but you thought of it as a bird, you will call it a
1'Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Mi'yar al-'Ilm fl Faiw al-Mantiq, 4th edn. (Beirut: Dar
al-'Audalus, 1983), p. 43.
^Al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/186.
3Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-Muzhir fl 'Ulum al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha, ed.
Muhammad 'Ahmad Jad al-Mawla, 'All Muhammad al-Bijawi and Muhammad ai-Fadl
Tbriihim (Dar al-Fikr, n.d.), 1/42.
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bird. If you come closer to it and it turns out to be a man, you will call it a man. This
shows that the same object may be named differently according to the mental
representation, which it is thought to conjure up in the speaker's mind. On this basis
it is possible that each mental representation conjures up a corresponding wad1
The second, which concerns constructions (al-murakkabat), is that if you say
'Zayd has stood up', this utterance will not mean that Zayd has indeed stood up;
rather, all it means is that you have stated that "Zayd has stood up" and reported it.
Only if we recognise that the statement is empirically true, it will be taken as a sign for
a state of affairs in the external world, which he calls al-wujud al-khariji (the external
existence).2
However, al-Suyuti states that the view that expressions are designations for
external entities (i.e. al-Shira/I's view) is the select one. He further mentions that al-
Razi's argument concerning the single items was controverted by some scholars on
account of the fact that the variation in the names at each stage in the process of
thinking is not, in fact, due to any change in the speaker's mental representation, but
to the belief that the entities that have been visualised are actually so in the external
world.3
Nonetheless, al-Shlrazi's view is open to many lines of criticism. I shall mention
the following:
(i)- If expressions were designations for the external entities, the designations
would be terminated the moment those objects ceased to exist.
^Al-Razi, 1/68; see ibid, 1/42.
2Ibid, 1/68.
^SeeJalal al-DIn al-Suyuti, al-Muzhir fi 'Ulum al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha, 1/42.
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(ii)- If wad' were for the external entities proper, we would need a special
expression for each particular entity to serve as a designation for it. This is obviously
impossible.
In defending that position, the advocates of this view invoke the notion 'analogy'
(al-qiyas). Thus, they say that although the Arabs have established a lexicon for
those particular entities they had experienced; and that although those entities had
vanished and then were replaced by other individuals, nonetheless Arabic speakers
still use the 'old' lexical items for new objects by virtue of analogy. 1
Since some Muslim thinkers view the pure Arabs as the makers (or the
establishers) of the Arabic language, i.e. the sole authority entitled to assign
expressions to meanings, all usages transmitted from the Arabs must be regarded not
only as utterances performed to function as a means of communication, but also as
acts manifesting their will of wad', hence the term a 'tested example' (shahid), which
is applied to utterances transmitted from the pure Arabs and deemed as examples
which must be followed by speakers who wish to speak correct Arabic.
To go back to the view that expressions are meant to be designations for concepts
(or mental images), which was adopted by some Muslim philosophers, e.g. 'Abu
Nasr al-Farabi (d. 339/950), 'Abu 'AH al-Husayn Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037) and 'Abu-
Hamid al-GhazaH and maintained by al-Razi, it seems that this view has dominated the
Hterature concerning the notion wad' in the PF.
According to this view, when the fluent Arabic speaker, who was the first to use
the word 'asad (lion) uttered this word, he did not intend to apply it merely to that
particular 'lion', which was meant by the speaker's utterance, but also to any animal
that has the same properties of that particular 'lion'. Consequently, any speaker of
ISee al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p.413; al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma ', 1/186.
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Arabic can use the word 'lion' whenever he wants as a sign for that animal. This can
be applied to the various aspects of language, whether they are lexical or grammatical.
Al-Qarafi who is one of the proponents of this majority view explained how the
Arabs have assigned expressions to meanings:
The Arabs have not 'established' [expressions] for what they saw with
their own eyes, but, for what they pictured in their minds. What arose
in the mind in the past is identical to that which arises in the mind now
[...]. Nothing has been 'established' for the external entities except
proper names. 1
The point which has to be made here is that although the legal theorists (e.g. al-
Qarafi ) apply the term wad' to the process of introducing proper names, it should be
noted that such names have not, as far as the notion of the wad' of Arabic is
concerned, been treated in the literature of Arabic as part of a language. The Arab
grammarians, who are considered to be the authoritative arbiters as to the formal
characteristics of Arabic, state, as Ya'ish Ibn Ya'Ish (d. 643/1245) reports, that
proper names can be substituted and changed without changing the character of the
language. This is, however, not true of common names, for if you called a man a
horse or a horse a camel, that would be tantamount to changing the language.2 Al-
Taftazani (d. 791/1389) puts it more clearly when he points out that "proper names,
qua their wad' as proper names, cannot be attributed to a particular language rather
than another".^
Given that proper names are not regarded as part of the language, it may,
therefore, be said that what al-Qarafi says above is regarded as applicable to
universals. The establisher of language (wadi' al-lughah), according to this
conceptual view, never concerns himself with particulars, rather, he always
1Al-Qarafi, Sbarh Tajiqih, p.413.
^Muwaffaq al-Din Ya'ish b. 'AH b. Ya'ish, Sharh al-Mufassal (Beirut: 'Alam al-
Kutub, n.d.), 1/27.
^Al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/171. See, also, al-Basri, 1/10-11.
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'establishes' universals. Not only lexical items are 'established' in such a way, but
also grammatical patterns. To put it in the legal theorists' own terms:
Just as the establisher of language has assigned each common name to
a universal entity 'haqiqah kulliyyah' without going into the
particulars subsumed under it, he has assigned each constructional
pattern (kull wahid min al-hay'at al-tarklbiyyah) to its universal
meaning without going into the particulars of that pattern. 1
The well-known example for the latter kind wad' is the wad' of 'the subject' (al-
fa'il). In this view the wad' of, say, zaydun in qama zaydun (Zayd has stood up) as
a subject is not meant to apply to this particular entity above, but to all entities that can
perform its function in this particular slot. Thus, the function of 'Zaydun' as a subject
in the above example is generalised or abstracted into a universal fact.2
Therefore, any item which functions as a 'subject' would be regarded as correct
Arabic provided that the 'subject' is in the nominative case and it meets all the other
conditions that are applicable to subjects. The realisation of this view in individual
instances is not considered to happen by analogy, and need not to be so, since it is
already subsumed under the so-called 'universal fact'. This is exactly what al-Shaiif
al-Jurjanl (d. 816/1413) means when he points out that "When we put a given subject
that has never been heard before in the nominative case, what is being done in effect is
not an application of analogy, but the realisation of a universal rule".^ However, the
view that the wad' of constructions was carried out by the pure Arabs, was subject to
criticism. This criticism, which was put forward by some legal theorists,
grammarians and other Muslim thinkers in general, could not, even though it led to the
introduction of significant ideas about the nature of language, be taken to refute the
fact that constructional patterns are established, mainly because it is directed at the
1 Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjani, al-'Isharat wa-l-Tanbihat fl 'Ilm al-
Balaghah , ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr, 1982), P.23.
2-Sec al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqih, p. 413.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/183.
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view that constructions are individually established which is not an integral part of the
thinking of the advocates of the conceptual view. The criticism is as follows:
That which signifies by wad', as is the case with 'words' (mufradat)
and 'idioms' (al-murakkabat al-qa'imah maqamaha), must be listed
and not added to. Consequently if utterances signified by virtue of
wad', they would be treated in this manner, and also, just as we
cannot use any word unless it has been used before, we would not
speak utterances that had never been used before. Since this is not
being the case, this would be evidence for the fact that utterances do
not signify by virtue of wad1
It is worth mentioning here that Jamal al-Dln Ibn Malik (d. 672/1273), who
develops this argument, introduces a striking idea, which has long been of great
importance in modern linguistics since it was introduced by Chomsky, namely the
idea that speakers, by virtue of their linguistic competence, can perform utterances that
have never been heard before.
It is not the knowledge of wad', but the intellectual capacity (al-'aql) which,
according to Ibn Malik, can deal with the relationships that hold between words in
sentences. This 'intellectual' view, was also criticised on the grounds that, just as
they have different lexicons, languages vary in terms of their constructional patterns:
The governing entity (al-mudaf) precedes the governed entity of a
genitive construction (al-mudaf 'ilayh) in some languages whereas
the contrary is true in other languages. If constructions had to do with
the intellect, the meaning would equally be understood; making no
difference whether the governing entity precedes its partner or not.2
The answer to Ibn Malik's criticism from the viewpoint of the advocates of the
view that constructions cannot be understood without the knowledge of wad', as
formed by Muhammad al-Zarkashi (d. 794/1392), was that:
'.Jalal al-Din al-Suyutl, al-Muzhir fi 'Ulum al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha, 1/43. The
Arabic text reads as follows: ('inna 1-dalla bi-l-wad'i la budda min 'ihsa'ihi wa-
man'i 1-isti'nafi fih, kama kana fi 1-mufradati wa-1-murakkabati 1-qa'imati
maqamaha, fa-law kana 1-kalamu dallan bi-l-wad'i wajaba dhalika fihi, wa-lam
yakun 'an natakallama bi-kalamin lam nusbaq 'ilayhi, kama lam nasta'mil fi 1-




What the Arabs have 'established' is the types of constructions
('anwa' al-mucakkabat) rather than the particulars of those types.
They have 'established' the category of 'the subject' (bab al-fa'il) in
order to predicate every action to its maker or doer, but they have not
'established' the particular subjects [...]. This is true of all types of
constructions. 1
RadI al-Dln al-'Astarabadhi (d. 688/1289) considers this issue with greater depth
and explains the difference between the wad' of lexical items and that of
constructional patterns:
The establisher of language tends to establish either particular
'transmission-dependent expressions' ('alfaz mu'ayyanah
sama'iyyah), the knowledge of which is dependent on lexicology
('ilm al-1ughah), or a canon (qanun) by which we can know either the
analogical items (al-mufradat al-qiyasiyyah) or [...] the analogical
constructions (al-mvrakkabat al-qiyasiyyah).2
By the canons by which one can know the analogical items he means what can
roughly be called 'the derivational rules of word formation, which, according to al-
Radl, are interpretable in relation to morphology. On the other hand, by the canons by
which one can know the analogical constructions he refers to both the inflectional
rules of word formation, "for the knowledge of which you need to consult
morphology" and the grammatical rules of sentence formation, "for the knowledge of
which syntax is needed".^
It seems to me that one of the significant distinctions made by al-Radl in the above
quotation is the distinction between the linguistic elements that have lexical meanings,
i.e. what he calls 'transmission-dependent expressions' and linguistic elements that
have grammatical functions, i.e. what he calls 'analogical expressions'. This
distinction is similar to Martinet's distinction between lexical and grammatical
1 Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-Muzhir fi 'Ulum al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha, 1/44.
-Radi 1-Din al-'AstarabadhI, Sharh al-Radl 'ala 1-Kafiyah, ed. Yusuf Hasan 'Umar
(Banghazi, Libya: Manshurat Jami'at Banghazi, 1978), 1/25.
^Ibid.
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monemes1 (morphemes). I will not concern myself with this correspondence here;
rather I shall concentrate on the distinction between the two types of wad', namely the
wad' of individuals (al-wad' al-shakhsi) and that of patterns (al-wad' al-naw'I) or,
as Weiss renders them, "isolative and subsumptive wad"'.2
The fundamental difference between the two types of wad' relates to the fact that
the former is defined as singling out (ifrad) an expression for a particular meaning,
whereas the latter is usually applied to setting up a general grammatical rule. This
means that every speaker who wishes to learn Arabic is required to know each
individual lexical item he needs in the communicative situation in which he might
potentially be involved in order for him to be said to have a knowledge of the
individual wad'.
Unlike the knowledge of the individual wad', the knowledge of universal wad'
enables the speaker to create a new lexically meaningless but grammatically
meaningful 'utterance' that has never been introduced before, and which can rightly be
attributed to a potential Arabic 'sentence'. Such an utterance can simply be
transformed into an actual meaningful Arabic utterance by, say, lexicalizing it.
Consider the following:
(1) saghama l-saghimu mutasaghghimasi [CaCaCa al-CaCiCu MutaCaCCiCan],3
(2)
a- saraqa 1-sariqu mutakhaffiyaji.
b- 'akala 1-sa'imu mutalahhifan.
c- dhahaba 1-qatilu mutawa"idan.
' See A., Martinet, A Functional View ofLanguage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962),
pp. 50-51; idem, Elements ofGeneral Linguistics, trans. E Palmer (London: Faber,
1964), pp. 110-111.
2b.G.Weiss, "Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of "wad' al-lughah"
and its Development", p. 94.
^C stands for consonants which are not part of the morphological patterns. The
vowels, the definite article and tanwln are represented as they are.
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Although the abstract pattern being 'established' in a subsumptive way cannot be
lexically processed, it is still possible for native Arabic speakers to regard a potential
sentence as realisable in terms of the subsumptive wad' of Arabic. Clearly the
knowledge of subsumptive wad' can enable the speaker to generate (the word is being
used in its pretheoretical sense) an infinite number of utterances of the type
exemplified in (2). According to the view that languages consist of a set of universal
wad's, each utterance of the type we find in (2), would be regarded as an actual
manifestation of the 'established' pattern represented in (1).
Ibn Khaldun (d. 808/1406), who seems to hold this view, likens the producer of
a spoken utterance to a builder or weaver while the proper mental form (al-surah al-
dhihniyyah al-muntabiqah) is likened to the mould used in the building process, or
the loom in weaving. 1 Thus, what the producer of an utterance does when he speaks
is to build "his utterance in the 'moulds' used by 'the Arabs'". Such mental patterns
(i.e. moulds or looms) "are known only to those who have expert knowledge of
'Arabic' speech, such that in their minds they have an absolute universal mould,
which is the result of abstraction from specific individual moulds".^
To relate this view to the distinction between language (or more precisely wad')
and use, we can say that the production of an utterance can be attributed partly to
language and partly to use. What belongs to language is the set of the grammatical
patterns and the lexical units being used in accord with wad'. What pertains to use,
on the other hand, is the selection of the very particular lexical units as well as the
selection of the very particular grammatical patterns. Such a selection is intended to be
typically controlled by the speaker's communicative intention. Accordingly, the
judgement that a given sentence is not well-formed should be ascribed to its being
ISee Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Taqaddum, 1322 A.H.), p.
474.
^Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 2nd ed, trans. Franz
Rosenthal (U.S.A: Princeton University Press, 1980), 3/380.
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incompatible with the common constructional patterns of the language in question
whereas the judgement that an utterance is, for instance, true or false, conceivable or
inconceivable, should be ascribed to the speakers' estimation. This is simply because
Language [according to 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 471/1078] tends
not to state nor to affirm or disaffirm[...]. That is to say, stating that
'beating' is Zayd's action or not, and that 'illness' is his condition or
not, is something made by the speaker and is a claim he assumes.
Consequently, whatever is levelled at this claim whether- it is belief,
accusation of lying, acknowledgement, denial, approving or
disapproving- is in fact a reaction directed to the speaker and has
absolutely nothing to do with language. 1
2.2.2. General & specific wad'
We shall turn now to the distinction between general and specific wad', which is
related to the universal versus particular distinction discussed above. It seems that the
simplest way of dealing with this classification is to approach it in terms of the
'generality' ('umum) and 'individuality' (khusus) of both expressions and meanings.
According to al-Taftazani, the attention of the establisher during the assignment of
an expression to a meaning can be directed to either of the following:
(i)- The individuality of both the expression and the meaning, in which cases the
establisher singles out a specific expression for a specific object, e.g. the particular
expression 'Zayd' for the very particular person.
(ii)- The individuality of the expression and the generality of the meaning, in
which cases the establisher singles out a specific expression for a general meaning or
generic signification, e.g. the very particular expression 'man' for every man.
1 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani, 'Asrar al-Balaghah, ed. H., Ritter, 3rd edn. (Beirut: Dar
al-MasIrah, 1983), pp. 345-347.
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(iii)- The generality of the expression and the individuality of the meaning, in
which cases the establisher considers, not a particular expression but, a universal (or
an abstract) pattern, e.g. the pattern Fa'il {CaCiC} (C stands for consonants), which
is typically used for infinitive tri-consonantal lexemes in Arabic to indicate, in any
given occasion, 'the active participle' (ism al-fa'il) of the corresponding lexeme. 1
Al-Taftazanl's classification does not constitute the common classification in the
PF literature on wad' in terms of both the approach which underlies it and the
terminology in which it is couched, nor is it the majority view in terms of its
application to the connection between the expression and the meaning in linguistic
wad'. Instead of talking about expression and meaning, the common custom of the
legal theorists is to speak about wad' and 'object' al-mawdv' lah (i.e. meaning).
Regardless of the approach, terminology and application, it is most likely that the
underlying reason behind this classification is the view among the legal theorists and
others who are interested in the notion of wad' in general that there is something
peculiar to the personal pronouns, demonstrative nouns, relative pronouns, definite
noun phrase (al-mu'arraf bi -al ) and proper names with respect to the notion wad'.
One of the questions which occupied the legal theorists was how can the same
pronoun or any of the other categories mentioned above be used to refer to different
referents on different occasions? Another question was why cannot these categories
be meaningful when they lack their referents? The answers to these questions led to
answers to two other important questions, namely which aspect of each one of these
categories can be attributed to wad' and which to use?
One possible answer to the first two questions can be obtained from 'Adud al-
Millah wa-1-Dln in his Commentary on Ibn al-Hajib (d. 646/1248). He points out
that such expressions as demonstrative, personal and relative pronouns are assigned in
ISee al-Taftaza.nl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al- 'Adud, 1/187-188.
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a general manner to specific objects, 1 i.e. the establisher is not concerned with the
individuality of such expressions; rather, his concern is exclusively to single out the
expression hadha (this), for example, for every particular relevant referent and 'ana
(I) for every speaker and alladhl ('who/which' for masculine singular) for every
referent identified by a relative clause.2 This kind of wad' is different from the wad'
of such expressions as 'man' in that 'the object' (al-mawdu' lah) in the case of 'man'
is general whereas the demonstrative pronouns and the other above categories are
assigned, in consideration of the general meaning to the individuals subsumed under
that general meaning.3 'Adud al-Millah supported his view by arguing that if 'man'
was used, exclusively for Zayd, it would be regarded as figurative in usage whereas if
the generic meaning of 'man' (which is true of Zayd and others who are included
under the concept of 'man') is considered, it would be regarded as displaying literal
usage (haqlqah). By contrast, if hadha ('this' for male), 'ana (I) or alladhl
(who/which for masculine singular) is used to refer to individuals, it would be
regarded as a literal usage. In fact, they are never used in the general sense, i.e. one
never says 'this' nor 'I' with reference to an undefined referent.^
Al-Taftazani's view, which was outlined above is, however, not different from
'Adud al-Millah's view on this matter in that, even though the former scholar places
expressions of this kind under class (ii), he nevertheless draws a distinction between
them and expressions like 'man'.5
In this regard it would be interesting to consider al-Qarafi's views on this subject





5See ai-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/188.
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By the personal pronoun (al-mudmar) al-Qarafi means that expression which
requires for its definition either another independent expression (in the case of the
third personal pronoun) or some contextual evidence to show what the referent is (in
the case of the first and second personal pronoun). 1 Al-Qarafi's interest in this issue
arises from his concern with whether the meanings of the pronouns can be regarded as
universal or particular. He begins by pointing out that the majority view is that the
pronouns are particular. The arguments adduced in this regard are as follows:
First, the Arab grammarians have unanimously agreed that the personal pronouns
are definite nouns (ma'arif), which presupposes that they are particular, in
contradistinction to entities that are indefinite (nakirah), which are universal, because
they apply to an infinite number of referents.
Second, if the personal pronouns were universal, they would necessarily be
capable of applying to something else other than the corresponding particular
individuals. Thus, according to the rational rule (al-qa'idah al-'aqliyyah): "What
signifies the more general does not signify the more specific", the personal pronouns
signify no particular individuals at all. But this is not the case with respect to the
personal pronouns, because their referents can be identified, for example the 'I' must
refer to the particular speaker.^
Al-Qarafi points out that a minority of the legal theorists, including himself, hold
the opposite view, which demands that the personal pronouns be regarded as
universal. In putting forward this view, he develops the following argument:
If the concept of personal pronoun was particular, it would not be true
of another individual except by another wad' as is the case with the
wad' of proper names, which, by virtue of being particular, are not
applicable to any individual other than the one to which they are
assigned except if sanctioned by another wad3
ISee al-Qarafl, Sharh Tanqih, p. 33.
2See ibid., pp. 34-35.
3Ibid., p. 35.
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To bring the view that personal pronouns are universal within the orbit of the
rational rule "What signifies the more general does not signify the more specific", al-
Qarafi ascribes the restriction of the reference of the definite noun to a particular
individual to two factors:
a- The assignment of an expression to the individuality of an individual. This is
the case with proper names like Zayd which is especially assigned to a certain person
and consequently refers merely to that person.
Here, it is not the case that Zayd signifies 'the more general' (i. e. more than one
individual) and 'the more specific' (i.e. the very particular person) simultaneously,
within the proviso that the proper name Zayd can refer to as many individuals as we
wish but each time with a different wad
b- The expression is assigned to a general meaning and the situation (al-wdqi')
proves that the designation of the expression has been restricted to a particular
individual. That is to say, the reference of the expression to that particular individual
is not due to its being assigned to it but to the restriction of its designation to it. 1 So if
you say 'I', the pronoun 'I' will refer to you and you alone and the recipient will rely
in identifying the referent of this pronoun on the fact that the situation is that nobody
else say 'I' in this particular occasion. This account is applicable not only to personal
names but also to the rest of the definite nouns. Therefore, if one says 'I have seen
the judge (al-qadl) of Mecca', the utterance will refer to the judge (al-qadl) of Mecca
at that time and it will refer to another judge of Mecca if it is uttered on another
occasion and so forth.2
To sum up al-Qaraft's account of the personal pronouns (and definite nouns in
general) we may say that he believes that the definite nouns are 'established' in so
*See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 35-36.
^See ibid., p. 35.
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general a manner that they are valid to refer to any relevant entity in the actual speech
situation and that the participants in the process of communication are entitled to
determine their references. Thus, the universal signification of these kinds of
expressions is determined by virtue of wad' but their particular reference is governed
by use.
In connection with the fact that each one of the personal pronouns, demonstrative
nouns, etc., can refer to different individuals on different occasions, one might raise
the question why could not they be regarded as homonymous?
Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl rules out this solution because, for example, the expression T
has not been assigned to its various referents by a multi-wad' but by a single act of
wad' only.*
Thus, the ambiguity of expressions, as al-Qarafi points out, is not caused
exclusively by the facts of linguistic wad' but may also be ascribed to what he calls
'rational possibility' (al-tajwiz al-'aqll). The distinction between the wad '-based
ambiguity and rationally-based ambiguity is very crucial to our subject matter, for it
presupposes that ambiguity can be inherent in the language and can also result from its
use.
2.3. Use
The term isti 'mal (use) in the PF literature is commonly applied, but it is rarely
defined. The most straightforward definition of this term which I have come across in
the works on the PF is given by al-Qarafi. According to him:
Use refers to the production of an expression with intending either its
literal meaning (in the case of literal usage) or non literal meaning on
1Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, HashiyaJti 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/188.
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the strength of a 'relation' between the literal and non literal meaning
(in the case of figurative usage).!
The first point to comment on in this definition is that the term 'use' is not
intended to involve the hearer. It is most likely that it is deliberately excluded in order
to be covered by the term haml (interpretation) which is employed to refer explicitly to
the interpretation of the speaker's utterance by the hearer. Having introduced the
threefold distinction between wad', use and interpretation, and defined each one of
these terms, al-Qarafi states that "wad' is preceding (sabiq), interpretation is
subsequent (lahiq) and use is middle (mutawassit). 2 The importance of this
statement relates to the fact that it portrays the process of communication as a product
of at least three different elements, namely wad', use and interpretation. Each element
has its own maker and takes place at a different time. The intermediate element, i.e.
the user, who concerns us at the moment plays the most significant role in the
communicative process, for he is the person whose communicative intention is the
centre or axis around which the communicative process moves.
2.3.1. Intention
A further point to notice in al-Qarafi's definition mentioned above concerns the
notion of 'intention' (al-qasd or al-'iradah ) which was the subject of fierce
controversy in the course of the long debate concerning the createdness of the Holy
Qur'asi. We shall not go into the details of this debate or its theological dimensions
here, instead, we will focus on the pragmatic aspects of this issue. The Mu 'tazills
(an early Islamic sect who took part in this debate) uphold the belief that any action of
issuing a command ('amr) taking the form if'al (Do!) involves three kinds of
intentions or wills (iradat):
*Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 20.
21bid., p. 22.
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(i) -the intention of producing the form if'al;
(ii) -the intention of its signification as a command; and
(iii) -the intention of getting the addressee to obey. ^
The first intention is designed to exclude any command that might be issued by a
sleeper in the course of his sleep. The second is designed to exclude such things as
threat, e.g. if'al ma tasha' wa-satara (lit, do what you want to do and you will see)
and inviting somebody to enter your house, e.g. udkhul (come in) and so on. The
last intention is designed to exclude situations involving indirect speech. Without the
occurrence of the three intentions the form if'al (do) cannot be a form of command.
The Mu 'tazilis argue that without the presence of intention we cannot distinguish
whether a given form is a command or threat because intention is the sole signifying
means.^
The Sunni scholars3 concede the first kind of intention and deny the involvement
of the other two in the operation of command. They argue that the intention of the
speaker does not serve as a means of underlining the signification of command (or
other meanings). In other words, this signification is understood, not through the
speaker's intention but, by the context of situation (qara'in al-'ahwal) according to
'Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni,^ or by the facts of wad' in the case of literal usage
(al-haqiqah) and by context in the case of figurative usage as may be inferred from
al-Qarafi.5
ISee; al-Juwayni, 1/204; 'Adud, 2/78; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/414.
2A1-Razl, 1/198.
2The term Sunnl in this particular context is being used in a narrower sense than
elsewhere in the present study where it is used in opposition to Shi'I.
^Al-Juwaynl, 1/211.
^Al-Qarafi, SharJh Tanqih, p. 138.
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The Sunnl view is based on the assumption that the intention of the speaker is "an
internal object lacking a signifier" ('amr daJdiill yahtaj 'ila mu'arrif).l That is to
say, "intention is, not a signifier, but signified".2
In the light of what has just been said about the SunnI view of 'intention',
particularly the statement of al-Qarafi, the above definition of use can be reformulated
as follows: use is intending a meaning by producing either a wad'-based expression
alone or with the consideration of some contextual evidence.
It should be stressed here that intention is very often used in contrast to meaning.
In this case, meaning is intended to be more general than intention. That is to say,
every expression has a meaning but does not necessarily involve an intention; for, as
al-Qarafi states, intention is required, not in the case of 'the signification of
expressions' but, in the case of 'signifying by expressions', i.e. the use of
expressions (cf. 2.3).3 Another way of explaining the difference between meaning
and intention is to say that meaning is the literal content of an utterance, whereas
intention is the message communicated by the speaker and intended to be recognised
by the hearer to yield a particular effect on him. Meaning is, thus, controlled by
wad'; intention is, on the other hand, motivated by use. In other words,
understanding meaning depends on well-formedness, but grasping intention is
determined by context,4 which leads to the fact that "a given meaning can be
understood by reference to language-based knowledge without being intended".^
iAl-Razi, 1/197.
^Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 218.
3Ibid., p. 136.
^See Sadr al-Shari'ah, 1/316.
^Al-'Ansarl, 1/319.
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In pragmatics, the meaning vs. intention distinction usually takes the following
forms: sense and force,! sentence meaning and utterance meaning^, and utterance
meaning and speaker's meaning.3
In the PF literature, the distinction between these two meanings is of great
significance particularly in the matter of figurative speech. The legal theorists
occasionally employ 'the meaning established for' (al-ma 'na 1-mawdu' lah) and 'the
meaning used for' (al-ma'na 1-musta'mal flh) for literal and non literal meaning
respectively, and reserve the term 'intended meaning' (al-ma 'na 1-maqsud) for the
latter only.'! jt js generally sustained that it is the speaker's intention that should be
grasped by the addressee in the actual communicative processes and that
understanding the wad'-based meaning is not always sufficient in order to recover the
speaker's intention. The question which should be considered then is how can the
speaker's intention be perceived if understanding the conventional meaning of the
speaker's words is not always sufficient for that purpose? The simplest answer to this
question is that although use is controlled in principle by the constraints imposed on it
by virtue of wad', speakers do not restrict themselves to the idealised type of
language, which fulfils the requirements of wad'. What is more, violating the
literalism of language may well be considered to be a self-evident fact, which shows
the speaker's efficiency of language^ on condition that (i) he provides some contextual
!See Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics (London: Longman, 1983), P.30;
Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), P.
15.
^See H.P. Grice, "Meaning", in Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.),
Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 53-59; idem, "Utterer's Meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning", in J. R. Searle (ed.), the Philosophy of
Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 54-70; Stephen C.
Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), P. 19; Mark
de Bretton Platts, Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to Philosophy of Language
(London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1975), P. 88-89.
^Marcelo Dascal, "On the Pragmatic Structure of Conversation", in John R. Searle
(ed.) (compiled and introduced by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren, (On) Searle on
Conversation (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992), P.41.
^See, e.g., al-Harawi, 1/142.
^See al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'alaSharh al-'Adud, 1/144; al-'Ansari, 1/204.
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evidence for his departure from the idealised constraints of wad', and (ii) there is a
'relation' ('aldqah) or 'appropriateness' (mundsabah) between the wad'-based
signification and the intended meaning. 1
It should be borne in mind however that just as the amount of information
intended to be conveyed by the utterance can be more than what the wad '-based
elements can bear, the amount of information signified by the wad '-based elements
can also be more than what the speaker intends to say. That is simply because "being
included in the meaning does not imply being intended in it" (['inna] 1-dukhula tahta
1-murddi la yastalzimu 'an yakuna muradan). 2
It goes without saying that being intended by the speaker does not imply that it is
meant by the wad '-based elements proper. These two fundamental canons are
practically of great importance: when one says in Arabic naJbnu tdlibdn (we are two
students) in reply to the question ma mihnatukumd? (lit, What is your profession?),
the reply involves, in effect, some redundant elements, namely the dual mark an in
tdliban, which is imposed by the facts of wad'- i.e. required by conventions in order
to meet the linguistic well-formedness- even though it is not intended,
communicatively speaking, by the speaker. Consequently, if one says nahnu
talabatun (we are students^) instead, one would be successful in conveying the
message despite the violation of the grammar. On the other hand, when a native
Arabic speaker says zaydun kathiru 1-ramdd (lit: Zayd has much ash) and means that
'Zayd is a noble generous man', he is not conveying the message exclusively by
means of 'established' expressions but he is, in effect, relying to a considerable extent
upon the inferential capacity of the hearer to grasp the inferred meaning of the
utterance. In other words, the speaker presupposes that the hearer will infer from 'has
much ash' that he very often burns firewood and sets fire for cooking —> he cooks a
*See al-Harawi, 1/142.
^Al-Taftazani, Hdshiyali 'aid Shark al-'Adud, 2/113.
^This is the common answer in modern spoken Arabic and most languages.
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great deal of food —> he invites (or receives) a large number of guests —> he is
hospitable —> he is a noble generous man. However, the inferential capacity of the
hearer in itself is not sufficient in recognising the intention of the speaker. Therefore,
this chain of inferences on the part of the hearer can lead to the recognition of the
speaker's intention if and only if the speaker is speaking non-literally. Deciding
whether the speaker is speaking literally or not depends upon the context.
So far we have mentioned three essential factors involved in communicative
processes, namely the inferential capacity of the speaker, context and wadMahmud
al-Jawnafurl (d. 1062/1652) distinguishes among these three factors and assigns each
of these factors a function as follows:
Rational inference suffices for implication, and context for
intentionality, but well-formedness requires an additional dimension.
This is the fact that there must be knowledge of wad' (soma') and
allowance on the part of the Arabs for the usage, in order for an
utterance to be compatible with their canons, and this is exactly the
isolative wad1
The first point to make about al-Jawnafuri's statement is that he does not mention
the understanding of the literal meaning, which is generally held to be related to wad
The reason for that seems to be, not because he was chiefly concerned with the notion
of 'metaphor' as the focus of his interest in this account, but because he assumes that
wad' is essential in attaining and maintaining well-formedness.
A further point is that contexts serve for intentionality in roughly the same way as
conventional expressions serve in conveying conventional meanings. In other words,
expression and context function as signifiers whereas meaning and intentionality
function as signified. However, although speakers can in principle 'intend' what their
expressions do not 'mean', their freedom as to the use of expressions that are not
*Al-:Ansari, 1/204. The Arabic text reads as follows: (inna 1-dalalata l-'aqliyyata
takfi li-l-mafhumiyyati wa-l-qarinata li-l-muradiyyati lakin la budda li-sihhati 1-
tarkibi min 'amrin za'idin, fa-la budda mina 1-sama'i wa-l-'ijazati minhum li-1-
isti'mali hatta yakuna jariyan 'ala qawamnihim wa-hadha huwa 1-wad' al-naw'i).
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assigned by virtue of wad' to their intended meanings is conditional on the ability of
the expression (with the help of contextual information) to bear the intended meaning.
Accordingly, "what the expression cannot bear is not considered [in the
communicative process] even if it is intended", 1 as 'Abd al-Latif Ibn al-Malik (d.
801/1399) puts it. Although it is not always possible to determine precisely the extent
to which the intention of the speaker can depart from the wad'-based meaning, the
accessibility of the expression is still the most important standard in the PF literature.
In addition to wad', context, as a means of rendering the intention of the speaker
recognisable, should be taken into account when we talk about the understandability
of expressions. Knowledge of context is needed when the expression is ambiguous,
for it identifies the intended meaning among other meanings that the expression bears.
So "what the expression bears is not considered relevant unless it is intended",2 and
of course identified by the context as the signifier of intentionality as al-Jawnafuri
pointed out in the quotation above.
2.3.2. Context
The term qarlnah, which is the Arabic equivalent to 'context', literally means
'concomitant' (muqdrinah). In his technical dictionary 'al-Ta'iifat', al-Sharif al-
Jurjanl defined the term as "a thing that refers to what is intended" ('amrun yushiru
'ila l-matlvb)3 In a more technical language, Muhammad al-Tahanawi (d. after
1158/1745)4 defines it as "what is set up to identify what is being intended".5
llbn al-Malik, p. 140.
2-Ibid.
Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 93.
^Khayr al-DIn al-Zirikll, al-'A'ldm: Qdmus Tarajim li-'Ashhar al-Rijdl wa-l-Nisa'
mina l-'Arab wa-l-Musta'ribin wa-l-Mustashriqin (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm li-l-Malayin,
1980), 6/290; 'Umar Rida Kahhalah, Mu'jam al-Mu'aliifin: Tarajim Musannifi 1-
Kutub al-'Arabiyyah (Beirut: Maktabat al-Muthanna and Dar 'Ihya' al-Turath al-
'Arabi, 1957), 11/47.
^Al-Tahanawl, 2/969. (al-isti 'drah).
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Although the above two definitions do not totally encompass the common use of
the term, they focus upon a significant component of its technical import, namely its
being evidence or indicative, of the speaker's intention. We may therefore say that the
senses of both 'concomitant' (or connection) and 'indication' constitute the central
meaning of the term qarlnah in the PF literature. By considering these two
components of the concept 'context', the term is intended to cover all the relevant
features that contribute to the recognition of the speaker's intention.
Although the term 'context' (qarlnah) involves the linguistic and non-linguistic
elements which have connection with the intended meaning, the legal theorists
occasionally employ the term 'co-text' (siyaq) to refer to the uttered units that precede
or follow the unit (whether it is a word or an utterance) in question. 1 However, when
the term siyaq is used against the term sibaq (preceding), the former is restricted to
the following units whereas the latter applies to the preceding ones.2
'Context' covers not only the immediate circumstances in which the utterance is
uttered but also the mutual knowledge of the participants (al-'ahd bayn al-
mutakhatiblnp and the presuppositions of the hearer.4
It is common in the works of the legal theorists to distinguish between at least
three types of context:
(i) -Verbal context (qarlnah lafziyyah, nutqiyyah or maqaliyyah), which
includes any uttered element that is believed to contribute to clarifying the speaker's
intention.^
ISeelbn al-Malik, p. 427; al-Ruhawi, p. 427.
2-SeeZadah, p. 427.
^See al-Razi, 1/381.
^See ibid , 1/140.
5See ibid; al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 1/339.
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(ii) -Rational context (qannab 'aqliyyah), which involves any cognitive facts that
are believed to contribute to clarifying the speaker's intention. 1
(iii) -Situational context (qarlnah haliyyah), which involves the state of the
speaker, his state of affairs, his previous history in terms of sincerity, any action or
gesture carried out by him, and the situation in which the utterance is performed.^
As to the last one, al-Ghazali states that "situational contexts [...] are unlimited and
unpredictable".^ This statement should be interpreted in the light of the belief that
context is but a means of recognising the speaker's intention, as 'Azml Zadah (d.
1040/1630) points out.4 Accordingly, since the intentions of the speakers are
inherently unlimited and unpredictable, so are the contexts which manifest them in
communicative processes. This property of context is very important, for it sets out
the role of context as a communicative element that can perform the function that
'established' expressions cannot, so much so that "whatever does not have an
'established' expression in language can be conveyed by context" (kullu ma laysa
lahu 'ibaratun mawdu'atun fi 1- lughati fa-tata'ayyanu fihi 1-qarinah).$
With regard to the function of context, the legal theorists as well as rhetoricians
differentiate between two kinds of context:
(i) -Diverting context (qarinah sarifah), which indicates the impossibility of
interpreting an expression literally.6
^See al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/340.
-See al-Razi, 1/140; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/340.
3Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/340.
^See Zadah, p. 352.
5Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/340.
^Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjani, al-'Isharat wa-l-Tanbihat fi 'Um al-
Balaghah , ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn, p. 205.
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(ii) -Guiding context (qarinah hachyah), which directs the hearer to the intended
meaning. 1
Muhammad al-Jurjani (d. 729/1329) stresses that the diverting context by itself is
not helpful in recognising the speaker's intention, "because unintending a particular
thing does not necessitate intending another particular thing, so there must be a
guiding context"2 to achieve the intended meaning since the role of the diverting
context is limited to indicate that the literal meaning is not the intended one.
However, it is customary in Arabic rhetoric and the PF to label the guiding context
as 'relation' ('alaqah) and to distinguish, at least, twenty-five types of relation,3
which are very often condensed and epitomised in four or five types: 'correspondence
in form' (al-ishtirak fi 1-shakl), 'correspondence in quality' (al-ishtirak fl 1-sifah),
'considering the previous condition' (i'tibar ma kan), 'considering the forthcoming
condition' (i'tibar ma sayakun) and 'proximity' (al-mujawarah). The last type is
intended to be so vague that it covers any recognisable relation, including antonymy
where utterances like 'you are a lion' is used ironically to mean 'you are a coward'.
What is common to all these types of relation (the twenty-five relations) is that they are
based on a survey of the potential associations that can take place between meanings
either in the external world or in the speakers' minds. These types of relation were set
up inductively through an investigation of the language.^ It seems that the main goal
of this survey is to recognise to which extent the ability of the speakers to reason can
associate the literal meanings of utterances with the non-literal intentions of their
speakers.
1 See Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjam, al-'Isharat, op. cit.,p.205.
2-Ibid.
3See al-Taftazanl, Hashiyah 'ala Shark al-'Adud, 1/143; al-Sharif al-Jurjanl,
Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/43-144; Muhibb Allah, 1/203.
Al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Shark al-'Adud, 1/145.
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The conclusion arrived at by scholars in this field is that such relations should be
distinct and well-known and that one should not be satisfied with any absolute
connection no matter what. 1 This condition seems to have been adopted to stress the
substantial contribution of the mutual knowledge (al- 'add) acquired by the participants
about the subject matter of speech to the success of communication. Thus, if one says
'Zayd is a lion' when one means 'he is brave', the utterance will properly be
understood; but if one says the same utterance to mean 'his mouth has bad breath', or
'is suffering from halitosis', the utterance will not normally be understood, for the
connection between the property of having bad breath and lion is neither distinct nor
well-known.2
It is clear that 'the guiding context' (or relation) has very often very much to do
with cultural values, even though reasoning plays an essential part in its resolution.
The difficulties facing non-Arabs in understanding such metonymy as 'Zayd has much
ash' or 'Zayd's dog is a coward' (both mean 'Zayd is a hospitable host') would
demonstrate the importance of the role that the environment plays in understanding
linguistic utterances.
^Al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqlh, p. 47. The Arabic text reads as follows: (fa-'inna
nashtaritu fl l-'alaqati 'an yakuna laha ikhtisasun wa-shuhrah, wa-la yuktafa bi-
mujarradi 1-irtibati kayfa kan).
2The second of Searle's principles of metaphor, which are designed to relate literal
meaning to metaphorical meaning, involves a similar idea. See John R. Searle,
"Metaphor", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader (New York: Oxford





In the Islamic legal literature, al-haml (interpretation) has received intensive
consideration. The most important underlying reason for this is that the whole life of a
Muslim is associated with the evaluations derived from the divine text, which acts as
the core part of a constellation of associated texts. Muslims believe that evaluations,
values, and principles derived from the Que'an and Sunnah are suitable to all
humankind, and applicable to any society, and that texts of this nature must be
readable and interpretable forever. Thus, interpretation in this sense is viewed as a
kind of searching for the intentions of Allah and His Prophet, with the attendant
requirement that any attempt to interpret such texts, or to establish an approach to
tackle this task must take the above parameters into account.
Additionally, interpretation covers a large set of speech acts, which have social,
legal and/or religious effects on Muslims in their everyday life. Examples of these
speech acts are swearing, defaming and the so-called siyagh al-'uqud, wa-l-fusvkh
(lit, forms of contracts and revocations), e.g. Nakahtuki (I hereby marry you), and
'ami taliq (I hereby divorce you).
Jurists, who are conventionally entitled to decide whether a certain utterance has
explicitly or implicitly such and such an effect, apply the same overall approach of the
legal theorists in interpreting speech acts. It is generally accepted that the PF is the
field that is concerned with constructing general principles and strategies that can be
relied on in interpretation.
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Al-haml in PF is commonly understood as the hearer's own understanding of the
intention of the speaker. 1 Any act of interpretation must consequently be preceded by
an intended act of use, which leads to the view that an utterance performed by a sleep-
talker, mad man or the like is judged not to merit interpretation, though the hearer may
attempt to understand it. But there is a substantial difference between understanding
an utterance and interpreting it. Thus, for an utterance to merit interpretation, it must
meet at least three conditions:
(i) it must be uttered intentionally;
(ii) it must be intended to a particular hearer or hearers; and
(iii) the hearer must be rational and able to understand it.
These three conditions can readily be derived from the following definition
suggested by some legal theorists for the term al-khitab (discourse), which is
considered to be the subject of interpretation: al-khitab is "a conventional utterance
intended to be communicated to whom is capable of understanding it".2
"Conventional" (al-mutwada' 'alayh) in this context is taken to exclude what is called
al-'alfaz al-muhmalah (lit, disregarded expressions), i.e. "expressions that have no
meaning by virtue of wad"' (al-'alfazu ghayru 1-dallati 'ala ma'nan. bi-l-wad')y
and, therefore, cannot be regarded as part of the lexicon of the language by which
communication is taking place. Sayf al-Din al-'Amidl (d. 631/1233), who advocated
this definition of discourse, insists on the intentionality of the speaker and the
capability of the hearer to recover it, rendering the term discourse inappropriate to such
utterances as those produced by sleep-talkers (condition (i) and (ii) above), and those
addressed to hearers who are judged not to be rational (or not speaking the same
language), and, therefore, unable to understand the full import of the discourse
concerned (condition (iii) above). It can be assumed that the interpretative activity of
^See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 20; al-Subkls, al-'Ibhaj, 1/263; Muhammad Bakhit
al-Muti'i, Sullam al-Wusul li-Sharh Nihayat al-Sul, 2/142.
2Al-'Amidi (1986), 1/136; see al-Tahanawi, 1/372.
3A1-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 124 (al-muhmalat).
the hearer is encouraged by the speaker's intent that his utterance is performed to be
recognised insofar as the hearer feels that he is required to make some effort to grasp
the intention of the speaker.
A further related notion that is given some emphasis is al-ta'awun (co-operation),
which is considered to be the motive behind communication in general. Co-operation,
as far as communication is concerned, can occur by means other than language, for
example, gestures and body language, but because of the properties of spoken
discourse, language is believed to be the favoured and most significant means of
communication. Some of the properties of spoken discourse are:
(a) efficiency (i.e. it can refer both to existent and non-existent entities);
(b) ease of use (i.e. the production of spoken utterances on the physiological side
is viewed as an exploitation of the natural operation of exhalation without
unnaturalness);
(c) ephemerality (sounds vanish immediately after use); and
(d) segmentability (by which an infinite number of utterances can be produced). *
Although 'co-operation' in PF is shown to contribute to communication, it is,
however, not given the same prominence and methodological status attributed to it by
Grice in his pragmatic account of how communication takes place.
In the PF account of communication, the hearer makes some presumptions about
the degree to which the speaker is co-operative. These presumptions are based,
whenever possible, on the hearer's knowledge of the speaker's habit of the use of
language. This implies a connection between the hearer's knowledge of the speaker,
and the success of communication. In other words, the more the hearer knows about
ISeeai-Razi, 1/65; al-Baydawi, 1/193; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/193; 'Adud, 1/115-116;
al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/115-116.
52
the speaker's way of using language, the more likely it is that communication will be
successful. 1
Correspondingly, in order to achieve a proper interpretation for the intentions of
Allah and His Prophet, the legal theorists believe that, at least, the two following
assumptions should be satisfied:
(a) it is impossible that Allah would say something without a prior intention; and
(b) it is impossible that Allah would set out to mean something contrary to what
people understand^ (i.e. He would not speak so ambiguously that people could
understand the wrong message).
The importance of these assumptions here is that they serve as elements in a
general principle that has to be considered in interpretation. Al-Qarafi formulates this
principle as follows:
'"The base' is that expressions actualise their implicatures and designate their
meanings".^
Thus, the hearer is required to act according to this principle, with the implication
that the search for meaning is presumed until it is presumed to have been identified.
Should the literal meaning be inconsistent with the context (in its broadest sense), the
interpreter has to look for another meaning or meanings until the process is
satisfactorily completed. There are particular strategies which guide this 'search'
process (they shall be explored later).
Similarly, if the hearer believes that the speaker is sincere, he will consider his
utterance meaningful even if its surface meaning seems unclear. The task of the hearer
1-See al-Mawsili, 1/121.
^See al-Baydawi, 2/191-192; al-'Asnawi, 2/192.
3Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 123.
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in such a case is to search for an ulterior meaning, which is guided by contextual
features. So, if S tells H that he saw a smiling moon, he will presumably think that S
is not speaking literally, provided that H believes that S is not telling a lie.
3.2. Fiqh, understanding and interpretation
The distinction drawn by the legal theorists between fahm (understanding) and
fiqh shows a great insight into the problem of interpretation. Clearly, this distinction
presupposes a further related distinction between meaning and intention. 1 It is
customary in PF to define fiqh in its pre-theoretical sense as "understanding the
intention of the speaker".2 It is, as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah states, more specific
than fahm (understanding), for it is more restricted than 'understanding' in its
common sense.3 Consequently, fiqh entails understanding, but not vice versa.
Another way of explaining the difference between understanding and fiqh is to say
that understanding is wad'-based construction, whereas fiqh is use-based one.
The term fiqh has a long history in the Islamic literature which can be traced back
to the Holy Qur'an, in which it is possible to find an implicit explanation of the
meaning of this word and its derivatives, where they associate with commendable
connotations, whereas the negation of the quality of fiqh suggests denial of praise and
criticism of people who lack this quality.
points out that "those who read texts literally and not according to their [true]
meaning are said to understand in a Jewish manner, as the Jews refuse to depart from
'This distinction is sometimes presented as a distinction between dalalt al-lafz (the
signification of expression) and 'iradat al-mvtakallim (the intention of the speaker).
See al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-TalwIh, 1/322.
^Al-Basri, 1/4; al-Razi, 1/9; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, 'I'lam al-Muwaqqi'In 'an
Rabb al-Alamin, ed. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Hadithah,
1969), 1/241; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj,' 1/28.
3Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, 'flam al-Muwaqqi'In 'an Rabb al-'Alamin, ed. 'Abd
al-Rahman al-Wakil, 1/241; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/28.
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the literal meaning". 1 In the Islamic literature, the Zahiris (lit, literalists: an Islamic
sect), whose approach to texts is said to be based merely on the surface meaning of
utterances, put themselves in a similar position. Since fiqh aims at the intention of the
speaker, which presupposes extra-linguistic considerations, the legal theorists tend not
to call this sect fuqaha' (people who have the faculty of fiqh) on the grounds that they
fail to go beyond the literal meanings of words.2 In an attempt to explain why he
thought that the Zahiris failed to understand the divine texts, Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah raises the fact that they rely on literal meaning without considering other
facts like the implications and references of expressions.3 In setting out his position
over this matter he calls the person who approaches a text in terms of what is said lafzi
(a verbal person), reserving the title 'arif (knowledgeable) to the person who asks
about the intention of the speaker.4 In modern pragmatics, the Zahiris''s approach
would be called a code model, while the mainstream approach would be called an
inferential model.5
Certainly, one of the crucial ideas of the Muslim legal theorists is the fact that they
regard 'aql (reason) as one of the two operators in the process of fiqh. & The other
operator is, of course, what they call sam ' (information-knowledge), which includes
the prior and immediate knowledge about the relevant elements that are believed to
contribute to interpretation (e.g. wad', common use, the speaker's habitual use of
language, context, etc.). Hence, fiqh is a mixture of two integrative components:
knowing and reasoning.
' Ian Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 142.
^See al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/28.
3See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, 'I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in 'an Rabb al-'Alamin, ed.
'Abd al-Rahman at-Wakll, 1/377.
4See ibid., 1/241.
5See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 2.
^See, e.g., Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/496.
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A further idea in PF is the intentions of Shari'ah. The essence of this idea can be
summarised by saying that the actual intentions manifested in the divine text are
usually motivated, according to Maturidis, Hanbalis, Mu'tazills, and others, by
wider, more abstract, and fundamental intentions. Contrary to the 'Ash 'aris, these
theological schools hold the view that the interests of human beings are considered by
Allah in His actions and evaluations, and that the ultimate goals behind those actual
intentions can potentially be identified.! 'Abu 'Ishaq al-Shatibl (d. 790/1388), who
places considerable emphasis upon the intentions of the Shari'ah, points out that the
Shan'ah is established to maintain the five necessities: religion, life, posterity (nasi),
wealth and intellect, insisting on the priority given to those five daruriyyat
(necessities) over what they call al-hajiyyat (the needs), and al-hajiyyat over al-
tahslnat (amelioratives or luxuries).2 The interpreter, in his attempt to derive
evaluations from texts, should be aware of the relation between the intentions of
Shari'ah and their priorities, on the one hand, and the text in its literal form on the
other. Any particular text that appears to be in disagreement, in some form or another,
with a general principle must be reconciled with it, since the legislator has set that
particular text with the intention of maintaining those principles.^
The idea of considering the intentions of the Shari'ah and generally any further
intentions,4 can be reasonably incorporated into the more abstract notion of the
knowledge about the habit of the speaker in the use of language, which is believed to
facilitate interpretation as an operation of searching for the actual intention represented
in the text concerned.
' See 'Abd al-Majld TurkI, Munazarat fi 'Usui al-Shari'ah al-'Islamiyyah bayn Ibn
Hazm wa-l-Baji, trans and ed. 'Abd al-Sabur Shahin, revised by Muhammad
Mahmud (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Tslami, 1986), p. 479.
^See ibid., p. 486-487.
3'Abu 'Ishaq ai-Shatibl, al-Muwafaqat fi 'Usui al-Shari'ah, ed. 'Abd Allah Darraz
and Muhammad 'Abd Allah Darraz, 2nd edn. (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1975), 3/8-10;
see ibid., p. 490.
^On the notion of further intentions see Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal
Theory, p. 166.
56
Hitherto, we have three distinct, but connected, terms for the process of
comprehending an utterance: haml (interpretation), fiqh and fahm (understanding).
In what follows, we will concentrate on haml only, because, firstly, it is regarded as
one of the four constitutive factors of communication, secondly, it is neutral (i.e. free
of the favourable connotations that characterise the term fiqh), and, thirdly, it is so
general that it can cover all speech acts whether they are of divine nature or not. The
term fiqh will, however, be eliminated because it has juristic connotations owing to its
being used as a label for the science of jurisprudence. With regard to fahm, its
vagueness and the fact that it is regarded as a temporary process to achieve the
interpretation of the speaker's intention make it unsuitable for discussion here (cf.
Figure (3.1).
Figure (3.1)
(The differences between haml, fiqh and fahm )
The property haml fiqh fahm
wad' based activity +
use based activity + +
meaning oriented activity
intention oriented activity +
suggests the possibility of
indeterminacy
+ - -
suggests the success of the hearer + +
has juristic connotations +
has favourable connotations + +
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3.3. Signifying by expressions and the signification of expressions
The distinction between al-dalalah bi-1-lafz and dalalat al-lafz (signifying by
expressions and the signification of expressions), which seems to have been first
introduced by al-Qarafi, implies that what the speaker intends by his utterance and
what the hearer interprets are two distinctively different things. Ibn Halul al-
Qayrawanl (d. 895/1489) points out that al-Qarafi's distinction in his work Sharh
Tanqlh al-Fusul seems to suggest that the two notions are completely different, but in
his Commentary on al-Razi's al-Mahsul, signifying by expressions appears to be
more general than the signification of expressions, which is interpreted as
understanding.^ Al-Qarafi managed to offer fifteen differences between the two
processes.^ Even if it is hard to assess how much importance can be given to each
difference, many of them, it can be argued, seem not to have any clear significance
since they have seemingly come to light only as a result of his determination to
mention as many differences as he could rather than as being relevantly valuable
dissimilarities.
Some of the considerations on which he relied in drawing his distinctions are
I-The producer
Under this category three differences can be accommodated:
(a) Signifying by expressions (henceforth SBE) is an activity of the speaker,
whereas the signification of expressions (henceforth SE) is an activity of the hearer.
To put it al-Qarafi's way, SBE is a quality of the speaker, but SE is a quality of the
hearer. ^
*See 'Abu l-'Abbas 'Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Halul al-Qayrawam, Hashiyah
'ala Sharh Tanqlh al-Fusul (Tunis: al-Matba'ah al-Tunusiyyah, 1910), p.23.
2 See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 26.
3See ibid] al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/207; al-'AsnawI, 2/38.
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(b) SBE takes place in the articulatory system, whereas SE in the mind of the
hearer. 1
(c) SE is preconditioned by life.2
Clearly, al-Qarafi does not seem to be precise in his formulation of (b) above in
that he concentrates upon the physical aspect for SBE and the intellectual aspect for
SE. The reason for that may well be that he intends to render SBE so general to
include any interpretable sound whether it is produced by man or an animate, or even
inanimate object. This general sense of SBE is exactly what Ibn Halul understood
from (c)3
The problem that arises from the extension of the term SBE in this way is that it
leads to abandoning 'intentionality' as a condition for any act of communication. In
another place in the same book, al-Qarafi considers 'intentionality' to be a condition of
SBE.^ What is more, his definition of SBE as 'use' presupposes 'intentionality' as
explained in the previous chapter. In order to reconcile the inclusion of 'intentionality'
in SBE in some instances with his exclusion of it in his distinction between SBE and
SE, we can say that intentionality is regarded in SBE in its narrow sense and
disregarded in its broad sense. The noise of thunder can be a good example of SBE in
its broad sense, for thunder does not intend to communicate any message, even if we
can infer something when we hear it. Pragmatically and communicationally speaking,
it is the narrow sense of SBE that concerns us in this work.
II- Occurrence
^See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 26; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/206; al-'AsnawI, 2/38.
2Ibn Halul, op. cit., p. 23.
3See ibid.
4See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 136.
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SE is preconditioned by SBE, i.e. whenever SE occurs, SBE must have
occurred, but SBE may occur without being followed by SE. 1
III- Causality
SBE is a cause, whereas SE is an effect.^
It is worth mentioning here, however, that the occurrence of the cause, as the legal
theorists stress on various occasions, does not necessitate the occurrence of the effect
as there might be an impediment. Accordingly, SBE may not be followed by SE
owing to some communicational problems.
IV- Types of signification
While SBE can be divided into two types: literally signifying and figuratively
signifying, SE can be divided into three types: dalalat mutabaqah (equivalence-
signification), dalalat tadammun (incorporational signification) and dalalat iltizam
(implicational signification) (cf. 5.2.1.1).3
The three types of SE will be discussed in the fifth chapter, but at the moment let
us consider the two types of SBE, which are involved in the following definition of
SBE.
Al-Qarafi defines SBE as "the use of an utterance either in its literal or figurative
meaning".^ The pragmatic significance of this definition (in fact, of the notion itself)
relates to the fact that, first, it implies a distinction between what words in themselves
mean and what we mean by them, and, second, it renders the speaker as the maker of
the message insofar as the formation of the utterance would be determined by the
*See al-Subkls, al-'Ibhaj, 1/206; al-'Asnawi, 2/38.
2Al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/207; al-'Asnawi, 2/38.
^See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, pp. 24-26; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/206; al-'Asnawi,
2/38.
4Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 26; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/206; al-'Asnawi, 2/38.
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extra-linguistic elements that he considers, specially his intention, context, rhetorical
goals, the type of the hearer, and the expectations of the speaker about him.
With respect to the intention of the speaker, it is generally believed that it governs
the speaker's selection of words and their order in a free-order language of the type to
which Arabic belongs. In modern terms, it is the intention of the speaker that
determines what Ferdinand de Saussure calls 'the paradigmatic and syntagmatic
relationships" in a particular utterance. It seems reasonable to think, however, that the
words selected from their paradigms and the very particular types of patterns chosen to
be followed by the speaker constitute the speaker's message. Any linguistic element
used by a rational speaker is largely held to be intentionally communicated, and its
possible alternatives are, therefore, deliberately ignored. This can obviously be seen
in the controversial notion mafhum al-mukhalafah (counter-implicature), which will
be dealt with in the fifth chapter (cf. 5.3.3.1.2). Any kind of giving precedence to
some parts of the utterance is also normally taken to be intended. In general, the
common view in PF is that the signification of expressions is controlled by the
intention of the speaker rather than self-controlled: "dalalat al-'alfaz laysat li
dhawatiha, bal hiya tabi'atun li-qasdi l-mutakallim"J
Context is, however, strongly believed to contribute to the forming of utterances.
In a situation where the speaker is accompanying a hunter and suddenly tells him
"gazelle", it is assumed that the speaker is pressurised to omit some parts of his
utterance.
The speaker might also consider what is called in Arabic rhetoric and PF al-
'aghrad al-balaghiyyah (rhetorical goals) to influence his hearer. Politeness (al-
ta'addub), glorification (al-ta'zlm) and degradation (al-tahqir) are examples of what
^Al-'Amidi (1986), 1/35; see Ibn al-Shat, 'Idrar al-Shuruq 'ala 'Anwar al-Buruq fi
'Anwa' al-Furuq: Hashiyah 'ala 1-QarafI's al-Furuq, (Cairo: Dar Thya' al-Kutub
al-'Arabiyyah, 1344.AH), 2/15, Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/496; al-Subkls, al-
'Ibhaj, 1/192.
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is regarded as rhetorical goals, which are thought to have considerable effects on the
utterance in terms of the quantity, quality and order of the linguistic elements used in
the utterance.
Discourse is believed to be partially determined by the type of the hearer, and the
expectations and assumptions the speaker makes about him.l Accordingly, the
discourse addressed to a stupid person, for example, has to be explicit and detailed,
and a hearer who is denying the proposition has to be addressed by emphatic words
and so on.
A fundamental distinction can be drawn here between intended and interpreted
meaning. This distinction is expanded to involve 'wad'-based meaning' (al-ma'na 1-
wad'I). It is clear that intended meaning can be associated with SBE, and interpreted
meaning with SE, while wad '-based meaning will be left without a counterpart in al-
Qaraft's distinction. The purpose of this tripartite distinction is to approach the
question: When can communication be regarded as successful? And the first step
would be to examine the possibilities of the occurrence of each meaning in relation to
the other two meanings. Normally, the following five possibilities would be available:
I- The wad '-based meaning is in agreement with the intended but not with the
interpreted meaning. This is the case when the speaker is speaking in accordance with
wad', i.e. speaking literally, but the hearer fails to grasp the speaker's intention,
perhaps because of some inherently problematic features attached to the language
itself, for example ambiguity.
II- The wad '-based meaning is in agreement with the interpreted but not with the
intended meaning. This is the case when the speaker is speaking non-literally, and the
hearer does not recognise that, thinking that the speaker is speaking literally, so he
^See al-Shatibi, op. cit., 3/347; al-Muti'i, op. cit., 2/54.
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fails to grasp the intention of the speaker owing to some pragmatic reasons (e.g.
misleading context).
III- The intended meaning is in agreement with the interpreted but not with the
wad '-based meaning. This is the case when the speaker is speaking non-literally and
the hearer recognises it because of the presence of the sufficient contextual information
and the success of the interlocutors in considering it.
IV- The intended meaning is in disagreement with both the wad'-based and
interpreted meanings. This is the case when the speaker is speaking non-literally and
the hearer fails to recognise that owing to the same reasons mentioned in (II).
V- The interpreted meaning is in agreement with both the wad'-based and intended
meanings. This is the case when the speaker is speaking literally and the hearer
recognises this fact because there is no 'diverting context' to the contrary. Obviously,
this is the ideal form of communication in which all the communicative elements are
acting in conformity with what tends to be called in PF al-'usul (the bases) (cf. 3.5.1).
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Figure (3.2)
(When is communication regarded as successful?)
1 wad '-based m intended m interpreted m success of communication
I + + unsuccessful
II + + unsuccessful
III + + successful
IV + unsuccessful
V + + + successful
As we have seen, the success of communication rests upon the agreement between
the intended and interpreted meaning (notice No III & V) rather than between the
wad '-based meaning and only one of the other two meanings (notice No I & II). This
leads to the conclusion that wad' (establishment) is similar to any contextual feature
whose value is dependent on how much it is needed in actual communication, which
means that it can be abandoned. However, this conclusion for the mainstream legal
theorists, is inaccurate, for even if the wad '-based meaning is not the ultimate goal of
the interlocutors in many communicative situations, it still functions as a means to
achieve the intention of the speaker as it is believed to have some relation with it. This
thesis is reflected in PF in the emphasis on what is called 'alaqah (relation) or
sometimes munasabah (relevance). According to the legal theorists, any non-literal
use must involve a relation between the literal and non-literal meaning (cf. 3.5.1.4);
otherwise any expression can be employed to convey any meaning, which is false. 1
However, not any munasabah would be sufficient, but only that one which is being
considered by the interlocutors can be relied upon in non-literal communication/
lAl-'Asnawi, 2/164; 'Adud, 1/142; al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
1/142; al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/142; al-Harawi, 1/142.
^Al-Harawi, 1/142.
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Since there is no correlation between the speaker's and the hearer's consideration 1
(i.e. the kind or aspect of relation considered by the speaker might differ from the one
considered by the hearer), it follows that the communicative act is subject to failure as
a result. It should be stressed, however, that failure in communication does not imply
failure in interpretation. This is because the hearer can rightly be said to have managed
to interpret a particular utterance if he manages to understand the linguistic meaning of
the utterance, considers the relevant contextual features, and follows the appropriate
pragmatic principles and strategies; regardless of whether he succeeds in grasping the
intention of the speaker (i.e. in communication) or not. This, obviously,
demonstrates the significance of the differentiation between fiqh, which, as mentioned
above, suggests the success of communication, and interpretation, which is neutral in
this respect. In the light of what has just been said about the difference between
success in communication, and success in interpretation,2 it seems appropriate to think
of al-Qarafi's distinction between SBE and SE in terms of types of signification,
which presupposes that the SBE is clue-giving, as it were, whereas SE is intention-
searching, and that the speaker has his own way of giving the clue (he may speak
literally or non-literally, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly and so on), and
the hearer has his own way of searching (he may give priority to the linguistic givens
over the extra-linguistic settings or to the explicatures over the implicatures and so on).
Strangely enough, the speaker might succeed in his SBE, and so might the hearer in
his SE in a particular communicative situation, but the communication fails. That is
exactly what happens when both of the interlocutors follow the proper principles and
strategies in using and comprehending utterances, but they diverge in their
consideration of the relation between the literal and non-literal meaning, probably as a
result of considering different contextual features.
lAl-Harawi, 1/142.
2()n this notion see Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, pp. 29-30.
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3.4. Context from the viewpoint of the addressee
3.4.1. Comprehensive sight of text
One of the most important characteristic features of the pragmatic thinking in the
PF is the fact that the Qur an and Sunnah are treated as one utterance "ka 1-lafzati 1-
wahidah" and that each part of this utterance has to be dealt with in relation to the
other relevant parts. 1 No text, accordingly, can be taken separately.^ The interpreter,
therefore, has to be aware of all other relevant texts in dealing with a particular one.
Failure to do so, as al-Shatibi points out, results in failure to achieve the intention of
the legislator unless the goal of the hearer is only to reach an understanding of the
surface meaning, which rests merely upon the linguistic givens, without seeking the
intention of the speaker.^ The idea behind this comprehensive sight is that the whole
contains more than the sum of its parts.4 A very much-quoted example to explain this
idea is the following verses from which one can, by joining two connected texts
together, infer a proposition that cannot be inferred from either of the two texts alone.^
(1)- "We have enjoined on man
Kindness to his parents:
In pain did his mother
Bear him, and in pain
Did she give him birth.
The carrying of the (child)
To his weaning is
(A period of) thirty months".^
(2)- "The mothers shall give suck
To their offspring
For two whole years".7
l.See 'Abu Muhammad 'All Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri, al-'Ihkam fi 'Usui al-'Ahkam (Cairo:
Dar al-Hadlth, 1984), 3/371.
2See ibid.
^A-Shatibl, op. cit., 3/413-414.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, Hashiyah 'ala Shark al-'Adud, 1/67.
^See al-RazI, 1/179.
6Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 46/15.
7Ibid., 2/233.
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By considering the two texts together, jurists infer that the minimum period of
pregnancy is six months. Consequently, should any wife give birth to a fine healthy
baby before six lunar months from her marriage, her husband has the right to deny it. 1
The legal theorists regard the texts that have to be considered when a particular text
is being interpreted as a verbal context on the grounds that it has some influence on its
interpretation. This is generally in conformity with their definition of context as "what
is set up to identify what is being intended"2(cf. 2.3.2). The question that arises here
is how can the same linguistic element be regarded as a context and text at the same
time? And the simple answer to this question is that the legal theorists see each text in
the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah as a part of a whole in a sense that the parts interact in a
way which makes the proper interpretation of a given text dependent on all the other
relevant texts.
3.4.2 Context as a signifying element
In PF context is treated as a signifying element and is given a position similar to
that of linguistic forms (versus meanings), in that both the relevant contextual features
and the linguistic forms are meant to be used as a means of communication. There are
of course some differences especially in terms of dependency, where context, unlike
linguistic forms, cannot function independently. This is, however, what the word
'context' both in Arabic and English seems to suggest. A significant difference in this
regard is that the linguistic forms are conventional signifiers, whereas the contextual
features are instantaneous signifiers. This difference is notably related to the
distinction between wad' and use (cf. 2.1), where the linguistic forms are held to be




Al-ZarkashI declares that the function of al-siyaq (co-text) consists of
(i) clarifying the obscure;
(ii) determining the intention of the speaker;
(iii) particularising the general;
(iv) qualifying the unqualified; and
(v) varying signification. 1
Thus, context can be described, as far as its function is concerned, as confining or
modifying rather than informing, as it were. This might partially, at least, explain
why it is that context is viewed as a sign of the intention of the speaker whereas the
speaker's words are taken as signs of their literal meanings. The addressee is,
therefore, required to realise which one of the available contextual elements is
considered by the addresser in order to secure successful communication. At this
point, a distinction should be drawn between available and actually considered
contexts. Correspondingly, the task of the addressee is not the awareness of the
available contexts but the knowledge of what the addresser has chosen, among them,
to be the sign of his intention. Hence, the expression "nasb al-mutakallim qarinab"
(setting up a context by the speaker), which is very frequent in both PF and Arabic
rhetoric, implies a favourable quality because it suggests that context is meant to
function as a means to reveal the speaker's intention.2
Having said that, a large portion of misunderstanding in communication can be
assigned to the multiplicity of possible contexts, where the interlocutors consider
different contexts, and, therefore, form different interpretations. Consider the two
following examples:
^Badr al-DIn Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah al-Zarkashi, al-Burhasi fl 'Ulum al-Qur'an,
ed. Muhammad 'Abu al-Fadl. 'Ibrahim, 2nd edn. (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah li-1-
Tiba'ah wa-l-Nashr, n.d.), 2/200.
2See 'Ahmad Mustafa al-Tarudi al-Tunusi, Kitab Jami' al-'Ibarat fl Tahqiq al-
Isti'arat, ed. Muhammad Ramadan al-Jirbi (Misratah, Libya: Dar al-Jamahiriyyah,
1986), pp. 245-247.
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(1)- On his way to Medina accompanied by the Prophet (in their secret Hijrah
(emigration) from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D.) 'Abu Bakr would be asked by some
of the unbelievers about his companion. His answer would be:
"Hadha 1-rajulv -lladhiyahdinl 1-sabil" (lit. this is the man who is guiding me to
the way).l
(2)- On his way to Badr (the first battle in Islam), the Prophet was asked by one of
his enemies: "Where do you come from?" He replied:
" We come from ma '.2
In both (1) and (2) the addressee misunderstood the intention of the speaker. In
(1) the addressee understood the word "way" as the path in its surface meaning,
whereas 'Abu Bakr intended it to be the way leading him to his interest in this life, and
Paradise in the hereafter. In (2) the addressee interpreted "ma' " (lit, water) as a
name of a particular tribe while the Prophet intended it to be 'water' as water is the
origin of human beings.3
Examples of this type show:
(i) choosing one interpretation over another is due to giving priority to a particular
context over another. Accordingly, the legal theorists are justified in considering
context to be the signifying element of the speaker's intention in actual
communication.
1'Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. 'Isma'il al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhan (Cairo:
Matoa'at al-Babl al-Halabi, 1345 A.H.), bab al-Hijrah: 5/79; seeal-Razi, 1/99.
2jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-Rawd al-'Unuf fl Tafsir al-SIrah al-Nabawiyyah li-Ibn
Hisham (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1978), 3/34.
3Sec Mohamed Mohamed Y. Ali, Wasf al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah Dilaliyyaji fi Daw'
Mafhum al-Dalalah al-Markaziyyah: Dirasah Hawla 1-Ma 'na wa-Zilal al-Ma 'na
(Tripoli, Libya: Manshurat Jami'at al-Fatih, 1993), pp. 141-142.
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(ii) giving priority to a particular context over another is in turn due to the fact that
the addressee tends to localise his interpretation by considering the most immediate
context, which is the fact that the meeting took place in the desert in (1), and that the
addressee was a tribesman in (2). This factor, which determines interpretation in this
way is referred to in PF as al-tabadur (immediacy) (cf. 3.5.1.4).
3.4.3. Types of context
Although three types of context are sometimes distinguished, namely verbal,
rational and situational context (cf. 2.3.2), the twofold distinction, in which the last
two types are integrated under what is called al-qarinah al-ma'tiawiyyah (non-verbal
or situational context), appears to be more frequent and less ambiguous. 1 There is not
much to say about verbal context (or co-text) other than what has already been briefly
said (cf. 2.3.2 and 3.4.1). My concern will, therefore, be the non-verbal context in
which the legal theorists incorporate the following:
(i) - The speaker's habit.
(ii)- Al- 'ahd (mutual knowledge).
(iii) - Cultural practices.
(iv) - Al-bisat (the carpet).
(i)- The speaker's habit:
By this term is meant the speaker's usual way of deploying expressions to convey
meanings so that the addressee, if he is familiar with the speaker's habit, can
immediately recover his intention through his utterance regardless of what the
utterance seems to mean. Ibn Taymiyyah, who attaches great importance to the
speaker's habit, argues that since the signification of expressions is intentional
iSee Sadr al-Shari'ah, 1/343; al-TahanawI, 2/1228 (al-qarinah).
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(qasdiyyah) and wilful ('iradiyyah), i.e. expressions signify what the speaker
intends them to signify and do not signify by themselves, it follows that hearing
expressions without the knowledge of the speaker and his custom would signify
nothing. * Although Ibn Taymiyyah seems to exaggerate to a certain degree the role
that the knowledge of the speaker's habit is assumed to play in everyday
communication, clearly it plays a significant role in the domain of text-based analysis,
especially religious texts, which probably form the scope of his statement.
The concept of the speaker's habit is usually linked with what is known in PF as
al-wad' al-'urfi,2 but the justification for handling it within the notion context is the
fact that this concept is sometimes widened to cover not only the verbal habit of the
use of language, but also some of what can be accommodated under the speaker's
history such as the speaker's sincerity.
The legal theorists believe that the assumptions the addressee makes about the
addresser's reliability have a direct effect on his interpretation of the utterance in that
they determine, in many cases, whether the utterance should be taken non-literally or
as a false statement.^ The general basis is that if the surface meaning of the utterance
is not in correspondence with reality, the utterance should be taken as untrue unless
the hearer has a reason to hold the following assumptions:
a- The assumption of the speaker's sincerity: (The hearer assumes that the speaker
is sincere).
b- The assumption of the speaker's rationality: (The hearer assumes that the
speaker is rational).
*Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/496. Ibn SIna seems to hold the same view. See al-
Marjanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-Tawdlh 'ala 1-Tanqih, (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-
Khayriyyaii, 1306 A.H), 1/317.
^See al-Tahanawi, 2/957 (al-'adah).
^See al-RazI, 1/140.
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c- The assumption of the legal plausibility of the utterance: (The hearer assumes
that the utterance is in agreement with the general principles of religion) (cf. 5.3.1.4).
Once an utterance that has an untrue surface meaning is, by virtue of the above
assumptions, accepted to be true, the hearer has to search for an ulterior acceptable
meaning. There are various reasons, according to al-RazI, to take a particular
seemingly untrue utterance as a figurative utterance: one of them is to know or to
think that the speaker does not tell a lie. 1 With respect to the texts of the Qur'an and
SunnaJj, any text seemingly conflicting with the speaker's sincerity, his rationality or
the utterance's legal plausibility is said to have been intended to be taken non-literally
since the utterer of the text is believed to be sincere.
It is generally accepted that the knowledge of the speaker's habit of the use of
language including his reliability facilitates the communication process and that, as Ibn
al-Qayyim points out, the more knowledge the hearer has about the speaker, his
intentions, his language and his habit, the more complete and more perfect his
knowledge of the speaker's intention will be.2 Furthermore, the assumptions which
the addressee forms about the addresser contribute to the interpretation of utterances.
(ii)- Al-'ahd (mutual knowledge):
The legal theorists usually apply this concept to al-ma'arif (definite nouns) with
the definite article in particular, where the subject of the conversation is mutually
assumed to be shared by the interlocutors. Any contribution by the speaker in such
cases would be related by the hearer to what both assume to be mutually known to
them.^ The general principle that can be formulated in this context is that the
^Al-Razi, 1/140.
^Al-Mawsill, 1/121.
^See; al-Razi, 1/381; 'Adud, 2/131.
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addresser refers to the nearest referent. The application of this principle can be found
in Arabic grammar in the discussion of the definite article.
(iii)- Cultural practices:
There are different contextual features pertaining to cultural practices which are
believed to contribute to interpretation, but without being given a special name in the
sources. In his discussion of the requirements of understanding the Qur'an, al-Shatibi
states that knowledge of the Arab customs, their ways of using language, their ways
of behaviour and their current affairs at the time of the revelation is necessary for this
purpose. 1 One of his examples is the following Qur'anic verse:
(3) "Wa 'atimmu 1-Hajja wa-l-'Umratali-Allah"
"And complete
The Hajj or 'umra
In the service ofGod".^
The reason why the Qur'an uses the verb 'atimmu (complete) instead of 'addu
(perform) is the fact that the Arabs used to perform the Hajj and 'Umrah3 before
Islam even if not in a complete manner.^
The term 'urf (custom) is commonly used as a synonym for 'adah (habit). Some
scholars, however, discriminate between the two terms, employing 'adah for actions
and 'urf for expressions.^ The 'urf is held to be a vital factor in determining the
1 See al-Shatibi, op. cit. ,3/351.
2THE HOLY QUR 'AN, 2/196.
^The Hajj is visiting "the Sacred Mosque, the Ka'ba. The Season of regular Hajj
culminates in the visit to 'Arafat on the ninth day of the month of Zul-hajj, followed by
the circumambulation of the Ka'ba. A visit to the Sacred Mosque and the performance
of the rites of pilgrimage at any other time is called an 'Umra" (Ali's Translation of
THE HOLY QUR'AN, p. 62. Note 62).
^See al-Shatibi, op. cit., 3/351.
^See al-Taftazanl, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 1/335; al-Tahanawi, 2/957-958 (al-'ada).
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reference of expressions. Al-RazI argues that the angels and thieves are not intended
when someone says (4), and that restricting the utterance in this way is due to urf.
(4) Whoever enters my house will be treated hospitably.
(iv)- Al-bisat (the carpet):
Al-bisat, which is regarded as a form of context, received relatively careful
consideration by the MalikI school of law particularly in the subject of al-yamin
(oath). By this term, which literally means 'the carpet', is understood the underlying
reason behind someone's oath. According to the Malikis, the interpretation of oaths
is highly determined by the motives behind them. They assume that the effects of al-
bisat on the interpretation of oath-taking are manifest in one of two forms:
First, al-takhsls (restriction), where an expression is modified by al-bisat to refer
to less than what it literally does. Consider the following example:
(5) I swear that I will never go to that market again.
Given that there is believed to be a particular reason that made the interlocutor take
this decision (e.g. the market is overcrowded or not safe), his oath should be taken to
be restricted solely to the cases where the relevant condition exists. Thus, the full
utterance of the speaker should be interpreted as: I swear that I will never go to that
market again as long as such and such a thing exists. The underlined part of this
utterance is assumed to be recoverable from al-bisat.
Second, al-ta'mim (generalisation), where the expression is construed to refer to
more than what it literally does. So, if one angrily says (6) to somebody who
reminded him of a favour he owes, his words in such an example should not be taken
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literally. Consequently, if he receives any benefit from the speaker in some form or
another, his oath will be taken to be broken even if he is not given water to drink. 1
(6) I will never drink water from you.
3.5. The mainstream interpretation model
The legal theorists construct a set of 'usul (singular, 'asl (bases or principles)) and
a series of strategies to describe how interpretation can be achieved. In this section, a
formula of their fundamental principles and postulates will be offered as a model of
their representation of interpretation. This model presumes that interlocutors follow
certain norms in communication processes, and handle linguistic utterances in
accordance with the 'usul to be examined later.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the Arabic term 'asl (base or
principle) is misleading. Although the word literally refers to the origin of something^
or the part on which something is based,3 the following explanations are provided to
identify its technical senses:
(i) al-dalll (evidence) e.g. the 'asl of this evaluation is al-Qur'an and Suruiah;
(ii) al-qa'idah al-kulliyyah (general rule);
(iii) al-ghalib (preponderant);
(iv) al-rajih (outweighing); and
(v) al-mustashab (roughly, presumption).^
1 See Shihab al-Din 'Ahmad b. 'Idris al-Qarafi, al-'Ihkam fi Tamylz al-Fatawa 'an
al-'Ahkam wa-Tasarrufat al-Qadl wa-l-'Imam, ed. 'Abd al-Fattah 'Abu Ghaddah
(Halab, Syria: Maktab al-Matbu'at al-'Islamiyyah, 1967), pp. 238-240. note no (1).
Al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqih, p. 15.
•^Al-Ruhawi, p. 18; al-'Ansari,. 1/8; al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 16; al-
Tahanawl, p. 85 (al-'asl).
^Al-Ruhawl, pp. 18-19; al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqih, p. 15; al-'Ansari, .1/8; al-'AsnawI,
2/170.
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With the exception of (i), all these senses are relevant to the notion 'base or
principle' in this subject. The notion 'base or principle' is usually formulated in one
of the forms:
- the 'asl is such and such, e.g. al-'asl al-haqlqah ('the base' is the literal use);
- such and such is an 'asl, e.g. al-haqiqah 'asl (the literal use is a base); and
- such and such is against the 'asl, e.g. al-majazu khilafu l-'asl (the non-literal
use is against 'the base').
Although it is not easy to assess exactly how significant a base is in interpretation,
it can generally be said that the import of each base is sensitive to how much it is
required in actual situations. There are, however, some 'usul which operate in the
majority, if not all, speech situations. One may be tempted to call these particular
'usul principles, reserving the term 'bases' for the 'usul which are applicable only to
particular discourses. However, the Arabic word ('asl) allows one to do so; and,
moreover, the way in which what I would call 'bases' are handled in PF is noticeably
different from those which I would call 'principles'.
One of the main differences between 'bases' and 'principles' is that the former are
designed to depict discourse in its ideal form (which is in conformity with wad'),
whereas the latter are intended to describe the behaviour of the interlocutors in the
course of the communicative process.
More importantly, the violation of the bases can generate ba'd al-'aghrad al-
balaghiyyah (some rhetorical intentions) or what Grice calls implicatures. The
violation of the principles, on the other hand, would lead to problems in
communication. For example, if the speaker flouts the 'literalness' base (i.e. 'the
base' is the literal use (cf. 3.5.1.5)), his utterance will be taken as figurative in nature,
but if he infringes the principle of truthfulness, his utterance will be taken to be false,
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leading to the breakdown of communication. The reason is that in violating 'the
base', the speaker sets up a context which indicates this violation, thus making his
intention manifest. In the case of violating the principle, the speaker, by contrast,
intends to mislead the addressee.
Thus, the above difference is manifested in the fact that speakers in the case of
violating the bases depart from what is presumed to be dominant or base in the
language veering towards the less common or subsidiary (al-far') for a particular
purpose by invoking some extra-linguistic elements (i.e. al-qara'in al-'aqliyyah
(rational contexts)), which cannot be made manifest except by moving from wad' to
use. In the case of violating the principles, speakers, however, depart from what is
presumed to be the common behaviour of the users of language (e.g. truthfulness) to
the exception (e.g. telling a lie) without purposefully making this departure clear to
the addressee.
Briefly, although both kinds of violation pertain to the manifestation of language in
actual situations, the violation of bases relates to use (versus language), whereas the
violation of principles concerns the users themselves (e.g. their credibility).
As far as I can ascertain, pragmatists do not draw the difference between principles
and maxims within the Gricean framework (which might be thought of as parallel to
the principles-bases dichotomy) in this manner. However, they would face serious
difficulties if they did so, since the Gricean distinction between principles and maxims
is not formulated with reference to the same underlying premise. A quick look at
Grice's maxims will show that they are nothing but instructions intended to show
what speakers should do in actual communicative situations in order to be co¬
operative. This, however, is not true of bases in their capacity as depicters of the
ideal, or wad '-conforming, discourse. More crucially, unlike the violation of bases,
the violation of some of the Gricean maxims does not necessarily generate what Grice
calls 'implicatures', but rather it leads to failure in communication. Thus, if one flouts
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the Gricean maxim of quality (Try to make contribution one that is true*) by telling a
lie, he will probably cause a communication problem. In contrast, if 'the base' of
literalness is violated by speaking figuratively, this would lead to an implicature.
However, one might claim that there is no difference between speaking
figuratively and telling a lie which would justify placing them in different categories
since both arise from the speaker's linguistic performance. This, however, is an
implausible claim since the telling of a lie, even if it is a product of the use of a
language, is not a property of the language per se~ for, as 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjanl
subtly expounds,
Language tends not to state nor to affirm or disaffirm [...]. That
is to say, stating that 'beating' is Zayd's action or not, and that
'illness' is his condition or not, is something made by the speaker
and is a claim he assumes. Consequently, whatever is levelled at this
claim- whether it is belief, accusation of lying, acknowledgement,
denial, approving or disapproving- is in fact a reaction directed to the
speaker and has absolutely nothing to do with language.^
Thus, the ethical basis of utterances in actual situations, though it does have
fundamental influence on communication in terms of success or failure, is not
attributable to the facts of language structure. Therefore, it would not be appropriate
to say that lying is a feature of language in the same way it would be appropriate to say
that figurative use is. For that reason, it is by no means accurate to place some kind of
lies (e.g. the well-known lies) in the dictionary as a part of a certain language in the
same way lexicographers do with some metaphors (i.e. dead or frozen metaphors).
The PF interpretation model is intended mainly to show how a plausible
interpretation of the religious and related texts can be achieved. It is generally
assumed that language as a product of wad' (i.e. as an abstract system) is not a
sufficient basis in interpreting texts, since performing utterances presupposes extra-
1Grice(1975), p. 46.
2A similar point can be found in Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics, p. 8.
^Al-Jurjam, 'Abd al-Qahir, 'Asrar al-Balaghah, ed. H., Ritter, pp. 345-347.
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linguistic elements in the communicative process. Any process of fiqh or
interpretation (cf. 3.2) in general would involve some kind of cognitive facts. Hence,
it is false, as Ibn Taymiyyah argues, to claim that expressions signify without the
involvement of cognitive contexts. 1
As drawn by the legal theorists, the wad '-based (or the highly idealised) discourse
must at least be:
(i) determinate (i.e. has one meaning);
(ii) intended to be taken literally;
(iii) taken in its generality;
(iv) independent (i.e. free from ellipsis);
(v) devoid of tautology; and
(vi) following standard syntactic order.2
However, this idealised form of communication does not always manifest itself in
actual communication. Accordingly, knowledge of wad' on its own, even if it can be
relied on in identifying linguistic meaning, as al-Ghazali points out,3 would not be
sufficient for recognising the intention of the speaker in non-ideal communication.
According to the legal theorists and Arab rhetoricians, the native speaker, who is
presumed to have knowledge of wad', has the ability not only to form this ideal
discourse, but also to discover how much a given discourse on a particular occasion is
in agreement or in disagreement with ideal communication, and also to recognise the
relationship holding between ideal and actual discourse.
This idealised form of discourse is sometimes called 'ibdrat al-muta'araf*
(conventionalised discourse) as it does not require to be supported by contextual
1 Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/459.
^Seeal-Razi, 1/151-152; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tasiqlh, p. 112.
^Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/339.
^See al-Tahanawi, 1/901-902 (al-'itndb).
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evidence in actual communication. Any departure from this common discourse, by
contrast, needs to be joined by a relevant context in order for successful
communication to be guaranteed. The task of the addressee in such a case is to
eliminate the wad-based discourse and search for an ulterior one. To make the task
of the addressee possible, the speaker has to set up two kinds of context:
(i) Diverting context (qarinah sarifah)1 to proclaim that the literal meaning is not
intended. By reference to this context the addressee recognises that the literal
interpretation is nonsense, unlikely or impossible. 2
(ii) Guiding context (qarinah hadiyahy to make the intention of the speaker
manifest to the hearer.^ In Arabic rhetoric, this kind of context is called 'alaqah
(relation).* It should, however, be pointed out that the employment of the term
'alaqah for guiding context is not precise since the relation between literal meaning
and intended meaning is only part of this kind of context, "which is designed to rule
out the competition of other interpretations".^
As elucidated in the second chapter, expressions are controlled by isolative wad'
(cf. 2.2.1.), while grammatical rules and pragmatic precepts are guided by
subsumptive wad'. Part of subsumptive wad' is the following precept: "every
expression assigned [by virtue of wad'] to a certain meaning should, given the
preventing context (al-qarinah al-mani'ah), be assigned to another specifically related
meaning".7 Consider this traditional example:
lit is also called qarlnat al-'ilgha' (the context of cancellation ). See al-
'Ansarl,. 1/203.
2See ibid., 1/221.
3It is also called qarinat al-'i'mal (the context of operating). See ibid., 1/203.
4See Hasan al-Fanari, Hashiyah 'ala Hashiyat al-Talwih 'ala Sharh al-Tawdlh 'ala
l-Tanqlh, 1/200.
^Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjanl, al-'Isharat wa-l-Tanbihat fi 'Ilm al-
Balaghah, ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn, p. 206.
^Ai-Fanara, op. cit., 2/64.
^Muhammad Bakhlt al-Muti'i, Sullam al-Wusul li-Sharh Nihayat al-Sul, 2/147.
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(1)1 saw a lion delivering an address from the pulpit (Ra'aytu asadan yakhtubu
'ala 1-minbar).
In this example, the hearer receiving this message is assumed:
(i) to know that lions (in the literal sense) cannot deliver a speech (diverting
context), thus eliminating the literal interpretation.
(ii) to believe that there must be another meaning (the principle of 'i'mal (to make
sense of the expressions) (cf. 3.5.1.3).
(iii) to search for the most possible related meaning (the principle of tabadur
(immediacy) (cf. 3.5.1.4). The relation ought to be distinct and well-known for both
of the interlocutors (cf. 2.3.2.).
Since both of the addresser and the addressee belong to the same linguistic
community, and they mutually know that 'courage' is the most well-known and
distinct property of lions, and that the hearer expects the speaker to intend the most
immediate interpretation (the principle of tabadur); it follows that the hearer would
conclude that the speaker intended to say that 'he saw a courageous man'.
However, there must be some reason, according to the legal theorists, for flouting
'the base' (or abandoning the use of 'ibarat al-muta'araf (conventionalised
discourse)), by, alternatively, appealing to something that is against 'the base' 1 (the
subsidiary). Several reasons or motives, which are mainly related to the effective use
of communication, are promulgated in this connection. Some of them are held to be
lafziyyah (stylistic); others, which are labelled as ma'nawiyyah (related to meaning)
have more to do with rhetorical or communicative intentions, for example al-ta 'zlm
ISadr al-Shari'ah, 1/1343.
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(glorification), al-tahqir (degradation), targhib (arousal of acceptance) and tarhib
(intimidation). 1
3.5.1. The 'usul (principles and bases)
The legal theorists widely believe that al-ta'awun (co-operation) is the underlying
motive behind the establishment of language. To this effect they argue that
man cannot live independently of others, for, unlike animals, he cannot
content himself with the natural goods [..]. For his survival, he has to
manufacture his synthetic needs such as food, shelter and wear. The
acquisition of such things can be accomplished only by co-operating,
participating and dealing with others [...], which, undoubtedly, require
people to inform each other of the needs related to their livelihood/
The fact that people have a mutual interest in expressing their needs is subtly
linked with the question of how communication works. It is generally assumed that
the purpose of the establishment of language is to reach a successful communication
(al-tafahumft and that the goal of utterances is to guide the hearer and to make the
intention of the speaker manifest to him.4 To achieve this goal, two things, according
to Ibn al-Qayyim, are required, namely bayan al-mutakallim (speaker's making of his
intention manifest) and tamakkun al-sami' min al-fahm (hearer's success in
understanding).
In what follows I shall try to answer the two following fundamental questions:
(i) How is it that the speaker makes his intention manifest to the hearer?
(ii) How can the hearer recover the intention of the speaker?
^See Sadr al-Shan'ah, 1/343-344; al-'Asnawi, 2/176; al-Baydawi, 2/176;
Mullakhusru, 1/154.
^Al-Shatif al-Jurjani, Hashiyah 'ala Shark al-'Adud, 1/115; see al-Razi, 1/64; 'Adud,
115; al-'Asnawi, 2/13-14; al-Baydawi, 2/11.
3 See Ibn Hazm, op. cit., 3/371; see al-'Amidi (1983), 2/322.
4A1-Mawsili, 1/50; al-Razi, 1/82.
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The answer to these two questions is largely obtainable by appealing to the five
following principles, each of which is treated in PF as a necessary guarantee for the
success of communication:
(i) Bayan al-mutakallim (the speaker's disposition to make his intention
manifest).
(ii) Sidq al-mutakallim (the speaker's truthfulness).
(iii) Al-'i'mal (roughly, operation).
(iv Al-tabadur (immediacy).
(v) Al-istishab (the presumption of the continuity).
It should be noted, however, that the assumption that co-operation is both the
motive behind the wad' of language and the goal of communication is the axis around
which these principles operate.
3.5.1.1. The Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his
Intention Manifest
By bayan al-mutakallim (the speaker's disposition to make his intention manifest)
the legal theorists mean "the speaker's revelation of his intention to the hearer". 1 'Abu
al-Husayn al-Basrl (d. 436/1044) offers four arguments to prove that the speaker
intends his audience to recognise his intention:
[First] Should the speaker not intend his intention to be recognised,
that would contradict his position as addresser (mukhatib lana ) since
what is understood from being an addresser is to address, and that would
mean nothing except to intend the addressees to understand.
[Secondly] Should he not intend the addressees to recognise his
intention immediately- despite the fact that his utterance seems as an
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 26.
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address to them, and the fact that if one addresses his audience in their
language, it would mean that he intends them to believe that he has
meant what they mean by the same discourse- that would mean he
intends the addressees not to know.
[Thirdly] Since the goal of communication is to make the addressee
understand [something], it would be futile if the addresser did not
intend the addressee to recognise his intention.
[Finally] If it was thinkable that he does not intend us to
understand, it would be thinkable to speak in Sudanese (zinjiyyah) to
an Arab who cannot speak it; rather this is more conceivable as in
Sudanese the Arab cannot find an ostensive interpretation that he might
hold.*
In order for the speaker to be said to have applied this principle, he ought to intend
his discourse to be taken in its ostensive interpretation, otherwise the speaker would
be intending something which his discourse does not signify.2 Thus, the speaker has
either to use his utterance in accordance with wad' or to indicate his departure from it
by contextual evidence. In other words, he ought to conform to the bases or to
introduce a valid context to show the addressee that he has violated one or more bases.
Failure to do so results in what is called al-ta 'qld (complication),3 which leads to
failure in communication.
Ibn al-Qayyim insists on the hearer's knowledge of this principle, regarding it as
one of two requirements the hearer must fulfil in order to be able to grasp the intention
of the speaker. The other requirement is, according to him, the knowledge of the
speaker's language and his habit in the use of the language^ (cf. 3.4.3).
^Al-Basri, 1/316; see al-Razi, 1/488-489. However, in modern pragmatics, similar
remarks are made by D Sperber and D Wilson: "It is generally true that ostensive
communicators try to be optimally relevant. When addressees are disappointed in their
expectations of relevance, they rarely consider as a possible explanation that the
communicator is not really trying to be optimally relevant. It would be tantamount to
assuming that the apparent communicator is not really addressing them, and perhaps
not communicating at all" (Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance:
Communication and Cognition, p. 159).
2-Al-Basri, 1/223.




However, there is no contradiction between the principle of the speaker's
disposition to make his intention manifest and the fact that speakers frequently use
vague expressions since their aims can be the identification of their intentions either in
general or in detail. 1 Zayd, for example, may know that 'Amr is in the house, but his
aim could be to make Khalid know that (a) 'Amr is in the house, or alternatively to
make him know that (b) a man is in the housed In both cases he can be said to have
observed the principle as long as he fulfils the condition mentioned in the previous
paragraph no matter whether he is very specific as in (a) or otherwise as in (b).
In brief, the importance of this principle with reference to interpretation is
manifested in the fact that the hearer is committed by virtue of this principle to take al-
zahir (the apparent interpretation) as the intended one. Thus, any interpretation which
is in disagreement with the apparent interpretation has to be, at least temporarily,
eliminated. However, the senses in which the term al-zahir (the apparent
interpretation) are employed vary from one context to another, yet in this context it is
usually used as equivalent to al-ma'na 1-mutabadir (immediate interpretation), i.e.
the first interpretation that occurs to the mind of the hearer (cf. 3.5.1.4).
3.5.1.2. The Principle of the Speaker's Truthfulness
The principle of sidq al-mutakallim (the speaker's truthfulness) does not receive
adequate exposition by the legal theorists, probably because they believe that the
truthfulness of the utterances ofAllah and the Prophet, which are their main concern,
is by no means questionable. However, there are some statements that offer some




presuming that the speaker is sincere? Why is it that hearers presume so? What is the
relationship between this principle and the presumption of co-operation?
With respect to the first question, al-Razi points out that if it is known or presumed
that the speaker is not telling a lie, it will be known that the utterance is intended to be
taken non-literally. ^ Conversely, it can be argued that if the hearer presumes that the
speaker is lying, he will halt the process of 'making sense of (or searching for the
purpose in) the speaker's utterances, which is required, by virtue of the principle of
'i'mal (cf. 3.5.1.3) for communication to be successful.
Thus, in order for language to function properly, we have to take the speaker's
statement to be true unless there is evidence to the contrary; thus if one says zaydun
qama (Zayd has stood up) we will, according to al-Qarafi, understand that the
addresser asserted this proposition, and take it to be true, because of the presumed
truthfulness of the addresser, thus believing what the proposition asserts is indeed the
case in reality.^
The principle of the speaker's truthfulness can be explained in terms of al-Qarall's
statement: "language is truthfulness not falsehood" (al-lughatu hiya 1-sidqu duna 1-
kadhib)^ by which he seems to render truthfulness as an inherent feature in language
to the effect that language cannot function properly without it. In fact, he goes much
further to claim that "the Arabs 'established' al-khabar (the declarative sentence) for
truthfulness but not for falsehood".^ To furnish the proof for this claim, he reports
"the consensus of the grammarians and linguists that the meaning of zaydun qama
(Zayd stood up) is the occurrence of the standing in the past" and adds "nobody said
^Al-Razi, 1/140.
^See Shihab al-DIn 'Ahmad b. Tdris al-Qarafi, al-Istighna' fi 1-Istithna', ed.
Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir 'Ata, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1986), p. 458;
see also al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, P. 248.
3Shihab al-Din 'Ahmad b. Tdris al-Qarafi, 'Anwar al-Buruq fi 'Anwa' al-Furuq,
(Cairo: Dar'Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah, 1344.AH), 1/24.
4Ibid.
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that its meaning is the possibility of standing and not standing".! It is worth
mentioning here that al-Qarafi has no objection to the definition of the declarative
sentence as the sentence that can be true or false, but his account is that the possibility
of falsehood "comes not in terms of wad' but in terms of the speaker".2
However, the claim that truthfulness is an inherent feature in language does not
appear to be in harmony with the common view which presupposes, as al-Zarkashi
explains, that "the Arabs established the patterns of constructions, but not the
particulars of these patterns [...] and referred meaning [i.e. the pragmatic meaning] to
the speaker's choice".3 According to this view, truthfulness or its denial has
absolutely nothing to do with language;"! rather they are generated by the performance
of the speaker. That is to say, sentences are neutral in terms of truthfulness and other
qualities, which, in fact, only emerge when sentences are rendered as utterances in
actual situations.
Nevertheless, there are at least two possible interpretations of al-Qarafi's statement
that "language is truthfulness not falsehood": the literal one, which has just been
explained; and the non-literal according to which he might be taken to mean that any
violation of this principle would lead to the disablement of language as a means of
communication.
The difference between the two views (e.g. al-Qarafi's view and the common
view) is, however, not applicable to falsehood in that both views treat this quality as a
non-linguistic behaviour of the speaker. Consequently, both views do not contradict
Ishihab al-Din 'Ahmad b. 'Idris al-Qarafi, 'Anwar al-Buruq fl 'Anwa' aJ-Furuq,
1/24.
2Ibid.
^Al-Suyuti, Jalal al-DIn, al-Muzhir fi 'ulum al-lughah wa-'anwa'iha, 1/45; see
Mohamed Mohamed Y. Ali, Wasf al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah Dilaliyyan fi Daw'
Mafhum al-Dalalah al-Markaziyyah: Dirasah Hawla 1-Ma'na wa-Zilal al-Ma'na,
p. 278.
^Al-Jurjam, 'Abd al-Qahir, 'Asrar al-Balaghah, ed. H., Ritter, pp. 345-347; see Ali,
op. cit., p. 278.
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the distinction between majaz (non-literal use) and falsehood owing to the fact that the
former, unlike the latter, has to be joined by contextual evidence which qualifies it as
an efficient alternative to literal use in communication.
So far, only one indirect answer to the question 'why is it that hearers presume
that the speaker is sincere?' has been provided, namely al-Qarafi's presumption that
truthfulness is an inherent feature in language. There is a further answer derived from
the general presumption in PF that people tend to be truthful in communication
because they feel that it is in their interest to do so. The legal theorists agree that the
tendency towards truthfulness is generally governed by al-'ilf (familiarity), al-'adah
(custom), madhhab (belief) and i'tiqad (ideology), and that al-'aql al-mujairad
(mere reason) prefers truthfulness to falsehood. 1 However, they acknowledge that
speakers may flout the principle of truthfulness for specific purposes, but this cannot
demolish the principle altogether, for although al-muqtadi (the cause) might fail to
produce its hukrn (issue) for a certain impediment, 'the base' is that the occurrence of
al-hukm is an inevitable consequence of the occurrence of al- 'illah (the cause).2 But,
as al-Razi's argument implies, if this principle was abandoned, and the reliability of
the speaker became dependent on the non-existence of an ulterior interest, which is
impossible to prove, it would be impossible to understand the discourse in its
ostensive form^ and, consequently, communication would break down. Obviously,
the correlation presumed by al-Razi between the violation of this principle and the
failure of communication implies that co-operation, which is held to be the motive
behind the establishment and use of language, could not be achieved without the
maintenance of this principle.
lrThey are, nevertheless, in dispute about whether al- 'aql al-mujarrad (the mere reason)
would be able to judge that truthfulness is worthy of religious reward and falsehood is
worthy of religious blame and punishment. Contrary to the Salafls and Mu 'tazilis,





3.5.1.3. The Principle of 'I'mal
The principle of 'i'mal (lit, to make something operate) is designed to describe
what the addressee has to do when he receives the speaker's utterance. The essence of
this principle is that the hearer tends to make the received discourse and the relevant
contexts operate by exploiting them to their maximum capability as they are, roughly
speaking, the clue to the intention of the speaker. The hearer, according to this
principle, searches for any clue that can lead to the intention of the speaker, presuming
that interlocutors have mutual interest in communicating with each other. This
principle also means that just as the speaker makes his remark manifest as clearly as
possible to render his intention recognisable, the hearer has to make the speaker's
utterance operate by assuming that it is meaningful in a way which allows for the
recovery of his intention. To explain this principle in a simple and pretheoretical
English, the 'i'mal of an utterance or an expression is to make sense of, or to search
for the purpose in it.
In PF, the principle of 'i'mal (operation) is formulated in different ways, but the
most common and precise formulation is the following:
(i) "'i'malu 1-Kalami 'awla min 'ihmalih" (Making sense of the utterance is
given priority to disregarding it).l
(ii) "'inna hamla 1-kalami 'ala fa'idatin 'awla min 'ilgha'ih" (Making sense of
the utterance is given priority to cancelling it).2
Thus, the first step for the hearer in dealing with a certain discourse is to take all
the speaker's utterances as operative signifiers for their meanings, for "the failure of a
Ijalal al-Din al-Suyuti, al-'Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir fi Qawa'id wa-Furu' Fiqh al-
Shafi'iyyah (Dar al-Sham li-l-Turath, n.p., n.d.), p. 142.
2-Ibid., p. 143.
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signifier to stand for its signified is against 'the base'".l However, if there is
evidence that expressions are not being used in their literal meanings "they must be
interpreted figuratively in order to avoid the cancellation of the utterance and leaving
the expression without intention".2 So, if a parent declares that he leaves his
possessions to 'awladih (his children), the word 'awlad (children) must, given that
his immediate children are dead, be interpreted to mean 'his descendants' since the
literal interpretation is muta'adhdhir (impossible), thus upholding the general
signification of 'awlad in order to avoid the disregard of the expression.3
Moreover, if the hearer has to choose between an informative interpretation and a
more informative one (richer in meaning), he would, as maintained by this principle,
choose the more informative one, since its selection leads to what is called "takthir al-
fa'idah (increasing the value) and enables him to obtain maximum information from
the expression. Similarly, should a conflict occur between taking the utterance as a
fresh contribution or as ta'kid (diaphora), the former would be more appropriate as a
course of action^ since 'the base' stipulates "that the expression fulfils its requirement,
and signifies its meaning".5 Besides, if the hearer receives two utterances, one of
which is more specific, he is required to give prominence to the more specific on the
grounds that this would guarantee the 'i'mal of the two utterances, which is regarded
by the legal theorists as more appropriate "li'anna 'i'mala 1-dalUayni 'ahra 'ay
'awla". ^
lAl-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 248; al-'Amidl (1983), 2/279.
^Al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih. 1/322.
3See Jalal al-DIn al-Suyutl, al-'Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir fl Qawa'id wa-Fvru' Fiqh al-
Shafi'iyyah, p. 143.
^Al-RazI, 1/271; al-'Amidl (1983), 2/274; al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rlfat, p. 28 (al-
ta'sis); see al-TahanawI, 1/28 (al-ta'sis); al-Ruhawi, p. 351.
^Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 132.
^Al-'Asnawi, 2/466; al-'Amidi (1983), 2/48; al-Muti'I, op. cit., 2/475.
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3.5.1.4. The Principle of Immediacy
The principle of tabadur (immediacy) is used to identify the most likely proper
interpretation. By tabadur the legal theorists presume that al-mubadir or al-sabiq (the
immediate, i.e. the first interpretation that occurs to the hearer) is the one which is
most likely to be the intention of the speaker. Any other possible interpretation that
occurs later is called mubadar (literally means masbuq (preceded)). However, not
any interpretation that comes to the mind is acceptable, but only that which the
addressee believes to be intended by the speaker. * The intention behind this constraint
is to rule out the infinite inferences that can be derived from utterances if taken
independently from the intention of the speaker.^
Al-tabadur is regarded as the primary criterion on which the addressee bases
himself in his selection of the proper interpretation. This is reflected in the way in
which this principle is formulated: "al-mubadarah 'awla" (priority is given to
immediacy).3
At this stage, two separate, but connected, questions arise:
(i) - Why is it that the immediate interpretation is the most likely to be the proper
interpretation?
(ii) - What kind of interpretation is qualified to fulfil the requirements of
immediacy?
The simple answer to the first question is that the speaker and hearer are both
presumed to have a mutual interest in communicating with each other, so they are
eager to facilitate the communicative process. On the speaker's part, this would, as
ISee al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/148, 2/76; idem, Hashiyat al-
Talwlh 'ala 1-Tawdih, 1/322.
2()n a similar view, see Diane Blakemore, Understanding Utterances: An Introduction
to Pragmatics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 30.
^Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 247.
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previously mentioned, involve following the bases, or, alternatively, indicating his
departure from them by means of a relevant context. Bearing in mind that the speaker
should behave in this manner, the hearer presumes that unless there is evidence to the
contrary, the intention of the speaker would be what is understood from the ostensive
interpretation.
With respect to the second question, the following answers can be offered:
(i) - The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance
with bases.
(ii) - The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance
with wad'.
(iii) - The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the most expected one.
(iv) - The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the most 'related'
interpretation to the literal meaning.
(I)- The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance
with bases.
[According to al-Qarafi], al-haqiqah (literal interpretation) is given
priority because its occurrence to the mind of the speaker is more
immediate than al-majaz (the figurative interpretation); and this
immediate occurrence (al-sabq) is what is meant by "the base [...] in
speech is literal use".*
However, if the literal interpretation is eliminated by contextual evidence, the
alternative would be the figurative interpretation,2 or more precisely "the figurative
interpretation nearest to the literal one".3
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 120.
2See Shihab al-DIn 'Ahmad b. Tdris al-Qarafi, al-'Ihkam fi Tamylz al-Fatawa 'an
al-'Ahkam wa-Tasarrufat al-Qadl wa-l-'Imam, p. 62.
3 Mullakhusru, 1/330.
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Since bases are formulated in accordance with the requirements of wad', the
answer to the second question can be stated as in (II):
(II)- The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the one in accordance
with wad'
(III)- The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the most expected
one.
The hearer's expectations about the speaker's utterance are heavily dependent on
his knowledge of the speaker's history including his habit of the use of the language in
the sense that "the more knowledge the hearer has about the speaker, his intentions,
his language and his habit, the more complete and perfect his knowledge of the
speaker's intention will be".2 This may be illustrated by the Prophet's example cited
above (cf. 3.4.2), where the addressee interprets " ma' " as a name of a particular
tribe while the Prophet intends it, in fact, to be "water" in the sense that water is the
origin of human beings. The success of 'Abu Bakr (and presumably anybody who
has the same relevant knowledge) in grasping the intention of the speaker could be
explained by invoking their presumed knowledge of this matter. Consequently, it can
be assumed that grasping the ulterior intention of the Prophet would partially depend
on his prior knowledge that the Prophet (i) would not provide the unbeliever with an
explicit answer to his question as this would lead to the destruction and, therefore, the
suppression of his mission, and (ii) would not tell a he. It would also partially depend
on knowing that human beings are created, according to Islam, from water. Since
these expectations (or presumptions) were not held by the addressee (the tribesman),
he failed to grasp the ulterior intention of the Prophet, though he understood the




However, temporal and spatial circumstances are believed to contribute to the
expectations about the intention of the speaker, and this appears to be the justification
for recording what is called 'asbab al-nuzul (the reasons for revelation) of the
Qur'anic verses, and for specifying the places in which they were revealed. The
reference to 'Abu Bakr's example (cf. 3.4.2) might be helpful to explain this idea,
where the addressee understood the word "way" in 'Abu Bakr's answer "this is the
man who is guiding me to the way" as 'road', whereas 'Abu Bakr intended it to be
'the way' leading to the furtherance of his well-being in life, and Paradise in the
hereafter. In this example, it seems reasonable to ascribe the addressee's failure to
recover Abu Bakr's intention to the fact that the meeting took place in the desert,
which makes the addressee inclined to equate the speaker's intention with the most
ostensive meaning of the utterance. However, the failure of the addressees to recover
the addressers' intentions in these two examples does not undermine the view that the
first interpretation that occurs to the hearer is the one most likely to be the intention of
the speaker since these two examples do not illustrate what is held to be the common
way of the use of language. On the contrary, these two examples may be judged to
demonstrate the correlation between the violation of the principle of the speaker's
disposition to make his intention manifest (the principle which is held to be a
presupposition for this view) and the failure of communication.
Furthermore, the more accessible a phenomenon or an object, the greater the
possibility that the hearer would expect it to be part of the speaker's intention. As al-
Qarati points out, if a given currency becomes the dominant one in a particular place,
currency-related expressions will be taken to refer to it. 1 Consider:
A- How much is a cup of tea?
B- Eighty.
^See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 120.
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It is obvious that if this exchange takes place in Britain, the "eighty" will probably
be interpreted as eighty pence, but it would be interpreted differently in different
places.
(IV)- The first interpretation which occurs to the speaker is the most related one.
This presumption is not necessarily in contrast with (III) above, since in most
cases, they actually express the same idea but from two different angles. However,
the term 'alaqah (relation) is usually associated with the notion majaz, which seems
to be more general than what the English term 'figurative' refers to, since a great deal
of what is labelled as 'implicatures' in the Gricean sense is covered by this term.
Relation in PF is designed to account for the connections between sentence
meaning and utterance meaning; or to use PF's terminology, between ma'na
(meaning) and murad (intention), which are, according to Dascal, "the business of
pragmatic interpretation". 1 Moreover, "the task of pragmatic theory is to account for
the means whereby this is achieved".2 As Dascal points out, some "of these means
are certainly the Gricean maxims, notably the maxim of relevance".3 If this is
conceded, it can be assumed that the legal theorists offer a workable theory to account
for interpretation in terms of relevance. According to this theory, every act ofmajaz
involves a relation and context. By context, they mean, in fact, a set of contexts,
some of which function as diverting contexts while the others serve as guiding
contexts. The former are intended to eliminate the irrelevant interpretations, whereas
the latter indicate the relevant ones (cf. 3.5). The literal interpretation is discarded if it
conflicts with qarinah sanfah (diverting context) in any way. Some of the instances
in which the conflict occurs are:
1 Marcelo Dascal, "On the Pragmatic Structure of Conversation", in J. R. Searle (ed.),




(i)- If the literal interpretation contradicts logical or customary facts (li-
ta'adhdhvriha 'aqlasi 'aw 'adatan)J
(ii) If the literal interpretation contradicts the hearer's assumptions about the
world. ^
(iii) If the literal interpretation contradicts another verbal context.^
(iv) If the proposition is already known by the hearer and the speaker knows that.
However, the legal theorists investigate further cases concerning specific kinds of
sentences, such as conditional and imperative sentences, where the literal interpretation
is eliminated if
(i) the speaker knows that the condition he makes already exists;
(ii) the speaker knows that the condition he makes is impossible to meet; or
(iii) the speaker knows that the demand he makes is impossible to perform.^
With regard to 'guiding context', the term context is sometimes employed in so
broad a manner that it incorporates some, if not all, of the principles of
communication, distinctly the principle of truthfulness (cf. 3.5.1.2). In his
exemplification of al-qarlnah al-haliyyah (situational context) al-RazI regards the
hearer's knowledge or assumption that the speaker is not lying as a way of
recognising that the speaker is speaking figuratively. According to him, al-qarinah
al-haliyyah includes any indication made by the speaker or inferred from the situation,
that the speaker is speaking non-literally.5
ISee al-'Ansari, 1/221.
-^Ibn al-Malik, p. 428.
3Ibidp. 427.
^See al-Samarqandl, pp. 323-324; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 146.
^See al-Razi, 1/140.
96
However, some scholars, particularly Arab rhetoricians, see the guiding context as
equivalent to what is meant by 'alaqah (relation). 1 As it has been pointed out earlier
(cf. 3.5), this view is highly suspect since the relation is not the sole guide to the
speaker's intention. Thus, it can be said that, with the exception of those falling under
the scope of diverting context, all the relevant assumptions involved in non-literal
communication can be covered by the term guiding context. Nevertheless, I shall
concentrate below on 'relation' as it forms the other part of what can be labelled as the
theory of relevance in PF.
In PF, relation is viewed as a matter of degree which allows speakers some
freedom as to the clarity between the linguistic meaning of an utterance and the
speaker's intention. Given that, according to the communication principles, speakers
are bound to communicate clearly and, therefore, successfully, there must, the legal
theorists say, be limitations on relation. Consequently, the figurative use of an
utterance is acceptable only if the relation is close 'idha qarubat 'alaqatuhu. Any
figurative use lacking this condition is characterised as majaz al-ta'qid (complex
figurative use).2 This kind of majaz, which needs too many relations to be
interpreted, is mumtani' (inaccessible) in communication.3 Plainly, this view is
based on the assumption that language is established and systematically used in a co¬
operative manner in communication, and that this in turn means that the more an
utterance conforms to this principle the more successful the communicative act will be
and vice versa. This applies to all kinds of implicational significations.^
This condition of qurb al-'alaqah (the closeness of relation), which is sometimes
alternatively expressed as the immediate occurrence to mind of the intended object of
communication sabqu 1-dhihni mina 1-musamma 'ilayh, is taken as a criterion to
1Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjanl, al-'Isharat wa-l-Tajibihat fi 'Ilm al-
Balaghah, ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn, p. 206.




decide whether or not a particular act of non-literal use is accessible and, also, to
evaluate which one of the two or more possible interpretations should be given priority
over the other. Al-RazI, who reports the consensus of the legal theorists in giving
priority to haqiqah (literal use) over majaz (non-literal use), formulates the following
workable criterion to justify this matter:
"Dependence on one factor is more appropriate than dependence on many".l
In his implementation of this criterion on majaz, al-RazI states that unlike haqiqah,
majaz requires the following:
(i) the existence of haqiqah ;
(ii) the existence of what is qualified to be majaz;
(iii) the relation whereby majaz would be justifiable; and
(iv) the impracticality of haqiqah2.
Al-Razi also points out that diverting the expression from haqiqah to majaz needs
"naw' ta'ammul wa-istidlal (some kind of mediation and reasoning)".3 in modern
pragmatics, this has been shown to be true.4 However, the issue is not as simple as it
seems to be, owing to the difficulty of providing a water-tight distinction between
literal and non-literal use. In PF, criteria are provided for making the distinction clear
between the two types of use, but, some of the legal theorists doubt these criteria.^
What is more, some scholars, the Salafls in particular, deny the plausibility of the
^Al-Razi, 1/154, see al-'Asnawi, 2/160.
2-Al-Razi, 1/154.
3Ibid., 1/158.
^Akmajian and others formulate the presumption of literalness as follows, "Literal
utterances seem to have communicative priority in that we presume a person to be
speaking literally unless there is some reason to suppose the contrary" (pp. 404-405).
They quoted some psychological evidence to prove this presumption (p. 455). Adrian
Akmajian, Richard A. Demers and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistics: An Introduction
to Language and Communication, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: the MIT press, 1984).
^See, e.g., al-Basri, 1/25-27; al-Razi, 1/148-151; Ibn al-Hajib, 1/145; 'Adud, 1/145-
153; al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/146-153; al-Sharif al-Jurjani,
Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, l/146-i53; al-HarawI, 1/146-152; al-Samarqandi,
i/197-198 and see the editor's note (38).
98
distinction altogether, claiming that this distinction is a technical construct, and that it
has no empirical basis (cf. 4.8). Nonetheless, there seem to be different degrees of
literalness in linguistic utterances that are sufficient enough to justify the assumption
that some utterances take more time and effort to process than others.
However, there are further criteria for identifying which one of the possible non-
literal interpretations would have priority over the other(s). Ibn Hajib mentions the
following:
(i) the prominence of the relation (shuhrat al- 'alaqah);
(ii) the strength of the relation (quwwat al- 'alaqah);
(iii) the closeness of the majaz's sense to the literal meaning (qurb jihatih);
(iv) the predominance of its contextual evidence (rujhan dalilih); and
(v) the prominence of its use (shuhrat isti 'malih). 1
Al-Taftazani condenses all these criteria^ in these words: "briefly, the more
prominent 'ashhar, stronger 'aqwa or more apparent 'azhar the relation of one of the
non-literal interpretations is to the literal meaning, the more appropriate that
interpretation will be". 3
Relation is classified into different types, each of which is held to be
subsumptively established (wudi'at wad'an naw'iyyan) and, therefore, mutually
known by interlocutors. The particular actualisations of these types of relations are
llbn al-Hajib, 2/312; 'Adud, 2/313; al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
2/313.
^Wilson and Sperber offer two similar criteria to account for relevance:
(1) "other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the
relevance" (Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and
Cognition, p. 119).
(2) "other things being equal, the greater the processing efforts, the lower the
relevance" (Sperber and Wilson, op. cit., p. 124).
See Sperber and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 119-125; see also Ellen L. Barton,
Nonsentential Constituents: A Theory of Grammatical Structure and Pragmatic
Interpretation (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 200-
201.
3Al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/313.
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dependent on the speaker's choice. In other words, speakers can create as many new
majaz as they wish provided that the relation between the literal meaning and the
intention is in accordance with the subsumptive wad' in its general meaning. Thus,
by virtue of these types of relation one might (given the relevant context and the
absence of any impediment) for example,
(i) utter the cause (al-sabab) and intend the effect (al-musabbab);
(ii) utter the effect and intend the cause;
(iii) utter something and intend its approximation (m ushabihih);
(iv) utter a part of something (al-jvz' ) and intend the whole (al-kull);
(v) utter the whole and intend the part;
(vi) utter the general (al-'amm) and intend the particular (al-khass);
(vii) utter the particular and intend the general;
(viii) utter the place (al-mahall) and intend its content (al-hall);
(ix) utter the content and intend its place;
(x) utter what is implying (al-lazim) and intend the implicatum (al-malzum);
(xi) utter the implicatum and intend the implying;
(xii) utter the unqualified (al-mutlaq) and intend the qualified (al-mvqayyad);
(xiii) utter the qualified and intend the unqualified;
(xiv) utter something and intend its function; and
(xv) utter something and intend its opposite (diddah). 1
The idea behind these types of relation is better explained in terms of the view that
"meaning attracts another meaning but not the expression".2 The essence of this view
is that expressing meaning can be carried out by one of two ways: (a) by producing
an expression to signify its conventional meaning or (b) by producing an expression to
^Al-Razi, 1/134-137; Ibn al-Hajib, 1/141; 'Adud, 1/142-143; al-Taftazani, Hashiyah
'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/142-145, al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
1/142-145; al-Harawi, 1/142-145; al-Samarqandl, pp. 532-533; al-Baydawi, 2/164; al-
'Asnawl, 2/164-169; Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjani, al-'Isharat wa-1-
Tanblhatfi 'Ilm al-Balaghah, ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn, pp. 206-237.
2-Muhibb Allah, .1/186; al-'Ansari, 1/186.
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indicate the implicational signification of its conventional meaning. In order for
speakers to understand each other, there must be a kind of relationship between
expression and meaning on the one hand, and between meaning and intention on the
other. The relation between the expression and its conventional meaning is held to be
arbitrary (i 'tibatiyyati)' whereas the relation between the conventional meaning and
its implicational signification (dalalatuh al-iltizamiyyah)- or what 'Abd al-Qahir al-
Jurjanl calls ma 'na 1-ma 'na (the meaning ofmeaning)^ is implicational.3 Implication
is meant to be so general that it covers the inference of meaning from meaning, which
is presumed to be based on one of the types of relations stated above. It should be
noted, however, that this implication is, as al-RazI puts it, not a mvjib (cause) but
only a condition.^ That is to say, it is, as al-'AsnawI explains, not the implication in
itself which is the cause that leads to the implicational signification, but that the cause
1 Since introduced by De Saussure, the notion of the arbitrariness of the linguistic
signs has become not only an unquestionable postulate, but also "one of the
cornerstones of modern linguistics". (See Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles of
Pragmatics, p. 25. In PF, although some Mu'tazilis, notably 'Abbad al-Saymari,
claim that the relationship between expression and meaning is munasabah dhatiyyah
(intrinsic relation), most scholars argue against this view. Some of their counter¬
arguments are:
(i) If the signification of expression was intrinsic, it would not vary across regions and
nations. Besides, everybody would be able to have access to any language (Al-RazI,
1/58; see Ali, Mohamed Mohamed. Y., Wasf al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah Dilaliyyan fi
Daw' Mafhum al-Dalalah al-Markaziyyah, pp. 31-32.
(ii) This view is contradicted by the phenomenon of al-addad, where one linguistic
form has two opposite meanings, e.g. jawn for black and white, and qur' for
menstruation and non-menstruation (See Ibn al-Hajib, 1/192; 'Adud, 1/192-193; al-
Taftazanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al- Adud, 1/192-193; al-Sharif ai-Jurjam, Hashiyah
'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/192-193).
2According to 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjam, if you say balaghani 'annaka tuqaddimu
rijlan wa-tu' akhkhiru 'ukhra (lit, I hear that you put one foot forward and the other
backward), "you cannot convey your intention by the expression alone, but rather the
expression will signify its ostensive meaning and then the hearer infers from this
meaning another meaning [which he calls the meaning of meaning] which is your
intention". 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjanl, Dala'il al-'I'jaz, ed. Muhammad Rudwan al-
Dayah and Muhammad Fayiz al-Dayah (Dar Qutayba, n.p., 1983), p. 184; see Ali, op.
cit., pp. 179-180.
3See Muhammad b. 'All b. Muhammad al-Jurjanl, al-'Isharat wa-l-Tajiblhat fi 'Urn
al-Balaghah, ed. 'Abd al-Qadir Husayn, pp. 206.
^Al-Razi, 1/76.
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is, in fact, the production of the utterance 1 with the consideration of the context.^ In
other words, these types of relations alone are not sufficient to enable speakers to infer
one meaning from another, but there must exist contextual evidence to determine
which one of the possible implicata is intended in any given actual situation. On the
other hand, speakers are not free to use any expression (or more precisely any
meaning) to generate an implicature, but there must exist a relevant relation between
the conventional meaning and the intention of the speaker so that the speaker can
render his intention manifest to the hearer by virtue of the fact that relations of this type
are mutually known by both of them. Thus, it can be said that the above types of
relations roughly function as a set of bridges between the meaning of an expression
and the implications derivable from it, while the guiding contexts function as 'road
signs' to guide the hearer to the appropriate bridge that should be followed in order to
reach the intention of the speaker.
3.5.1.5. The Principle of Istishab
This principle, which is usually presented in this form: "al-'aslu baqa'u ma kana
'ala ma kan"^ (lit, 'the base' is the maintenance of the status quo^), is frequently
combined with the notion of al- 'asl and al-far', so it would be useful to examine these
notions in relation to each other. Al-'asl (the base) is usually understood in relation to
what is considered to be its opposite, namely al-far' (the subsidiary). The notion of
al-'asl and al-far' is given great importance not only in PF, but also in different
lAl-'Asnawi, 2/35.
2-See Mullakhusru, 1/303; Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i, Sullam al-Wusvl li-Sharh
Nihayat al-Sul, 2/35 note no (1).
^Al-'Asnawi, 2/160; al-RazI, 1/231; seeal-'Amidi (1983), 2/342; al-Tahanawi, 1/809
(al-istishab).
^See Ian Richard Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam (London: Curzon Press,
1992), p. 130 (al-istishab). On a similar notion in modern pragmatics, see Gillian
Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (London: Cambridge University Press,
1983), p. 65.
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domains of the Arabic sciences. It is recognised by the grammarians, the rhetoricians
and the jurists in their respective disciplines. It is clear from this that 'asl and far' are
important notions in the Arabic intellectual tradition.
The idea behind the notion of al-'asl and al-far' seems to be the fact that humans
tend, in the absence of any instantaneous evidence, to form an initial intuition-based
presumption about the situation they encounter. By virtue of the principle of istishab,
this presumption is maintained unless it conflicts with some contextual evidence.
However, although the two notions (the base-subsidiary notion and the notion
istishab) appear to operate jointly, they, nevertheless, should be kept distinct.
However, it should be noted that assuming the continuity of something logically
necessitates the assumption of its prior existence, and that is why the two notions are
occasionally investigated together in PF and the other branches of the Arabic sciences
in general.
There are fundamental general assumptions concerning the base and subsidiary
which can be found in PF either explicitly or implicitly. The following are examples
of these assumptions:
(i) 'The base' cannot be renounced for 'the subsidiary' without justification, 1
which may be a reason, condition, contextual evidence, motive or goal, depending on
the viewpoint being considered.
(ii) 'The subsidiary' must have some connection with 'the base',2 these
connections, however, vary in terms of degree and type.
(iii) It is typically possible to attribute a certain subsidiary to its base by way of
abstraction (or decontextualisation).
ISee Sadr al-Shan'ah, 1/343.
2-See ibid., 1/343.
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(iv) 'The subsidiary' can be explained by reference to its base.
(v) 'The subsidiary' is potentially exposed to some environmental variations which
are not attached to 'the base'.
(vi) Bases and subsidiaries are relative concepts; that is, some bases may be
regarded as subsidiaries in relation to other bases, and some subsidiaries may be
regarded as bases in relation to other subsidiaries.
(vii) Some bases can be arranged in hierarchical order, and the lower bases, in this
case, might be governed by the higher.
(viii) Bases may sometimes conflict with each other, which might be resolved by
what is called qawa'id al-tarjlh (rules of preference).
However, there are certain characteristics that can be attached to bases and others
to subsidiaries. These characteristics are not necessarily applicable to each base or
subsidiary, but at the same time no element can be regarded as a base or subsidiary
without displaying some of the relevant characteristics given below.
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The legal theorists formulate a set of bases, which they assume obtainable in any
act of communication if there is no evidence to the contrary. It should, however, be
noted that some bases are formulated in a variety of ways in the literature:
(i) "Al-'aslv isti'malu 1-sighati fi musammaha"1 (lit. 'the base' is to use the
form in its meaning) (i.e. the original state is to use the form to signify its
predetermined meaning).
"Al-'aslv 'adamu 1-naqli wa-l-taghylr"2 (lit, 'the base' is the non-existence of
transfer or change) (i.e. the original state is to exclude any transfer or change of
established features).
"Al-naqlu khilafu l-'asl"3 (lit, transference is against 'the base').(i.e.
transference deviates from the original state).
(ii) "Al-'aslu 1-haqiqah "4 (lit, 'the base' is literalness).
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 139.
2Ibid., pp. 137, 235, 247; Shihab al-DIn 'Ahmad b. Tdris al-Qarafi, al-Istighna' fi 1-
Istithna', ed. Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir 'Ata, p. 457; al-'AsnawI, 2/218.
^Al-RazI, 1/129; al-Baydawi, 2/159; al-'Asnawi, 2/160.
^Al-Razi, 1/146, 381; al-'Amidl (1983), 2/291, 322; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, PP.
123, 130, 193, 235; ai-Baydawi, 2/226; al-'Asnawi, 2/186, 239; al-Taftazanl,
Hashiyat al-Talwih, 1/314; al-Suyuti, Jalal al-DIn, al-'Ashbah wa-l-Naza'ir fi
Qawa'id wa-Furu' Fiqh al-Shafi'iyyah, p. 69.
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"Al-majazu khilafu l-'asl"1 (lit, non-literalness is against 'the base') (i.e. the
original state is to rule out the opposite of the prior state of literalness).
(iii) uAl-'idmaru khilafu l-'asl(lit, ellipsis is against 'the base').
"Al-'aslu 'adamu l-'idmar"3 (lit, 'the base' is the non-existence of ellipsis) (i.e.
the original state is to rule out the opposite of the prior state of complete
manifestation).
(iv) 'Al-'aslu 'adamu 1-ishtirak"4 (lit, 'the base' is the non-existence of
indeterminacy) (i.e. the original state rules out indeterminacy).
"Al-ishtiraku khilafu l-'asl(li, indeterminacy is against 'the base') (i.e. the
original state is to rule out the opposite of the single expression of function).
(v) "Al-'aslu 'adamu l-'ijmal"6 (lit, 'the base' is the non-existence of obscurity)
(i.e. the original state is the exclusion of obscurity).
"Af-'ijmalu khilafu l-'asl"7 (lit, obscurity is against 'the base').
(vi) "Al-mutaradifu 'ala khilafi l-'asl"° (lit, synonymy is against 'the base') (i.e.
synonymy is a deviation from the original state, which is the one-for-one meaning
relation).
^Al-Razi, 1/144; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 130; al-Baydawi, 2/170; al-'Asnawi,
2/172, 269; al-Suyuti, Jalal al-DIn, al-Muzhir fl 'ulum al-lughah wa-'anwa'iha,
1/361.
^Al-'Amidi (1983), 2/364, 366, 377; al-'Asnawi, 2/254.
3Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 112.
^Al-'Amidi (1983), 1/105, 2/191; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 130-131, 192.
5A1-'AmidI (1983), 2/190, 192, 342; al-'Ansari, 1/311.
6Adud, 2/258.
7Al-'Amidi (1983), 2/343, 378.
^Al-Razi, 1/130.
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(vii) "Al-'aslu 'adamu 1-taqyid"1 (lit, 'the base' is unqualification) (i.e. the
original state is to exclude qualification).
(viii) "Al-'aslu 'adamu 1-taqdim wa-l-ta'khir"2 (lit, 'the base' is the non¬
existence of 'preposing and postposing') (i.e. the original state is to exclude
'preposing and postposing').
Thus, priority ought to be given to
literal use over non-literal use (al-haqiqah duna 1-majaz), the general
over the particular (al-'umum duna 1-khusus), determinacy over
indeterminacy (al-'ifrad duna 1-ishtirak), unqualification over
qualification (al-'itlaq duna 1-taqyid), originality over tautology (al-
ta'sll duna 1-ziyadah), order over 'preposing and postposing' (al-tartlb
duna l-taqdlm wa-l-ta'khir), initiation over emphasis (al-ta'sis duna 1-
ta'kld), continuation over abrogation (al-baqa duna 1-naskh), legal over
rational [interpretation] (al-shar'I duna 1-naqli), technical over linguistic
[interpretation] (al- 'ucfi duna 1-lughawi); unless there is evidence to the
contrary. 3
Al-Qarafi insists that a base does not always have priority in interpretation since
the principle of immediacy demands that the hearer chooses the dominant interpretation
whether it is a base or not. In other words, bases are given priority only by default.
He says:
Turning into the dominant [interpretation] is obligatory, even if it is
against 'the base'. Do not you see that non-literal use is against 'the
base', yet if it appears most likely by evidence, it will become inevitable.
This applies also to particularity, ellipsis and the rest of the things that
are against 'the base'.4
Let us now turn to the principle of istishab (lit, "seeking a companion or link".5
As mentioned above, by virtue of this principle the initial presumption is to maintain
the 'asl until evidence to the contrary is made manifest. The notion of istishab or the
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 113.
^Al-RazI, 1/176.
^Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 112.
^Shihab al-DIn al-Qarafi, al-'Ihkam fi Tamyiz al-Fatawa 'an al-'Ahkam wa-
Tasarrufat al-Qadi wa-al-'Imam, p. 62.
5 Ian Richard Netton, A PopularDictionary of Islam, p. 130 (al-istishab).
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presumption of continuity is based on the assumption that the status quo is presumed
to obtain as long as there is no evidence to the contrary. This assumption is believed
to play an essential role not only in the scientific thinking of the Arabs but also in
everyday life. As 'Adud al-Millah wa-1-Dln puts it,
were it not for this presumption, no sane person would justify the
correspondence of the people staying away from him, the engagement in
works that take time [to yield] such as ploughing (.hirathah) and
commerce, the dispatching of consignments and gifts from country to a
remote country, loan or debt; and if it were not for this assumption, all




Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual theory of interpretation
4.1. Introduction
In the course of his extended discussion of the two controversial topics ofmajaz
(figurative use) and ta'wil (diverting to non-apparent meaning), Ibn Taymiyyah
advances scattered, but powerful, arguments in favour of a contextual approach to
interpretation. These arguments can be interpreted as a polemic criticism against what
can be called atomism (i.e. the view that certain meanings are ultimately simple and
unqualified)^ and foundationalism (i.e. the doctrine that meanings are predetermined
and a priori 'established') as developed by the adherents of the notion of wad', in
favour of a well-developed version of compositionalism and contextualism. My task
in this chapter will be to integrate these scattered arguments into a coherent form so
that they appear as a highly evolved theory of interpretation. Moreover, my
formulation of this theory will display its coherence by delving into its underlying
philosophical principles. This will involve relating it to Ibn Taymiyyah's relevant
ontological and epistemological concepts but with less emphasis on his theological
outlook. Besides, the inquiry will include an outline of what can be assumed to be the
two other related pragmatic theories which they form, together with the theory at
issue, a consistent pragmatic paradigm enhanced by a uniform philosophical
framework. The other two are his theory of definition and his theory of cognitive
relativism. What these theories have in common is that all of them lay great emphasis
on context and make the participants (i.e. the actual agents) the principal element in
!According to Ibn Taymiyyah, what is called basa'it (atoms) which are assumed to be
unqualified components of al- 'anwa' (the species) has no reality (Ibn Taymiyyah, al-
'Iman,p. 102). They are in fact merely postulated abstract objects. This leads him to
question the validity of the distinction between what is known in the traditional logic as
tasawwur (conceptualisation) which he explains as "the conceptualisation of a simple
object which is free from any qualification" (Ibid., pp. 101-102) and tasdlq
(propositional apprehension) which can roughly be explained as the cognition of a
proposition, arguing that tasawwur in this sense does not take place. (Ibid., p. 102).
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forming the subject, whether it is a definition, interpretation or cognition. Thus, it will
be demonstrated that context-dependency is a firmly established notion in Ibn
Taymiyyah's thinking and that his contextual theory of interpretation constitutes only
one of at least three theories in which the notion of context-dependency is manifested.
In spite of its originality, Ibn Taymiyyah's pragmatic position does not seem to
have been considered before in a serious study if at all. In fact, his call for a
contextual approach to interpretation is almost always understood by his opponents
either as a dogmatic denial of the existence ofmajaz in the language or as a naive call
directed at the adherents of ta'wll (cf. 4.9.1) for the abandonment of the attention they
give to non-apparent meanings of the Qvr'anic and Sunnaic texts. Unfortunately,
even his followers- with the exception of his eminent disciple Ibn al-Qayyim who
shows in his elaboration of Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas a deep understanding of his
remarkable insights- do not seem, as far as I am aware, to give to his ideas the
consideration they merit. Hence, this chapter is tantamount to an attempt to reveal
some of Ibn Taymiyyah's pragmatic thought and re-evaluate a significant aspect of his
obscure insights.
4.2. Call for a contextual approach
Ibn Taymiyyah's main thesis is that "there is no entity that is free from any
qualification in the external world" (la yujadu fl 1-khariji shay'un mawjudun
kharijun 'an kulli qayd). 1 Consequently, there is no such a thing as unqualified
expression or unqualified meaning other than the mental representations of real
expressions and meanings, which are in effect nothing but abstract constructs having
no reality in the external world. The essence of his argument is that the formal
approaches attempted by Greek and Muslim philosophers^ to discover the truth failed
4bn Taymiyyah, al-'Iman, p. 101.
^Ibn Taymiyyah's arguments aim at refuting Greek philosophy and its Islamic
versions particularly those of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna).
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owing to their appeal to abstract structures instead of dealing with reality, and that a
plausible inquiry can be achieved only by an empirical approach which takes the
overall situation of a particular phenomenon into account. The philosophers'
misconception is, says Ibn Taymiyyah, due to a confusion between the world per se
and their assumptions about the world. They incorrectly think that what they construct
in their minds represents the external reality, although their mental representations are
decontextualised and divested of the individual variations of the external entities which
are generated by their individuation and which, he believes, is the sign of their real
existence in the physical world.
It may be helpful to point out that this approach is patently consistent with his
theological doctrines. Chief among them is the belief that Allah has real external
existence with actual unique attributes on the grounds that nothing can be said to have
real external existence unless it is entitled to be assigned particular attributes. He
strongly rejects Ibn Slna's and al-RazI's notion of al-mutlaq al-mahd (the pure
absolute), "which cannot be characterised by oneness or plurality, or existence or non¬
existence, or otherwise" (alladhl la yattasifu bi-wahdatin wa-la kathratin, wa-la
wujudin wa-la 'admin, wa-la ghayri dhalik). 1
4.3. Philosophical Background
The basic idea Ibn Taymiyyah is attempting to convey in the course of his
discussion ofmajaz is that meaning is context-dependent. This view of meaning can
readily be related to his philosophical framework, particularly his ontological and
epistemological ideas, as well as to his theory of cognitive relativism and his theory of
definition. The next three sections are devoted to these issues, together with a sketch
as to how his ontological and epistemological ideas can be related to his contextual
theory. Before proceeding further, it is essential to point out that the preoccupation
1 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-'Iman, p. 102.
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with the universal versus particulars dichotomy is one of the main concerns of any
epistemological and, especially, ontological discussion, and that the ontological
positions of a philosopher are usually explained in terms of his view over the existence
and nature of universals and particulars and the relationship between them.
As pointed out earlier (cf. 2.2.1), there is some connection between the
distinction between wad' and use and the distinction between universals and
particulars in a way which permits us to say that sentences, which are based on wad',
are universals, while utterances, which are motivated by use, are particulars. Thus,
whatever Ibn Taymiyyah assigns to universals can be assigned to sentences; and
whatever he assigns to particulars can be assigned to utterances. Hence, the
distinction drawn in modern linguistics between sentences and utterances is very
useful here to identify what is universal and what is particular in relation to language
structure and, consequently to show how Ibn Taymiyyah's ontological and
epistemological conceptions can be related to his contextual theory.
Although Ibn Taymiyyah does not distinguish explicitly between sentences and
utterances, neither does he constantly use technical terms to refer to this dichotomy,
this distinction is, nevertheless, central to the explanation of his contextual theory.
However, Ibn Taymiyyah seems to be very aware of the difference between the
actually-produced signals (utterances) and the abstract structures which underlie them
(sentences), but he insists on the invalidity of any operation involving a kind of
abstraction which leads ultimately to the disregard of the very distinctive peculiarities
of the individuals (e.g. the relevant contextual features of the actual utterances in the
case of abstracting sentences from utterances). This amounts to the neutralisation of
the distinction between sentences and utterances and of the other two pertinent
distinctions, namely the traditional distinction between wad' and use (cf. 2.1) on the
one hand, and between wad'-based meaning and intention (cf. 2.3.1) on the other.
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One way of relating these two distinctions to that between sentences and utterances
is to say that sentence-meanings (and sentence-structures) are based on wad' whereas
utterance-intentions (and the production of utterances) are motivated by use.
4.3.1. Ibn Taymiyyah's ontological position
Within Ibn Taymiyyah's ontological framework, the following philosophical
attitudes seem to be relevant to his contextual theory:
(i) Contrary to the realists, Ibn Taymiyyah holds that al-kulli 1-tabi'i (the natural
universal), that is, almutlaq la bi-shart (the unconditionally absolute universal) 1
exists only in the mind and has no actual existence in the physical world.2
Nonetheless, one may say that "a universal does have a reality in the external world,
but only as a particular and individual; thus, there can be nothing in the external world
other than a particular human with a particular animality and a particular 'ability to
speak' (natiqiyyah mu'ayyanah)".3
Applying this view to the sentences-utterances dichotomy leads to the conclusion
that sentences as abstract entities have no objective reality in the extra-mental world
independent of the corresponding utterances. This is based on Ibn Taymiyyah's
conception that universals are the result of an abstraction from the particulars, which
1According to Muslim philosophers, the natural universal "is distinguished from two
other types of universals, the mental universal (al-kulll al-'aqll), which is nature
insofar as it is a universal, that is, nature conditioned by universality (bi-shart la-
shay'), and the logical universal (al-kulli al-mantiqi), which is the concept of
universality itself. Nicholas Heer, "al-Jami's Treatise on Existence", in Parviz
Morewedge (ed.), Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany: State University of New
York, 1979), p. 227; see Ibn Taymiyyah 'Ahmad, Kitab al-Safdiyyah, ed.
Muhammad Rashad Salim, 2nd edn. (tubi' 'ala nafaqat 'ahad al-muhsinin, 1406 AH),
1/298.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/159; see also, 'Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar' Ta'arud al-
'Aql wa-1-Naql, ed. Muhammad Rashad Salim (Riyadh: Jami'at al-Tmam
Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud al-Tslamiyyah, 1979), 1/286-295; Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah,
Sayan Talbls al-Jahmiyyah fi Ta'sis Bida'ihim al-Kalamiyyah 'aw Naqd Ta'sis
al-Jahmiyyah, ed. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Qasim, (Mecca: Matba'at al-
Hukumah, 1391 AH), 1/15-16.
3Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/191.
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means that they can be conceptualised only by the conceptualisation of the relevant
particulars; or as he puts it, "if one cannot conceptualise the particular existing thing,
how can he be able to conceptualise its kind and type" (jinsah wa-naw'a/j)?.l Thus,
utterances are the true manifestations of a language, while sentences are mental
constructions.
This position contrasts with the Platonic realist's doctrine according to which
universals exist prior to particulars. According to Katz, who has swung from
Chomsky's conceptualism2 to Platonic realism, sentences exist prior to utterances and
"grammars are theories of abstract objects (sentences)".3 Katz as a Platonist
philosopher and linguist "conceives of sentences in much the same way that Platonist
philosophers of mathematics (and many working mathematicians) conceive of
numbers and mathematical spaces"4 assuming that mathematical and logical facts exist
"prior to our mathematical and logical Adams and Eves".5
Ibn Taymiyyah strongly rejects both the Pythagorean view that numbers and
measures (al-'a'dad wa-l-maqadlr) exist in the external world independently of the
corresponding entities counted or measured (al-ma'dudat wa-l-muqaddarat), and its
platonic version that the universal essences (al-haqa'iq al-naw'iyyah), which are
thought to be immutable realities, exist in the physical world externally to their relevant
individuals.6
1 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/147.
^For Katz's conceptual position see Jerrold J. Katz, Linguistic Philosophy: the
Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical Import (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1972).




6lbn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/164. For a discussion of this idea in the Philosophy of
'
Ikhwan al-Safa', see Ian Richard Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to
the Thought of the Brethren ofPurity (Ikhwan al-Safa') (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1982), p. 12.
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(ii) Properties of individuals are not independent of them and their existence is
not prior to the existence of the individuals in the external world. 1 Ibn Taymiyyah
emphasises that the cognition of an object and its properties depends on al-hiss a1-
zahir ('exterior sense' or perception) or al-hiss al-batin (lit, inner sense, or
'introspection') whereas the cognition of a relation (e.g. generality, particularity,
sameness, resemblance, contrast) between a property of a given object and a property
of another is constructed by the mind.2 For instance, there is no objective similarity in
the physical world between the external entities that are said to be similar; but it is the
mind that constructs and identifies this kind of relation. It is for this reason that the
construction of a relationship may vary from one person to another, and that it is,
consequently, plausible to put 'the analogists' (al-qiyasiyyun) in the wrong when
they concentrate on the point of resemblance and disregard the distinctive feature.3
Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah denies that these types of relation have reality in the physical
world assuming that they are nothing but mental constructions. For him, the cognition
of particulars takes place by means of either exterior or interior sense, whereas the
cognition of universals is an immanent act of the mind.4
While Ibn Taymiyyah assigns the knowledge of mathematics, logic and meanings
to innate faculties (or mental abilities), he insists that knowledge of expressions can be
acquired only on the basis of knowledge of wad
Ibn Taymiyyah sharply criticises the assumption that there is knowledge of the
presumed, abstracted and priori existing structure of language, which is represented
by the PF mainstream in the intuition-based notion knowledge of the first wad'
(ma'[ifat al-wad' al-'awwaf).
^Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/174-175.




(iii) Ibn Taymiyyah strongly rejects al-Farabi's and Ibn Slna's distinction between
al-mahiyyah (essence) and al-wujud (existence)^ in that both have objective
realities.^ In addition, he objects to the distinction between what they call dhati
(contingent) and lazim li-l-mahiyyah fi 1-wiijud wa-l-kharij (essential for the essence
both mentally and extra-mentally) arguing that there is no real difference in the external
world between them. What appears to be differences is essentially conceptual
(i'tibariyyah) and motivated by the wad', the selection of the establisher and his own
conceptualisation.3
This misconception, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is again due to a confusion
between mental worlds (or mental existence) and real worlds (or objective existence).
To put it his way:
The reason behind their delusion [the philosophers'] is that they see
that an object can be known and intended (yu 'lam wa-yurad) before its
existence and that it is possible to distinguish between what is possible
and what is impossible. Consequently, they say if this object were not
existent, it would not be the case. They are also confused by the fact that
we are able to speak about the substances of objects (i.e. their essences)
irrespective of their existence in the external world, which leads them to
think that these substances and essences are existent in the external
world. But the truth is that all these are mental facts; and that mental
constructions are larger in number than the real entities in the physical
world "al-muqaddar fi l-'adhhan 'awsa' mina 1-mawjud fi l-'a'yan"
[...]. Thus, the proper difference is that essence is the mental
representation of an object, whereas existence is its actuality in the extra-
mental world.^
In his attempt to show that the distinction between dhati and lazim is based on a
construction rather than an actual knowledge, Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that "the
external facts which are independent from us are not dependent upon our
Latin translations attributed to Avicenna [Ibn Sina] the notion that existence is an
accident to essence". Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 16th edn.
(New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.), p. 31 (Avicenna).
2 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/160. For more discussion of this distinction, see Ian
Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic
Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 109-114.
3Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/97-101; Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/98.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/97-98.
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conceptualisations; thus, it is not the case that if we assume that such-and-such is prior
and such-and-such is posterior, they would be so in the external world". 1
Although the above ontological attitudes in general appear to be related to his view
that actual utterances have a chronologically prior existence to the unobservable and
abstracted structure of utterances (i.e. sentences), it is not clear whether the above
three ontological attitudes are based on this view or vice versa. Nonetheless, the
following reasons make the former possibility more likely:
a) The alternative possibility (i.e. that his general ontological philosophy is the
rationale behind his particular conception that utterances are prior to sentences ) might
be seen as self-contradictory, since, as this doctrine implies, a universal is a product
of generalisation from the corresponding particulars, but not vice versa.
b) The motive behind his inquiry into the distinction between haqiqah and majaz,
on which his contextual theory is presumably founded, is, as pointed out by Ibn al-
Qayyim,^ to find rational arguments to refute the strongly-held doctrines of 'ahl al-
ta'wll (the advocates of the non-apparent interpretation of the Qur'anic verses)
especially those pertaining to the attributes ofAllah. Thus, it is the textual, rather than
the philosophical, inquiry that appears to have been his starting point.
c) The hallowed status of the actual utterances of the Qur'an for him as a Muslim
generally and as a Salafi Hanbali in particular3 may have contributed not only to his
giving privilege to utterances over sentences but also to assuming that utterances are
llbn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/99.
^See al-Mawsill, 2/29.
3It should be noted that the term Hanbali is not employed here in its strict sense, since
Ibn Taymiyyah is widely considered to be mujtahid mutlaq (roughly independent
jurist) rather than Hanbali. However, this term is remarkably suggestive in this
context for readers who are aware of
(i) the Hanbalis' denial of al-'Ash'arls' notion of al-Kalam al-nafsi (mental speech);
(ii) Ahmad b. Hanbal's mihnah (inquisition) during al-Ma'mun's rule because of his
strong objection to the Mu 'tazilite doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an;
(iii) the Hanbali position on Allah's attribute of speech; and
(iv) Ibn Taymiyyah' strong adherence to all these Hanbali positions.
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prior to them and concluding, consequendy, that particulars are prestigiously superior,
and chronologically prior, to universals.
At this stage, three points have to be made:
Firstly, despite of what has just been said about the probability of the priority of
his linguistic (or pragmatic) inquiry over his philosophical investigation, the opposite
possibility should not be ruled out.
Secondly, no matter how insignificant the above investigation about whether Ibn
Taymiyyah's linguistic or philosophical inquiry is prior, the fact that this investigation
shed light on the probable justification of his pragmatic approach into language is
almost undeniable.
Finally, (b) and (c) above should not be construed as to undermine Ibn
Taymiyyah's ontological arguments on the grounds that they are motivated by
doctrinal beliefs rather than philosophical convictions. They are, in actual fact,
approached in a highly critical and scholarly way.
4.3.2. Ibn Taymiyyah's theory of cognitive relativism
According to Ibn Taymiyyah's theory of cognitive relativism, the acquisition of
knowledge has no objective standard since determining whether a given proposition is
discursive or self-evident depends on the individual's mental ability rather than the
nature of the proposition itself. To put it his way, the difference between a discursive
and self-evident proposition "is relative and comparative {'innama huwa bi-l-nisbati
wa-l-'idafah), what is discursive for a given person can, thus, be self-evident for
another".^ His argument is based on the fact that mental abilities are different from
one individual to another. Consequently, contrary to the traditional logic, the middle
term (al-hadd al-'awsat) is, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, dispensable for people who
*Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/103.
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are exceptionally quick at conceptualising propositions. Hence, the propositions that
are hissiyyah (perceptible), mujarrabah (empirical), burhaniyyah (evidential) or
mutwatirah (i.e. one that has a large "number of reliable transmitters"1) for many
people cannot be attainable for others except by meditation and demonstration.2
4.3.3. Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual theory of definition
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the process of conceptualisation is quite different
from the process of signification and reference in that the former is a natural process,
whereas the latter two processes are wad'-based and contextual ones. "The name [i.e.
the expression] per se cannot induce the conceptualisation of al-musamma (the
nominatum) for a person who is not able to conceptualise it, but can only produce its
signification and its reference (al-dalalah 'alayh wa-1- 'isharah 'ilayh)".3 This seems
to be based on the view that signification is a relationship between an expression and
meaning, reference is a relationship between an expression and extra-mental referent,
while conceptualisation is a relationship between a meaning and referent (cf. figure
4.1).
*Ian Richard Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, p. 185 (mutwatir).
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/103.





However, the common sense between names and logical definitions is that they
are both not qualified to make the hearer conceptualise the entities that he has never
conceptualised before. This idea seems to be based upon his philosophical view that
names and logical definitions 1 do not add any new proposition to the set of
assumptions the hearer already possesses, since both the nominatum and definiendum
(the concept defined) are not only conceptualisable without them but their
conceptualisation is a necessary pre-condition for names and definitions to signify
their meanings.2 Hence, languages are not designed to signify the meanings of single
expressions (al-lafz al-mufrad), because signifying the meaning of a single
expression depends on the knowledge that the expression is assigned, by virtue of
wad', to it; and the only way to know that the expression is assigned to a particular
meaning is to conceptualise both the expression and meaning. Thus, if the aim of
wad' was to produce the meanings of single expressions, the argument would be
'He treats definitions in the same way he treats names, for " a definition is nothing but
a name, two, or three names". Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/66.
2Ibid., 1/110-114.
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circular.1 For this reason, "all people [i.e. scholars] agree that a meaningful utterance
(,al-kalam al-mufid) can be nothing but a full sentence".2
What Ibn Taymiyyah seems to be trying to say is that since the relationship
between expression and meaning is conventional, saying a single word to somebody
who is not aware of the convention would not convey any sense. If he is, however,
aware of the convention, the word would only refer to the subject, but since references
cannot properly be made in isolation from a defining context, it follows that single
words would be nothing more than gibberish.
Definitions, in Ibn Taymiyyah's view, should be used to identify the intention of
the speaker.3 To put it another way, "the use of definitions is to identify the
nominatum of the name, it is, therefore, the intention and the language of the user of
the name that should be consulted for this matter".^ Thus, the intention of the speaker
is not only the goal of communication but also the goal of definitions. This boils
down to saying that a successful definition is, therefore, that one which apprises the
speaker's intention. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, it is only the nominal definitions
that are capable of doing this.
Nominal definition can involve:
i) ism muradif (synonym);
ii) ism mukafi (equivalent, but not synonymous, name), two expressions are not
synonymous unless they denote the same sifak (quality), and refer to the same dhat
(referent); if they refer to the same referent but denote different qualities, they are
'equivalent names', e.g. al-sarim (distinctively sharp sword), and al-muhannad
(sword made of Indian steel); or
llbn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/113-114. The same argument had been used by al-RazI.
Seeal-RazI, 1/67.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/114.
llbid., 1/133.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 9/51, 58-67.
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iii) mithal (example). Ibn Taymiyyah includes in this class any kind of
exemplification aiming at the identification of the nomintatum in order to be recalled,
e.g., pointing at a loaf of bread for somebody who asks: 'What is bread?; "since the
knowledge of the individual [e.g. the particular loaf of bread] leads to the recognition
of the kind [bread in general]." 1
What he means by nominal definitions is, therefore, that definitions which identify
the meaning, the referent or the translation of a term.2 Thus, the wording of nominal
definitions is not a firmly fixed and pre-determined scheme, but rather a temporary and
procedural process as it varies according to the actual communicative situations. The
same thing can, therefore, be described differently depending on the way the speaker
selects and sees as sufficient to identify his intention in the very particular situation.
So, in a certain situation one may refer to a glass of water by 'the large one', and in
another situation he can refer to the same glass by 'the one in the middle', or 'the dirty
one' etc. according to the condition, position or any other contextually distinctive
peculiarities of the glass in the communicative situation. Ibn Taymiyyah's view of
definition may well be understood as a call for the abandonment of the Aristotelian
way of forming definitions and treating them instead as context-based descriptions. If
the argument that Aristotelian definitions are not qualified to make the hearer
conceptualise the entities that he cannot conceptualise without them is accepted, it
would be reasonable to say that unless they are seen as context-based descriptions,
definitions would be useless. This view can best be appreciated if definitions are
investigated from a communicative point of view; and this is what Ibn Taymiyyah
seems to have done since he associates them with language use to render the intended
meaning as a unique individual in the corresponding situation by both the expression
and the relevant contexts. If definitions are, however, examined from a scientific
viewpoint, as is the case when water, for example, is defined chemically as the sum of
*Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/137.
2-See ibid., 1/133.
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one part oxygen and two parts hydrogen, his view would be questionable. However,
scientific definitions may well be contextual since the definition of water for example
may vary from field to field according to the purposes of the definers.
Nonetheless, Ibn Taymiyyah does not deny that definitions can produce a new
proposition provided that the hearer already knows the constituents of the concept to
be defined, but this applies only to complex concepts. In this case, "definition
signifies the definiendum but does not identify its particular intended referent" (fa-1-
haddu yufidu 1-dalalata 'alayhi la ta'rifa 'aynih). 1
It should be noted, however, that Ibn Taymiyyah does not claim that al-ta'yln
(referring) is the only way to make definitions.2 In fact, he holds that definitions can
also be made by al-wasf (description). At first glance, the claim that definitions can
be made by wasf does not seem to be in harmony with his strict pragmatic approach to
definitions, since it seemingly undermines his insistence on context as an
indispensable element in forming definitions. This implication is, nevertheless, not
necessarily applicable, since the claim that the use of definitions is to make the
intention of the speaker manifest does not necessarily imply that referring is the only
way to make definitions. In fact, one can form a descriptive definition, which can still
be regarded as a proper pragmatic definition provided that he takes into account the
contextual considerations such as the need and purpose of the hearer.3 This
conception of definition is applicable also to Ibn Taymiyyah's account of meaning,
where he takes 'intention' in so broad a sense that it encompasses both intended
referent and intended meaning. His sole condition for both meaning and referent to
meet the requirements of what he calls mvrad al-mutakallim (the intention of the
speaker) is that they should not be taken out of their contextual realisations.




Thus, the gist of Ibn Taymiyyah's thesis is that the aim of the use of names and
definitions is to distinguish the respective nominatum and the respective definiendum
from others. 1
4.4. Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual view of language and
meaningfulness
Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that language is nothing but a means to make
predications, so one can never be considered to be speaking language by uttering
merely a single word in isolation from any defining context. Although he does not
dispute the claim that names and definitions do have references, he, nevertheless,
reserves the terms lughah (language) and kalam (speech or utterance) for making
predications since references, in his view, cannot be made without predications. He
mentions, however, some instances, where speakers may use single names for
purposes such as tanblh (e.g. warning, awakening and calling) and 'isharah
(pointing)^ but even in such cases, words are not being used for the same meanings
being intended by al-kalam (linguistic utterances).3 He distinguishes quite clearly
between mentioning a word without the intention of communicating a certain
proposition and the process in which the user intends to convey a particular message
to the hearer. It is only the latter case that can, in his view, be said to pertain to the use
of language. This distinction is very useful for understanding his conception of
meaningfulness and his rejection of the distinction between haqiqah and majaz,
where he claims that words such as 'lion' taken in isolation from every context would
never be meaningful, let alone characterised as haqiqah. This is meant to be a
llbn Taymiyyah, al-Rcidd, 1/73. He traces this view back to al-nuzzar (Muslim
speculative theologians) from different schools, attacking the Aristotelian view that the
purpose of definition is "to have the definiendum conceptualised, and to identify its




counter-argument against the claim of the advocates of the distinction between
haqiqah and majaz that an expression is haqiqah if it signifies independently of
context1 {'in dalla bi-la qarinah) and majaz if it does not signify without context (cf.
4.8.1.1).
Ibn Taymiyyah maintains the claim that an expression is never used in an
unqualified way. An expression cannot be meaningful prior to its being 'knotted' and
'combined' with other expressions ; but even knotting and combining (al-'aqd wa-1-
tarkib) alone are not sufficient for an expression to be meaningful. It is, therefore,
necessary for the hearer to know not only the speaker, but also his communicative
habits ('adatih bi-khitabih). Information of this type would be needed to render the
speaker's intention manifest.2 Thus, language in his view is a medium for speakers to
express their communicative intentions, which are inexpressible by merely
decontextualised words.
Ibn Taymiyyah lays great emphasis on the significance of the syntagmatic
relationship holding between the items of language in the determination of the
speaker's intention. For example, al-'idafah (annexation), among others, plays a
significant role in determining the meanings of words.
There is a consistent correlation between qualification and meaningfulness, i.e.
the more restricted the expression the more meaningful it is, and vice versa. Hence,
absolute and abstracted expressions (al-lafz almutlaq al-mujarrad) have no meanings
at all.^ It should be noted, however, that the terms 'absolute expression' and
1Unlike Salafis who confine meaningfulness to the full utterances, the adherents of
majaz claim that both single expressions and full utterances can be characterised as
meaningful. For single expressions, 'meaningful' is explained by 'Abu 1-Husayn al-
Basti al-Mu'tazili (one of the distinguished figures of the adherents of majaz died
436/1044 ) as being 'established for' (or assigned to) a particular meaning and,
consequently, potentially used to convey this meaning. With respect to utterances,
'Abu 1-Husayn employs the term 'meaningful' to refer exclusively to an utterance
involving a predicative relation.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/412.
^Al-Mawsili, 2/57.
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'abstracted expression' are usually used by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim in a
specific technical sense, where they refer to the completely decontextualised
expression, which, in their view, can never be part of language. Ibn al-Qayyim
argues that the goal of communication is the maintenance of the interests of human
beings by means of understanding and making others understand, which can be
available only by the appeal to qualified meanings and qualified expressions. The
absolute is, however, nothing but a mental image that has no existence in the external
world. 1 Thus, the highly decontextualised concept zahr (surface or back), for
example, is viewed as an eminently abstracted image which is derived from the
individuals in the external world but has no counterpart in it. For this reason, "it
cannot be used in the language unless it is combined with a revealing adjunct" (e.g.
zahr al-tariq, zahr al-'insasi, zahr al-faras, zahr al-jabal)^
This view implies that what the linguists and philosophers do when they
decontextualise some concepts for their own special purposes is not necessarily
applicable to what the speakers of language do in actual communication. So, as Ibn
al-Qayyim explains, "the expression that is abstracted from all its contexts is not used
by the sane whether they are Arabs or not, and can never be used without
qualifications since use would certainly restrict it" .3 Thus, all the names of the entities
which can be expressed by the language are in reality contextualised, and no
expression would be meaningful if it has not been contextualised.
^Al-Mawsili, 2/58.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/431.
^Al-Mawsill, 2/63.
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4.5. Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual view of the wad '-use distinction
The distinction between wad' and use adopted by the PF mainstream was subject
to sharp criticisms by the salafis. 1 Expressions, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, cannot
be abstracted in isolation from use: just as movement is anchored to the mover (al-
mutaharrik), so also expressions are anchored to use. Ibn al-Qayyim agrees that
expressions may be abstracted from use in the mind; however, he does not call them in
such cases expressions, but assumed expressions ('alfaz muqaddarah)P-
Ibn al-Qayyim's main concern about the notion wad' is with the claim that
expressions are 'established' in isolation from context ('amia 1-lafza wudi'a wad'an
mutlaqan la muqayyadan). 3 He points out that the position of the proponents of this
claim is similar to the position of the logicians who abstracted the meanings and took
them in isolation from all qualifications; and when they realised that their conclusions
are contradicted by the fact that these meanings are not disengagable from their
qualifications in their external existence, they found themselves in a dilemma as to
whether to deny external existence or to renounce those entities which they assumed to
be abstract and unqualified. They consider the entities without their external
qualifications in such a manner that
they profess a human that is neither tall nor short; neither white nor
black; neither in time nor in place; neither motionless nor moving;
neither in the world nor out of it; with no flesh, no bone, no nerve, no
nail; has no stature or shadow; and cannot be characterised or
restricted. And when they noticed that the external human is different
from all that, they said that these are irrelevant characteristics to its
sense, rendering the imaginary image as its sense (haqiqatah).4
* The term salafiyyah in this context is employed in a very restricted sense where it






Thus, in order to avoid the traditional philosophers' misconception of entities, we
have to consider the entities as they are in reality, that is, to take them as a whole
without ignoring any of their features whether they are contingent (dhati) or essential
(.lazim). To apply this procedure to meaning requires taking the overall actual context
of the utterance into account.
4.6. Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual view of the meaning-intention
distinction
Although the term 'meaning' was frequently used by the PF mainstream in a rather
vague sense, it was, nonetheless, given a distinct definition. Generally speaking, the
term was employed to refer to the mental image which the expression denotes, but
since the so-called mental image was given different names, it may be helpful to
introduce these names in order to know what exactly is meant by meaning, and to
show the differences between these various terms. Before proceeding, it would be
essential to remember that all the terms to be introduced are referentially synonymous
as they refer to the same thing, namely the mental image. If this image is seen as
being intended by the expression, it is called ma'na (meaning); if it is seen as being
conjured up by the expression in the mind, it is called mafhum (concept); if it is
viewed as an answer to the question ma huwa ? (What is it ?), it is called mahiyyah
(quiddity); if it is viewed as an existing entity in the external world, it is called
haqlqah (fact); if it is perceived as being distinguished from the others, it is called
huwiyyah (identity); 1 if it is seen as being an object for an 'established' name, it is
called musamma (nominatum);^ and finally if it is seen as derived from the
expression, it is called madlul (signified).3
1 See al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, 116; 'Abu-l-Baqa' al-Kafawi, al-Kulliyat, ed.
'Adnan Darwlsh and Muhammad al-Masri, (Damascus: Manshurat Wazarat al-
Thaqafah wa-l-'Irshad al-Qawmi, 1981), 4/251.
^Al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 1/298.
^Al-Sharxf al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 104.
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With the exception of the contexts in which the Salafis employ it merely for the
sake of the argument, the term 'meaning' in the above sense has no room in their
framework. They do not seem to accept that word-meaning can be accounted for
independently of use. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, signification, which he defines as
"understanding a meaning from an expression at the time of its production" (fa- 'inna
1-dalalat hiya fahmu l-ma'na mina 1-lafzi 'inda 'itlaqih), can never take place
without use.l Since intention is defined as 'meaning in use', taking Ibn al-Qayyim's
definition of signification (which has just been mentioned) for granted would lead to
the equation of meaning with intention. Obviously, the neutralisation of the
differentiation between meaning and intention (cf. 2.3.1) is founded upon the rejection
of the notion wad' in its folk sense. However, it should be noted that it is essential to
be aware of the consequences of conflating the two ideas, i.e. meaning and intention.
One consequence is that this conflation (or neutralisation) would entail that
conventional meaning is trivialised to the advantage of contextual meaning. To put it
Searle's way, the adherents of this procedure do not "make a clear distinction between
what is conventionally expressed by means of language and what someone actually
intends by his utterance".^ This was intended to be an objection directed against Grice
who followed this practice- Defending Grice's position, Wunderlich points out that
"Grice's neutralisation of this distinction is fully intentional. The conventions of a
language do not exist independently of the numerous situations in which one could
communicate in the language; conventions are established, stabilized and modified in
them".^
In order to prove that conventions are set up in actual communicative situations
rather than being established independently of contexts in a one-to-one relationship
^Al-Mawsili, 2/8.
^Dieter Wunderlich, Foundations of Linguistics, trans. Roger Lass (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 271; J. R., Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in
the Philosophy of Language (London; Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 43f.
^Wunderlich, op. cit., p. 272.
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between expressions and meanings, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim refer to the
natural way of acquiring language by a child, where he gradually masters his mother-
tongue via the actual communicative processes until he manages to have a full
command of it without need for others to agree with him on a prior convention (wad'
mutaqaddim).l However, it may be the case that speakers in a child's environment
explain to him some words he may occasionally inquire about in the same way texts
are translated to somebody who does not know the language, but this is not meant to
be a kind of establishing conventions. Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim do not
deny, however, the fact that new conventions for new ideas are established from time
to time^ "particularly for specialists who have to establish their own technical terms
which are required to fulfil their communicative needs".3 But this, according to Ibn
al-Qayyim, is a special case "in which a wad' prior to use is known", and does not fall
within his enquiry.^
It may be worth mentioning that, in contemporary pragmatics and cognitive
studies, there are others who share this view: Peter Bosch, for example, proposes that
"we should give up the notion of the meaning of, or the interpretation of, a sentence or
utterance as an identifiable unit or thing" propounding that 'meaning' in his model "is
not only procedural but also 'holistic'. It is holistic, as it were, to the extent of self-
sacrifice: 'meaning' as such disappears entirely and, as it would seem, without
loss".5 On the other hand, there are other linguists who believe that meaning can be
accounted for independently of context. The firm version of this view is held by Katz
who assumes that the error of those who identify a natural language "with the concrete
llbn Taymiyyah, al-'Imdn, p. 87; al-Mawsili, 2/70.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, al-'Imdn, pp. 87-88.; al-Mawsili, 2/70.
^Al-Mawsili, 2/70.
4Ibid.
5peter Bosch, "Context Dependence and Metaphor", in Wolf Paprotte and Rene
Dirven, The Ubiquity ofMetaphor: Metaphor in Language and Thought, (Amsterdam
Studies in The Theory and History of Linguistic Science IV: Current Issues in
Linguistic Theory Volume 29), (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing company,
1985), p. 165.
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realization of the linguistic rules in the heads of its speakers" lies in "conflating a
language with its empirical exemplifications. [...] A language is not itself subject to
the fate of the mortals who speak it. It is some sort of abstract entity, whatever it is
that this means''.^ He argues that there is "some given, natural level of context-
independent meaning, and that sentence-meaning can be described independently and
prior to utterance meaning".^
Katz's position seems similar to the position of the advocates of the assumption
that the establisher has 'established' the types of constructions, but not the particulars
of those types (cf. 2.2.1). There is, however, a significant difference between his
explanation of meaning and the view of those who see meaning as a mental image
whose views he criticises. 3
4.7. Ibn Taymiyyah's contextual view of signification
Within al-salafiyyah's framework, the term dalalah (signification) is employed in
a special sense. Showing a discernible consistency in his pragmatic approach, Ibn al-
Qayyim points out that the term dalalah is intended to refer either to fi '1 al-dall (the
action of the signifying agent),4 that is to say, the use of the utterance by the speaker
as a signifier to the hearer (wa-hwa [i.e. the action] dalalatuhu li-l-sami'i bi-
lafzih) or the speaker's understanding of the meaning of that utterance.^ The rationale
behind adopting this definition is not only his insistence on the inclusion of the agents
as indispensable elements in the production and understanding of the linguistic
Ijerrold J. Katz, Semantic Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 16.
^Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 20.
^Jerrold J. Katz, Semantic Theory, pp. 7-8.
^This definition is found in 'Abu Muhammad Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri, al-'Ihkam fi 'Usui
al-'Ahkam, 1/41.
^Al-Mawsill, 2/68. Ibn al-Qayyim remarks that it is common to devote dilalah (bi-
kasri 1-dai) to the former sense and dalalah (bi-fathi 1-dal) to the latter (2/68).
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utterances, but also his wider belief that sentences cannot be properly handled in
isolation from the situations in which they occur.
Maintaining that the signification of an utterance is intentional and wilful, Ibn
Taymiyyah distinguishes between two types of signification: dalalah wujudiyyah
and dalalah 'adamiyyah (existential and non-existential signification). By existential
signification, he intended to cover any process in which the speaker utilises an actual
signifying element, whether it is a mark {'alamah), word or the like to convey a
meaning. If the speaker, on the other hand, relies for this purpose on an abstract
(zero) element, he will be said to apply a non-existential signification. The notion of
non-existential signification could be seen as an attempt to maintain consistency in his
claim that expressions cannot be used without contextual qualifications; especially if
we take into account the fact that he regards non-existential significations as intentional
qualifications made by the speaker. To make this idea clear, it may be beneficial to
quote his statement that "uttering an expression without qualifications is a
qualification" (fa-nafsu 1-takallumi bi-l-lafzi mujarradan qayd), and that "abstinence
from specific qualifications is a qualification" (fa-1-'imsaku 'ani 1-quyudi 1-khassati
qayd)A In other words, "[non-existential] signification is not [made by] the
expression itself, but rather [by] the expression, the speaker's confinement to it, and
his abstaining to add something to it" (fa-laysat al-dalalatv hiya nafsa 1-lafzi, bali 1-
lafzu ma'a 1-iqtisari 'alayhi wa-'adami 1-ziyadati 'alayh). 2 Accordingly, the
relevant silence of the speaker during the conversation is treated as an informative
process and, consequently, given a certain communicative function. It should be
noted, however, that not any silence (or more precisely abstinence) is said to be
communicatively meaningful, but only abstinence from what he calls 'specific
qualifications' by which he seems to mean the qualifications that the speaker knows
that they are expected by the hearer in a given situation.
' Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/413.
2Ibid., 20/414-415.
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Hence, the speaker of an utterance proceeds in one of two ways: he
sometimes stops talking while intending a particular meaning, and
sometimes combines an expression with another to indicate a meaning
that is different from the meaning designated by the first expression
alone. The first expression has, therefore, two forms: it is either
followed by silence, abstinence and the omission of the qualifier (tark
al-silah), or combined with another expression. Thus, it is common for
the speaker to intend a particular meaning if he abstains, and to intend
another if he combines; in both cases his intention would be manifest,
since he couples his utterance with what makes his intention clear. 1
4.8. Ibn Taymiyyah's critical review of haqiqah and majaz
dichotomy
From the time of Aristotle and up until recently, linguists and philosophers in
general have taken the classical distinction between literal and figurative meaning for
granted. However, in recent years there has been a growing tendency among some
contemporary pragmatists, language philosophers and researchers in artificial
intelligence to question this distinction either entirely or partially. To take one
example, Sperber and Wilson state that it "is possible that the whole idea of tropes and
their classification is destined to go the same way as the notion of humors in
medicine[...]. Quite independently of the existence of irony, there are already strong
grounds for rejecting the notion of figurative meaning".2
One of the points that have recently been added to the inquiry into metaphor is the
question whether metaphor is a matter of meaning or a matter of use. To put it another
way: Is metaphor a subject of semantics or pragmatics? Arguing against traditional
views and in favour of an adequate theory of metaphor, Searle insists on the need to
distinguish between what he calls speaker's utterance meaning and word or sentence
meaning. Searle ascribes the "endemic vice" of traditional theories of metaphor to
their failure to appreciate this distinction and their attempt "to locate metaphorical
llbn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/413.
^Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, "Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction", in Steven
Davis (ed.) Pragmatics, pp. 550-564, pp. 551-552.
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meaning in the sentence or some set of associations with the sentence". 1 Similarly,
Davidson holds that metaphor, unlike literal meaning which "can be assigned to words
and sentences apart from particular contexts of use"2 "concerns not the meaning of
words but their use".3
As will appear, despite their revolutionary contributions, these recent approaches
are still closer to the Islamic traditional than to Ibn Taymiyyah's radical approach,
since their fundamental assumptions such as the assumption that metaphor is a matter
of use rather than a matter of linguistic meaning are already held by the traditional
Muslim theory of majaz. However, what distinguishes Ibn Taymiyyah's radical
theory is its emphasis on the neutralisation of the distinction between haqiqah and
majaz within a contextual framework.
In the next three sections three issues will be discussed:
(i) the view of the adherents of haqiqah and majaz dichotomy and their arguments
in favour of this distinction;
(ii) the Salafls' arguments against this distinction; and
(iii) Ibn Taymiyyah's account ofmajaz.
4.8.1. The view of the adherents of haqiqah and majaz dichotomy
The first point that has to be made here is that the distinction between haqiqah and
majaz is commonly explained by reference to the notion of wad'. 'Abu 1-Husayn al-
Basri 1-Mu'tazili defines haqiqah as "that which is used to convey the meaning for
which it is 'established' in the code [language] of communication" {ma 'uflda blha
1 John R. Searle, "Metaphor", in Steven Davis (ed.) Pragmatics, pp. 520-524.




ma wvdi'at lahu fl 'asli 1-istilahi -lladhi waqa'a l-takhatubu bih)J According to
the view of the adherents of haqiqah and majaz dichotomy (which is the mainstream
view in the works of the Muslim legal theorists), if an expression is used to convey
more than one meaning, this expression is characterised either as a homonym
(.mushtarak), polysem (manqul) or metaphor (musta 'ar). The difference between the
first category, on the one hand, and the other two categories, on the other, may be
explained in terms of the relatedness of meaning.2 If there is a recognisable
connection between the different meanings of a given multi-meaning expression, the
expression is classified either as a manqul (polysem) or as a musta 'ar (metaphor); if
this connection is not made, the expression is then classified as a mushtarak
(homonym). For the legal theorists, the difference is commonly defined in terms of
the way in which the expression is held to have been assigned its meaning in the
primordial wadif the expression is judged to have been assigned two or more
meanings by virtue of different acts of wad'- whether the assignments are made by the
same establisher or by different establishers- the expression is classified as a
homonymif the expression is, however, judged to have been primordially assigned
only one meaning, and the other meaning or meanings are thought to have been
obtained by a fresh convention ('urf), or alternatively as a result of the progressive
use of the language, the expression is categorised either as a polysem (.manqul) or as a
metaphor (musta 'ar) respectively. Another way of explaining the difference between
a homonym and the other two categories is to say that, unlike polysems and
metaphors, homonyms signify, as al-Suyuti points out, their different meanings
lAl-Basri, 1/11. The same definition is adopted by some of his successors, such as
al-Razi who adopts the definition without any alteration; al-Qarafi who substitutes "that
which is used" with "the expression used" and uses the word 'urf (convention) instead
of istilah (code) which can also be translated in this context by language or
terminology, and al-Sharif al-Jurjani with the replacement of "that which is used" with
"the word used". See: al-Razi, 1/112; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, pp. 42-43; al-Sharif
al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 48 (al-haqiqah).
^See John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977),
2/551-552; John Lyons, Language and Linguistics: An Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 147.
3Seeal-'Amidi (1983), 1/24-25.
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equally. 1 To put it al-Ghazali's way, none of the meanings of a homonym can be
regarded as more suitable to be rendered as 'asl (original or base) than its partner(s).^
As has already been explained in the previous chapter, treating a kind of meaning as
'asl means giving it a number of privileges, chief among which is that it is held to be
the first to occur to the mind of the hearer in the communicative process. And this is
what is assumed to form the fundamental parameter by which one can judge whether a
given multi-meaning expression should be seen as a homonym or not. Thus, the
important point to notice is that in PF, the meanings of a homonym are presumed in
the absence of any contextual evidence to occur simultaneously to the mind, whereas
only the literal meaning of a polysem and metaphor is believed to occur to the hearer's
mind if there is no evidence to the contrary.
With respect to the difference between polysem and metaphor, it may be briefly
said that although the two categories are generally covered by the term majaz and
sometimes studied as a single class, some legal theorists attempt to draw a distinction
between them. To clarify the difference between a polysem and metaphor, al-Ghazali
takes recourse to a special test which may be called 'the constancy test'. Al-GhazaE
applies the term manqvl (polysem) to refer to the expression that is transferred from its
original meaning to another (yunqalu 'an mawdu'ihi 'ila ma'na), treated invariably
as a constant name for it, and used to convey both the original and new meaning.3
For example, the expression salah is held to have been originally assigned to, or
technically speaking, 'established' for du'a' (call) in its wide sense and then used
narrowly to refer to the Islamic prayer. To take more examples, hajj, which is said to
have been originally assigned to qasd (intention) and kufr, which is primordially
assigned to taghtiyah (covering) are given in the Qur'an and Sunnah new Islamic
1 Al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din, al-Muzhir fi 'Ulum al-Lughah wa-'Anwa'iha, ed.
Muhammad 'Ahmad Jad al-Mawla, 'All Muhammad al-BijawI and Muhammad al-Fadl
Tbrkhim, 1/369; see also, al-Samarqandi, 1/208.
^'Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Kitab Mihakk al-Nazar fi al-Mantiq (Beirut: Dar al-
Nahdah al-Hadlthah, 1966), p. 21.
3See al-Ghazali, 'Abu Hamid, Mi'yar al-'Ilm fi Fann al-Mantiq, p. 56.
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meanings, namely 'the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca' and 'unbelief respectively. The
process of assigning a new meaning to an old expression in this way is, thus,
interpreted as a process of transferring an expression from its original meaning to a
new one. The pretheoretical meaning of naql (transferring) and isti 'arah (borrowing)
may well be useful here to pinpoint the terminological contrast between manqul and
musta'ar, which have only technically been translated as polysemy and metaphor.*
Just as borrowing implies that borrowed objects are customarily returnable, so also
musta'ar (metaphor) entails that the non-literal message conveyed by a metaphoric
expression is only contextually implied, rather than conventionally signified, by the
expression.
It is essential, however, to point out that while homonymy (ishtirak) is assumed
to be a wad'-based phenomenon and treated as haqiqah/- metaphor is widely judged
to be a partially use-motivated one. The qualification made here by the adverb
'partially' is meant to indicate that metaphor is also based on a kind of wad', namely
the so-called subsumptive wad' (ad-wad' al-naw'I) (cf. 2.2.1), which, unlike
individual wad' (al-wad' al-shakhsi), gives the speakers a great deal of freedom to
use innovative utterances. As to polysemy (naql), it is held to be brought about either
by the Sharl'ah-based wad' (al-wad' al-shar'i) by virtue of which the Shari'ah-
based terms are coined, or by the conventional wad' (al-wad' al-'urfi). The latter
involves both the general conventional wad' (al-wad' al-'urfi 1- 'amm) and the special
conventional wad' (al-wad' al-'urfi 1-khass). The difference between the general and
special conventional wad' is that the latter is made by the specialists in a particular
^Both polysemy and metaphor are Greek terms, polysemy is composed of two parts:
poly (of many) and semy (meaning). See Mohamed Mohamed Y. Ali, Wasf al-
Lughah al-'Arabiyyah Dilaliyyan fi Daw' Mafhum al-Dalalah al-Markaziyyah:
Dirasah Hawla 1-Ma'na wa-Zilal al-Ma'na, p. 346. Metaphor is, however, "a
derivative of the Greek metapherein , to "transfer"". Weiss, The Search, p. 141.
Consequently, polysemy and metaphor are only the technical, but not the literal,
equivalents of naql and isti 'arah respectively. In fact, the literal meaning ofmetaphor
ualifies it to be a good literal, but not technical, counterpart for naql (transferring).
Emphasising that homonyms are haqiqah-expressions, al-Basri employs the term al-
haqiqah al-mushtarakah (homonymous haqiqah-expression) for homonyms versus
al-haqiqah al-mufradah (univocal hagiqah-expression). See al-Basri, 1/16-17.
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field, whereas the former is made by ordinary speakers of the language (cf. 2.2). It
should be noted that the fresh expressions entering the language by Shari'aij-based
wad', or by the conventional wad', can be counted as haqiqah-expressions since they
satisfy the definition of haqlqah mentioned above. What this definition suggests is
that determining whether a given expression is haqlqah or majaz is relative to the
code [language] in which the communication takes place. Accordingly, the expression
salah (the Islamic prayer ) is counted as haqlqah-expressiori in relation to the
Shari'ah-based wad' and majaz-expression in relation to the original (or the
linguistic) wad1
4.8.1.1. Arguments in favour of the distinction between haqlqah
and majaz
Since the issue of the existence of majaz in languages has long been taken for
granted, I will not introduce all the arguments that are developed by the proponents of
majaz to support their claim that there is a distinctive type of speech called majaz.
Instead, I shall select the ones that seem to me most powerful. These arguments can
be outlined as follows,
(1) Unlike the recovery of a haqiqah-expression, the recovery of a majaz-
expression depends on contextual evidence. Hence, the word 'Hon' can stand alone to
mean "the ravenous animal", but needs to be supported by an appropriate context to
refer to a brave man.2
(2) Some meanings of a multi-meaning expression tend to occur to the mind prior




Therefore, it is reasonable to distinguish those meanings as ma'am haqiqiyyah
(proper meanings) and the others as ma'ammajaziyyah (figurative meanings). 1
These two arguments can be combined and reformulated in the following manner:
(3) If a native speaker is asked about the meaning of an expression such as 'lion'
in isolation from any context, his reply can typically be said to be satisfactory if and
only if he states what is known as the literal meaning of the word, which in this
example is something like 'the king of Beasts' or 'the ravenous animal'. This
demonstrates that some of the meanings of such expressions, that is, the literal
meanings, are more entitled to be their proper meanings than others.
4.8.2. Arguments against the distinction between haqiqah and
majaz
Prior to embarking on the discussion of Ibn Taymiyyah's arguments against the
distinction between haqiqah and majaz, it would be necessary to point out that we
will confine ourselves to the arguments and remarks that are of universal nature, that
is, those which are not distinctively and exclusively related to Islamic history and
culture. It is also necessary to stress that in order to do full justice to Ibn Taymiyyah
and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim, their position on the notion majaz will be taken as one
element of a complex pragmatic theory.
Challenging the advocates of the distinction between haqiqah and majaz to
introduce any reliable distinction between haqiqah and majaz, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn
al-Qayyim advance several arguments against this distinction; the following are some
of these:
ISee al-Basri, 1/23-24; al-Razi, 1/148-149; Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/405-406; al-
Mawsill, 2/18.
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(I) The distinction between haqlqah and majaz is based upon a false claim that
there is wad' prior to use. Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim assume that the
distinction between haqlqah and majaz is acceptable only if it can be proven that
(a) a group of sane people held a meeting, and agreed to assign names to designate
entities in the extra-linguistic world;
(b) and then used those expressions for those meanings; and
(c) after holding another meeting they agreed to use the same expressions for
different meanings by virtue of the relatedness between the original meanings and the
accidental ones; and refereed to the expressions signifying the original meanings as
literal, and to the expressions signifying the accidental meanings as non-literal. 1
The essence of this argument is that the etymological and diachronic account of
majaz is invalid since it is founded upon non-demonstrable assumptions. In other
words, the claim that a given meaning of a multi-meaning expression is a literal
meaning on the grounds that it is the first meaning to have been assigned to the
expression is a non-verifiable claim. It should be noted, however, that Ibn Taymiyyah
does not deny the existence of relationships holding between literal and figurative
meanings or the possibility that one meaning is chronologically prior to the other(s),
but what he disputes is the possibility of finding reliable tests by which one can judge
that a particular meaning is haqlqah or majaz. Thus, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, it
is untenable to assume that dhawq (taste) in one of the following phrases is more
suitable to be classified as haqlqah than the others: dhawq al- 'adhab (the taste of
punishment), dhawq al-mawt (the taste of death) or dhawq al-ta'am 'aw al-sharab
(the taste of food or drink). It will be made clear that Ibn Taymiyyah develops an
alternative synchronic account ofmajaz, which will be dealt with later (cf. 4.8.3).
lAl-Mawsili, 2/6.
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(II) Responding to the claim that an expression is haqiqah if it signifies
independently of context ('in dalla bi-la qarinah) and majaz if it does not signify
without context, 1 Ibn Taymiyyah argues that there is no meaningful expression that
may signify in isolation from all contexts.
Similarly, he refuses the claim that an expression is haqiqah if it is satisfied with a
verbal context- which, unlike situational context, is assumed to be a wad '-based or
conventionalised one- and majaz if it requires a situational context.2 Defending this
position, Ibn Taymiyyah states that
An expression is never used without wad '-based verbal qualifications.
Furthermore, situation (i.e. the speaker's and hearer's situation (had al-
mutakallim wa-l-mustami')) must be taken into account in all kinds of
utterances. For knowledge of the speaker would reveal a great deal of the
speaker's meaning, which cannot be understood otherwise. This is
because knowledge of the speaker's habit of the use of the language
depends on knowledge of the speaker himself, and because an expression
cannot be meaningful unless the 'language' of the speaker, that is, his habit
and custom which he usually observes in his speech, is known. What is
more, the signification of an expression for its meaning is intentional
(qasdiyyah), wilful ('iradiyyah) and freely chosen (ikhtiyariyyah ). 3
It seems that Ibn Taymiyyah's statement that "an expression is never used without
wad '-based verbal qualifications" appears to be irreconcilable with Ibn al-Qayyim's
notion 'unqualified meaning', more of which later (cf. 4.8.3). However, there is in
fact a way of reconciling the two positions since what Ibn Taymiyyah means by
qualifications is so general that it embraces not only what the speaker utters, but also
his relevant silence during the conversation.
(III) In his attempt to refute the second argument of the adherents of majaz, Ibn
Taymiyyah argues that the fact that a particular meaning of a multi-meaning expression
tends to occur to the mind prior to the others does not justify the distinction between
haqiqah and majaz. For the meanings of some haqiqah-expressions may also tend to
ISee the first of the arguments developed in favour of the distinction between haqiqah
and majaz (the previous section).
2fbn Taymiyyah, al-'Iman, pp. 109-110.
2Ibid., p. 110.
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occur to the mind prior to others. For example, lexicographers agree unanimously that
the word zahr (back) is literally used to refer to all animal backs, but the back of a
human may, nevertheless, be the one which occurs immediately to many people's
mind (wa-ma'a hadha fa-kathirun mina 1-nasi qad la yasbiqu 'ila dhihnihim 'ilia
zahru l-'insan). They do not think of the back of a dog, fox, wolf, weasel, ant or
louse. Similarly, if someone takes an oath that he will never eat ru 'us (heads) or eggs,
his utterance would be taken to mean, according to the jurists, the heads and eggs that
are usually eatable but not the heads of ants and fleas or the eggs of fish. 1 Thus,
tabadur (immediacy), within Ibn Taymiyyah's framework, is not a fixed,
predetermined or predictable, but rather context-dependent, process such that what
occurs first to the mind in a given situation could not be the same in all other
situations. That is to say, there is no constant immediate meaning attached to each
word in the language, but the context in which the word is processed determines
which interpretation is most likely to be the first to occur to the hearer's mind.2 To
put it another way, the occurrence of a particular meaning rather than another in the
mind is not due to variation in the nature of the speech itself, but to other extra-
linguistic factors such as the frequency of the words in the speech, the relevance of the
meaning and a host of psychological factors related to the way in which memory
operates. Hence, the reason why a back of a human rather than a back of an ant is
most likely to occur to the mind when the word al-zahr (the back) is mentioned relates
to the fact that the back of a human is the most frequent meaning expressed by the
word al-zahr (the back) in the everyday use of the language.^
Thus, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, there is no distinctive feature in the expression
itself by which one can distinguish haqlqah from majaz in the same way that one can
distinguish a declarative sentence from an interrogative one. However, if it is the case




that no distinctive feature inheres in the expression itself which can help in identifying
haqiqaF-expression from majaz-expression, then why cannot tabadvr (immediacy)
be regarded as a well defined parameter by which haqlqah can be distinguished from
majaz, especially if we take into account that the native speakers of the same linguistic
community are usually capable of recognising the immediate meanings ofmost, if not
all, the words in the language? Putting it in a modern context, Ibn Taymiyyah's
position on this issue would be tantamount to saying that just as there is no need to
render the Canadian dollar, for example, as the literal meaning and the American dollar
as the figurative meaning of the word 'dollar' if it is used in Canada, so also there is
no need to regard 'the ravenous animal' as the literal meaning and 'the fearless man' as
the figurative meaning of the word 'lion', since the intended meaning of these words
is identified by the situations in which they are employed. *
Thus, instead of saying that since 'a ravenous animal' is more likely to occur to
the mind as a meaning for 'lion' than 'a fearless man', which qualifies the former to be
regarded as the literal meaning and the latter as the figurative meaning for 'lion', the
opponents ofmajaz would prefer to say that what occurs to the mind first in the actual
respective situation is the intended and, consequently, the proper meaning.2
(IV) On the basis of the postulate that the conventions of the language are set up in
the actual communicative situations rather than being established independently of
contexts in a one-to-one relationship between expressions and meanings, Ibn al-
Qayyim develops two arguments:
a) The claim that wad' is independent from, and prior to, use theoretically implies
that it is possible to assign another meaning to an expression without being previously
CSee Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/437. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah's example has been
altered to make his idea clear.
^See al-Mawsili, 2/68.
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used in its first meaning, which leads to the inadmissible consequence that there can be
majaz without being preceded by haqiqah.1
b) Since signification, which he defines as "understanding the meaning of an
expression when it is produced", never takes place without a preceding use, and since
use is either equivalent to haqlqah ormajaz according to those who define haqiqah as
the use of an expression to convey its wad'-based meaning, or one of the constituents
of haqlqah2 for those who define haqiqah as the expression that is used to convey its
wad '-based meaning, it follows that the claim that wad' (i.e. the assignment of a
meaning to an expression) is independent from, and prior to, use leads to saying that
an expression, before being used, is free from both haqiqah and majaz while at the
same time signifying one of them, which is a paradox. 3
(V) The distinction between haqiqah and majaz is unfounded, whether it is taken
in terms of signifier (al-dalil), signified (al-madlul) or signification (al-dalalah).
As far as the signifier is concerned, the invalidity of the distinction
between haqiqah and majaz is indisputable inasmuch as no sane person
would say that an expression, regardless of its meaning can be divided into
haqiqah and majaz. Looking at the same issue from the angle of the
signified, the distinction between haqiqah and majaz is invalid because the
signified on its own cannot be conceived of as being haqiqah or majaz, but
can only be asserted or negated [...]. The distinction between haqlqah and
majaz is similarly false when considered from the angle of signification.
This is because signification is intended to refer to two things: first, the
action of the signifying agent [i.e. the speaker], that is, his signifying
something to the hearer by means of the expression (dalalatuhu li-l-sami 'i
bi-lafzih); [...] and, second, the hearer's understanding of that expression
[...]. In these two senses of signification, the intended meaning of an
expression is its proper or literal meaning (haqiqatuh) regardless of how
clear or unclear the expression is, or the ability or inability of the speaker to
make his intention manifest, or, finally, whether the hearer knows the
language of the speaker, including his speech habit ('adat khitabih)A
Hence, much of the misconception in the mainstream account of majaz is due,
according to Ibn al-Qayyim, to the confusion between a theoretical or abstract
^See al-Mawsiti, 2/7.




language (al-kalam al-muqaddar) and the language in use (al-kalam al-musta'mal). 1
By the former he seems to mean the set of the assignments of the single words to their
meanings which the mainstream assume to have been made by the establisher and by
virtue of which they claim that these meanings are the proper or literal meanings.
The major mistake in the analysis of the adherents ofmajaz is that
They abstract single expressions from the qualifications which apply to
them, examine them in isolation from their contexts, and apply the same
conclusions to the expression when it is combined with other expressions.
Thus, they say that 'lion' taken in isolation from context is the specific
animal and that 'sea', in isolation is a large quantity of water. But this is
fallacious, because 'lion', 'sea' and the like, when used in isolation, are not
utterances or parts of utterances, nor do they mean anything; they are
nothing in fact but sounds used for cawing (wa-hwa sawtun yun'aqu
bih). ^
4.8.3. Ibn Taymiyyah's account of majaz
Ibn Taymiyyah argues that since language is used as a means to express the
contents of the external world, there must be a correspondence between the structure
of reality and the use of language in such a way that the structure of reality is reflected
in the language. Consequently, since there is no abstract thing in the external world
but all entities are conceived to be qualified in some way, it follows that there would
be no unqualified expressions in the language to signify it.3
Thus, in a language there is no such a thing as blackness,
whiteness, tallness and shortness independently of black, white, tall or
short objects, or in isolation from any qualification. However,
expressions in isolation can indeed be found in the works of
lexicographers, but this is because these abstract expressions are
understood by lexicographers to represent the common range of what
native speakers mean in different utterances.^
This is intended to be a counter-argument against the advocates of the distinction
between haqlqah and majaz who hold that single expressions such as "lion' are
ISee al-Mawsill, 2/41.
21bid.
^See Ibn Taymiyyah, al-'Imaxi, pp. 103-104.
4Ibid., p. 104.
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haqiqah if it is considered in isolation from any context and majaz if there exists a
contextual indicator that the speaker means 'a brave man'.
Since Ibn Taymiyyah strongly believes that simple expressions (e.g. dhawq in its
abstract sense) are not meaningful and, accordingly, cannot unequivocally signify
objects in the extra-linguistic world, it follows that his empirical conception of the
relationship between language and reality differs fundamentally from the view of
logical atomists. According to this view, "Every simple expression of the language
would have a single meaning and this could be described, either directly or by
reduction, in terms of the relationship holding between the expression and the object
or class of objects which the expression stood for, or named, in the external world". ^
The fact that languages vary in their structures and that word-for-word translation is
not usually a good procedure for a proper translation of texts raises major difficulties
for this view, which may lend credit to Ibn Taymiyyah's thesis that meaningfulness is
a context-dependent notion.
The remainder of my discussion of Ibn Taymiyyah's account of majaz will be
introduced in three points. The first is his emphasis on the following principles
without which no expression can be seen as an actual part of the language:
Firstly, no expression can be meaningful unless it is combined with others to
form, at least, a sentence.^
Secondly, expressions never signify without the following conditions being
satisfied:
(i) the speaker is rational and uses the language in a conventionally accessible
manner, this being his habit of speech.
(ii) the hearer has a knowledge of the speaker's habit of the use of his utterance.
Ijohn Lyons, Semantics, 1/140.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/450.
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(iii) the speaker speaks in agreement with this habit.
(iv) the hearer assumes this is the case. 1
However, one could argue that Ibn Taymiyyah is wrong in insisting that meanings
are so contextuaiised to the extent that it would be impossible to recover the meaning
of 'back' when it occurs in isolation. In response, Ibn Taymiyyah would argue that
although an expression like 'back' may conjure up a mental picture of 'human back', it
is still an expression that does not refer to one object in particular in a one-to-one
relationship nor can it be used for predication. Also since expressing intentions is the
ultimate goal for communication, and because it is not possible to assign any intention
to an expression in isolation, it follows that the expression in question cannot be
regarded as part of language.
The second important point in Ibn Taymiyyah's account of majaz is that he
equates metaphors with what is called in PF al-mushakkikat, derived from shakkaka
(to make somebody doubt something). Al-Qara.fi points out that the reason why a
mushakkik-expression is given this name has to do with the fact that the investigator
doubts as to whether to classify it as a mushtarak (homonym) or as mutawati' (lit,
concurrent or accordant). By mutawati is meant "an expression assigned for a
universal meaning which applies equally to its referents". For example, the
expression 'man' applies equally to all objects that have the following features (+
human + adult + male). Mushakkik, by contrast, is defined as "an expression
assigned for a universal meaning which applies differently to its referents".2 'Light',
for example, is employed to refer to 'sun light' and 'lamp light', although they are
different from each other. Similarly, there are different kinds of existence, such as the
eternal and everlasting existence of Allah, the existence of his mortal creatures,
physical and metaphysical existence, and mental and external existence; these different
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/446, 450, 459.
- Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 30-31.
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kinds of existence are, nevertheless, covered, at least in some languages, by one term.
Therefore, there is no essential difference, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, between
metaphors and mushakkikat which would allow us to place them under different
categories and, therefore, treat them differently. In the mainstream analysis,
metaphors are distinguished from mushakkikat by reference to wad'. If the
assignment of two or more meanings to an expression is assumed to be carried out by
a single act of wad', the expression is classified as mushakkik, and the meanings are
consequently treated as one meaning. Thus, the different kinds of existence, which
have just been mentioned, are treated as one meaning, rather than multi-meanings. If
the assignment of meanings to an expression is, however, assumed to be made by
more than one act of wad' at different points in time and, also, the creator of the new
meaning is thought to have relied on the relatedness between the old and new
meaning, the expression is classified as a majaz-expression, thus allowing for the
existence of figurative meaning. For Ibn Taymiyyah, this criterion is unsatisfactory,
because, first there is no means by which one can identify which meaning is prior to
the other, and, second, the only way to know that the assignment of the meanings to
an expression is made by more than one act of wad' at different points in time is to
assume that the expression is majaz, which is circular.
However, there is one element that both the mainstream and Ibn Taymiyyah have
in common in their different accounts ofmajaz, namely the relationship between the
so-called literal and figurative meaning. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this
relationship is existent in mushakkik as well. Thus, just as it is not reasonable to say
that 'existence' in its abstract meaning is the literal meaning and the actual qualified
meanings (like the eternal and everlasting existence of Allah, the existence of his
mortal creatures, physical and metaphysical existence) are the figurative meanings, so
it is not reasonable to say that 'lion' in its abstract meaning is the literal meaning and
the actual qualified meaning 'a brave man' is the figurative meaning of the expression
'lion'. It should be pointed out here that what is meant by abstract meaning is
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essentially different from unqualified meaning. 'Abstract meaning' refers to the
mental construction of the meaning of an expression resulting from considering it in
isolation from all its actual contexts. With respect to unqualified meaning, it would be
better to explain it in line with Ibn Taymiyyah's distinction between dalalah
wujudiyyah and dalalah 'adamiyyah (existential and non-existential signification)
(cf. 4.7). As mentioned earlier, if the speaker intentionally abstains from qualifying
his expression in a conventionally recognisable manner, his abstention will be
interpreted as an attempt on his part to use the expression in its unqualified meaning,
that is, the meaning understood from the expression together with the speaker's
abstention. Accordingly, the word 'lion' in 'I saw a lion yesterday' is used to convey
an unqualified meaning, while in 'I saw a lion delivering an address from the pulpit' is
used to convey a qualified meaning. Unlike abstract meanings, unqualified meanings
can be described as linguistically relevant and consequently regarded as meaningful.
Hence, it can be said that although the Salafis acknowledge the existence of 'single
meaning', they, nevertheless, employ it in a special sense which is compatible with
their thesis that expressions are meaningful only if they are used in particular
communicative situations.
The question that has to be raised here is why the Salafis refuse to regard
unqualified meanings as haqlqah (literal meanings) and qualified meanings as majaz
(figurative meanings). According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the reason pertains to the
elasticity, inconsistency, and open-endedness of this distinction in empirical terms
(ghayru mundabitin wa-la muttaridin wa-la mun'akis). Furthermore, this
distinction involves an unnecessary differentiation between totally similar notions,
since the adherents of majaz do not apply majaz to all those expressions whose
meanings vary according to unqualification and qualification, which form the majority
of, if not all, expressions in a language. However, Ibn al-Qayyim's point is this: if
each expression whose unqualified meaning is different from its qualified meaning is
regarded as majaz, the whole language would be regarded as majaz, since this is the
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case with every expression in the language. But this (i.e. that the whole language is
majaz) is, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, self-evidently false because it is obvious that
most expressions are used to convey their literal meanings. Besides, the majority of
the adherents of majaz acknowledge that each majaz must have a haqlqah.
Consequently, haqlqah in their view is prior to, and more commonly used than,
majaz. Moreover, they acknowledge that haqlqah is the base (al-'asl) and majaz is
the derivative (al-farj. However, if the whole or the majority of the language was
majaz, would not majaz have to be considered the base, and, therefore, would
inevitably have to be given priority in interpretation, which would inevitably lead to
confusion in language and communication. 1
Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim's basic point is that a single meaning is either unqualified
(.mutlaq) or qualified (muqayyad). Unqualified meanings are designated by
unqualified expressions, and qualified meanings are designated by qualified
expressions. Both unqualified and qualified meanings belong to haqlqah type (the
term 'haqlqah' is being employed here in a special sense where it refers to the proper
use of language). Accordingly, 'lion' is a haqlqah-Qxpression whether it is used to
refer to the ravenous animal or to a fearless man since the intended meaning in both
cases is determined by the situational context and since it does not matter whether
context is wujudl (existential) or 'adami (non-existential). Although the distinction
between existential and non-existential contexts does not seem to have been explicitly
drawn by Ibn Taymiyyah or Ibn al-Qayyim, it is, nonetheless, quite vital in their
framework, especially in connection with the existential/non-existential signification
dichotomy and the unqualified/qualified meaning dichotomy; for it is doubtful that
these two dichotomies can be explained without reference to this distinction.
If one is to compare Ibn Taymiyyah's account with the mainstream account of
majaz, one may say that Ibn Taymiyyah's account is committed to a wide sense of
^Al-Mawsili, 2/22-23.
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meaning which can accommodate both what the mainstream call ma 'na haqiql (literal
meaning) and ma'na majazi (figurative meaning). Therefore, instead of saying that
bahr (sea) literally means a huge quantity of water and could be used metaphorically to
refer to a person who possesses wide knowledge, Ibn Taymiyyah would say that bahr
unqualifiedly means 'very wide' and thus can be used, given the relevant context, to
refer to the sea or to a person who possesses wide knowledge. 1 Thus, there is no
difference, according to the Salafls' approach, between the relationship holding
between 'the blackness of ink' and the 'blackness of tar' and the relationship holding
between 'sea' and 'an extremely knowledgeable person'. Just as the mushakkik-
expression 'black' covers both 'the blackness of ink' and 'the blackness of tar' and
can be employed to refer to either of them, so the word bahr can be used to refer to 'a
huge quantity ofwater' or to 'an extremely knowledgeable person'.2
Thus, the Arabic word 'dhawq' (taste) is treated by the mainstream as having only
one literal meaning (to experience the sensation of food or drink in the mouth). The
other meanings of this word are viewed as figurative. This conception, in Ibn
Taymiyyah's view, is inaccurate, because the meaning of dhawq is in actual fact "to
experience the sensation of something", as al-Khalll Ibn 'Ahmad al-Farahidl (one of
the classical Arab lexicographers (d. 175/791)) says, whether it is food or not. Ibn
Taymiyyah quotes several Arabic texts to support his claim; the following Qur'anic
verses constitute some of these examples;^
(1)
Wa-la-nudhiqannahum mina l-'adhabi l-'adna duna l-'adhabi l-'akbari
la 'allahum yarji 'un.
And indeedWe will make
Them taste of the Penalty
Of this (life) prior to
The supreme Penalty, in order
That they may (repent and) return.^
ISee Ibn Taymiyyah's quotation of the debate between an opponent and a proponent
ofmajaz. Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/490-491.
2Ibid.
3See Ibn Taymiyyah, al-'Iman, pp. 104-105.




Then did they taste
The evil result of
Their conduct. 1
(3)
la yadhuquna flha 1-mawta 'ilia 1-mawtata l-'ula
Norwill they there
Taste Death, except the first
Death.2
(4)
la yadhuquna fiha bardan wa-la sharaban 'ilia hamiman wa-ghassaqa
Nothing cool shall they taste
Therein, nor any drink,
Save a boiling fluid
And a fluid, dark, murky,
Intensely cold.3
Thus, instead of saying that dhawq literally means 'to experience the sensation of
food or drink' and can be used metaphorically to refer to other kinds of sensation, Ibn
Taymiyyah says that dhawq can be used to refer to any experience of sensation of any
kind and the context provides real means by which the speaker's intended meaning can
be recovered.
Although this account of majaz may appear to be bizarre, some lexicographers
such as Tsma'il Ibn Hammad al-Jawhari seem to find it practical to the extent that they
prefer to treat words like bahr as having a broad scope of application rather than
having different meanings, so bahr applies to sea because of its deepness and
vastness, to the horse that has wide steps (used for fast horses) and to every great
river.4
lAli's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 65/9.
2Ibid., 44/56.
2Ibid., 78/24-25.
4See Tsma'il Ibn Hammad al-Jawhari, al-Sihah: Taj al-lughah wa-Sihah al-
'Arabiyyah, ed. 'Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafur 'Attar, 4th edn. (Beirut: Dar al-'lim li-1-
malayln, 1987), (bahr).
152
The third point we need to highlight in Ibn Taymiyyah's account of majaz
concerns the relationship between an abstract expression like janah (wing) and its
actual variants, which are divided by the mainstream into haqiqah-expressions like
janah al-ta'ir (bird's wing) and ma/az-expressions like jasiah al-dhull (the wing of
humility) as one involving the general (al-'amm) and the specific (al-khass) or
between the unqualified (al-mutlaq) and the qualified (al-muqayyad) respectively.
The difference between the general (al- 'amm) and the unqualified (al-mutlaq) is that
the former is used to refer to a class of entities (to which it conventionally applies)
regardless of their individual variety whereas the latter is used to refer to them
regardless of their qualitative variety. Thus, 'man' can be seen as a general expression
since it is applicable to Zayd and 'Umar despite of their difference; and can also be
seen as an unqualified expression since it is applicable to a bad and good man
regardless of their qualitative variety. 1 However, this difference between general and
unqualified expression is not essential here, since the intended referent or the meaning
of the expression in both cases is relative to the situation in which the expression is
uttered. In other words, the point of resemblance between a majaz-expression like
'lion' in 'I saw a lion delivering an address from the pulpit', on the one hand, and a
specific and qualified expression like 'Zayd' and 'the good man', on the other, is that
all of them are indexical expressions.
In addition to specific, qualified and majaz expressions, there are others that are
treated as context-dependent categories in Ibn Taymiyyah's framework. These are
'asma' al-ma'arif (definite nouns), which involve
i- personal pronouns (al-mvdmarat), e.g. 'I', 'you' and 'he';
ii- demonstrative nouns ('asma' al-'isharah), e.g. 'this' and 'that';
iii- relative pronouns (al-'asma' al-mawsulah), e.g.
*See al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, pp. 38-40.
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iv- definite nouns (al-'asma' al-mu 'arrafah bi-al), e.g. al-rasul (the messenger);
v- proper names (al-'asma' al-'a'lam), e.g. 'Ibrahim, 'Ismail and Ramadan;
vi- what is annexed to any of these categories to form a genitive construction (al-
mudaf 'ila 1-ma'rifah), e.g. baytl (my house), baytu hadha 1-rajul ( this
gentleman's house), baytu -lladhl dhahaba -l'an (the house of that who has just left),
baytu 1-rasul (the House of the Messenger) or (the Messenger's House), baytu
Ibrahim (Ibrahim's House) or (the House of 'Ibrahim,); and
vii- al-munada 1-mu 'ayyan (the definite noun in the vocative), e.g. the prophet
Yusuf's statement,
(5) "ya 'abati 'innl ra'aytu 'ahada 'ashara kawkaban"y
"O [...] father
I did see eleven stars".3
Ibn Taymiyyah points out that such expressions as rasul (messenger) and bayt
(house) can be intended to denote the general meaning or refer to a more specific
meaning (i.e. a particular house). To illustrate this, he considers these examples:
(6) "'inna 'arsalna 'ilaykum rasulan shahidan 'alaykum ka-ma 'arsalna 'ila
fir'awna rasulan; fa-'asa fir'awnu 1-rasula"
"We have sent to you,
(O men!) an apostle,
To be a witness concerning you,
Even as We sent
An apostle to Pharaoh.
But Pharaoh disobeyed
The apostle...".4
(7) "la taj'alu du'a'a 1-rasuli baynakum ka-du'a'i ba'dikum ba'dan",
"Deem not the summons
Of the apostle among yourselves
1Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 5/55, 27/3, 31/4.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/429.
3Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 12/4.
4Ibid., 73/15-16.
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Like the summons of one
Of you to another".1
The expression al-rasul (the apostle) in these two different texts is the same
expression, but it refers to different people: the messenger Moses in (6) and the
messenger Muhammad in (7).2 Similarly, 'I' and 'you', 'this' and 'that' can be used
to refer to different referents in different situations.
Ibn Taymiyyah's basic point here is that although this type of expression is never
used without a context for identifying the entity to which it refers, and although the
signification of this type of expression consists of the expression and a context serving
to identify the referent, it is, nevertheless, treated as haqlqah and no sane person
could claim that it was majaz.3
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the pronoun (I) has never been uttered unqualifiedly
(mutlaqan) owing to the fact that the average universal abstract speaker does not exist
in the external world, since each speaker is particular and distinctive. So, in order to
know its referent and its meaning, one has to know the speaker.4 In the Salafls'
view, just as there is no abstract speaker, so there is no such a thing as an abstract
janah (wing), dhawq (taste), dhahr (back), or bayt (house). What exists in the
external world, and what speakers do refer to in their communications, is the qualified
janah (wing), dhawq (taste), dhahr (back), and bayt (house). Consider these
examples:
(8) Thy Lord hath decreed
That ye worship none but Him,
And that ye be kind
To parents. Whether one
Or both of them attain
Old age in thy life,
Say not to them a word
Of contempt, nor repel them,
But address them
1Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 24/63.




In terms of honour.
And, out of kindness,
Lower to them the wing
Of humility, and say:
"My Lord! bestow on them
Thy Mercy even as they
Cherished me in childhood. 1
(9) But lower thy wing
in gentleness)
To the Believers.2
(10) There is not an animal
(That lives) on the earth,
Nor a being that flies
On its wings, but (forms
Part of) communities like you.3
The word 'wing' in all these examples is being used in an unqualified way to refer
to a specific entity in the extra-linguistic world. It is not typical of speakers to use
'wing' or any other expression in an unqualified way; so, there is no difference
between 'ana (I) and janah (wing) that can justify subsuming them under different
categories. Furthermore, the connection between janah (wing) in its abstract sense
and dhull (humility) in "Lower to them the wing of humility" is similar to the
connection between janah (wing) and ta'ir (bird) in 'the bird's wing', so why is it,
Ibn al-Qayyim asks, that the expression janah (wing) is rendered as haqlqah in the
latter and majaz in the former although the speakers of the language use each of them
in its respective qualified manner. If someone says, Ibn al-Qayyim adds, but
'humility' has no wing, we would say to him it is indeed the case that 'humility' has
no wing covered by feathers but has an immaterial wing that suits it.4 I shall not go
any further into the question why the Salafis do not conceive of 'the bird's wing' as
haqlqah and 'the wing of humility' as majaz as I have already dealt with in this
section.





Let us sum up this point by saying that context is the essential element in
identifying the intended meaning in each linguistic utterance, especially in utterances
involving mushakkik, mvtawati' and mushtarak expressions; and that each pair of
the so-called haqlqalj-expression and ma/az-expression represents two variants of a
wider unqualified expression. Thus, instead of saying that 'the bird's wing' is a
haqlqalj-expression, and 'the wing of humility' is a /na/az-expression, Salafls would
say that both 'the bird's wing' and the wing of humility' are two different variants of
'wing', which only has mental, not actual, existence. In other words, just as the
mushakkik-expression 'white', given the appropriate context, is capable of referring
to the whiteness of ice and the whiteness of milk, the mutawati-expression 'man'
refers equally to Zayd and 'Umar, and the mush tarak-expression 'al-mushtari' is
applicable to a 'buyer' and 'Jupiter', in the same way that the personal pronoun 'I' can
refer to different speakers in different situations; thus the expression 'wing' can be
applied equally to 'a bird's wing' and 'the wing of humility', subject to the condition
that identifying which one of them is the intended meaning will depend on context.
Ibn Taymiyyah's account ofmajaz is assumed to have at least one advantage over
the account of the adherents of majaz, namely the advantage of being relatively
objective. There are at least three reasons which make Ibn Taymiyyah's account more
objective than its rivals:
(i)- It does not presuppose a chronological priority for one meaning over another.
(ii)- It does not claim that one meaning is more deserving to be the primary
meaning of an expression than its other meaning(s).
(iii)- It does not give priority in interpretation to one meaning over another, but
assumes that an interpretation that is supported by contextual evidence is the only
possible and intended one.
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Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah does not accept the idea that the use of the so-called
majaz involves a departure from what the mainstream assume to be al-'asl (the
original state or the norm).l Majaz in Ibn Taymiyyah's view is not a decorative
alternative of expressing haqlqah, for what is expressed by majaz is inexpressible by
haqlqah. Determining whether to use an unqualified expression or qualified one rests
on the communicative situation rather than the speaker's choice; and the relationship
between the use of unqualified expressions and the use of qualified ones is integrative
rather than substitutive. Also, although he accepts that speech varies in terms of
eloquence and ambiguity, he, nevertheless, does not believe that this justifies dividing
speech into majaz and haqlqah?
4.9. Ibn Taymiyyah's model of interpretation
Compared with the mainstream model examined in the previous chapter, Ibn
Taymiyyah's model of interpretation appears to be more straightforward. In what
follows I shall sketch out the principles of the mainstream model, and then highlight
the differences between the mainstream model and Ibn Taymiyyah's one.
As has already been elucidated, the mainstream model consists of the following
principles ('usul):
(i)- The Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest
(bayan al-mutakallim): the speaker tends to make his intention as clear as possible.
(ii)- The Principle of Truthfulness (sidq al-mutakallim): the hearer takes the
speaker's utterance as being true.
(iii)- The Principle of 'I'mal ('making sense of expressions): the hearer treats the
text as meaningful as possible.
ISee Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/462.
2-See ibid., 20/462-463.
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(iv)- The Principle of Immediacy (tabadvr): the hearer takes the interpretation that
occurs to the mind first as the intended interpretation.
(v)- The Principle of Istishab: the hearer takes the interpretation that is
compatible with the base as the intended interpretation.
It is clear that there is a striking similarity between the Principle of Immediacy and
the Principle of Istishab, but there is also, it should be noted, an important difference,
which makes the mainstream model and Ibn Taymiyyah's model diverge. Whereas
the Principle of Immediacy operates in relation to the whole communicative situation,
the Principle of Istishab operates only by default, that is, in isolation from the actual
contexts in the communicative situation.
It is because of this difference that the Salafls appeal to the Principle of Immediacy
rather than that of Istishab, owing to the fact that it harmonises well with their belief
that valid interpretations are not obtainable in isolation from communicative situations.
Furthermore, the Salafls believe that the Principle of Istishab is incompatible with the
Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest, which forms
with the Principle of Immediacy the cardinal postulates in their model of interpretation.
They defend this position in this regard by pointing out that in recovering the
signification of an utterance the hearer does not have to move from a literal-base
meaning to a non-literal subsidiary or derivative one. In fact, the Salafls believe that
the intended meaning strikes the hearer directly by virtue of the Principle of the
Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest and the Principle of Immediacy.
In other words, the hearer's mind goes directly to the intention of the speaker without
the need for mediating meanings, simply because it is the appropriate context, not the
context-independent meaning, of the expression which provides the effective guide to
the speaker's intention.
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Let us now consider the difference between Ibn Taymiyyah's model of
interpretation and that of the mainstream in dealing with the example 'I saw a lion
delivering an address from the pulpit'.
Let us begin with the mainstream model of interpretation:
(i)- The hearer takes the word 'lion' in its literal sense (the Principle of Istishab +
literalness base).
(ii)- The hearer recognises that this meaning is irrelevant (by virtue of a diverting
context).
(iii)- The hearer assumes that the speaker is not telling a lie (the Principle of
Truthfulness).
(iv)- The speaker must, therefore, be intending another meaning since the
utterance cannot be without meaning (the Principle of 'I'mat).
(v)- The hearer concludes that the speaker intends 'lion' to be 'a brave man'
(guiding context: 'delivering an address from the pulpit'.
Let us now deal with Ibn Taymiyyah's model of interpretation:
(i)- The hearer assumes that the speaker is interested in making his intention
manifest; consequently, he provides him with a sufficient relevant context to display
his communicative intention (the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his
Intention Manifest).
(ii)- Both the speaker and the hearer belong to the same linguistic community and
the hearer knows the speaker's habit in the use of language (the presumption of
knowing the speaker's habit).
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(iii)- The hearer presumes that the speaker will speak in accordance with his habit
(the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest).
(iv)- Provided that all the previous conditions are fulfilled, the hearer concludes
that the speaker intends 'lion' to be 'a brave man' since this is the first interpretation to
strike the hearer's mind (guiding context plus the Principle of Immediacy).
The main difference between the mainstream model and Ibn Taymiyyah's model
of interpretation is that the mainstream model presupposes that the hearer examines the
interpretation in accordance with 'asl, and only if it is ruled out by a diverting context
that the hearer looks for other interpretations until a proper one is found, while Ibn
Taymiyyah's model presupposes that the hearer goes directly to the contextually
relevant interpretation. As a result, the mainstream model can be characterised as
indeterminate since it leaves the way open for other possible interpretations whereas
Ibn Taymiyyah's model is determinate.
4.9.1. Ta'wll (diverting to non-apparent meaning)
The Arabic word ta'wll literally means tasylr, 'to make something be something
else'l and tarjl' 'to bring something back'2 but in Islamic literature, it is used as a
technical term to refer to one of the following:
(i)- According to a majority of late traditional Muslim Jurists and legal theorists,
ta'wll is the diversion of an expression from al-ihtimal al-rajih (the preponderant,
probable interpretation) to al-ihtimal al-marjuh (the outweighed, improbable
interpretation) on the strength of contextual evidence accompanying it.3
^Al-Mawsili, 1/10.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 28 (al-ta'wil).
3For more definitions of ta'wll in this sense, see al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/387.
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(ii)- In the common terminology of the commentators of Qur'an, as well as that of
the Salafi jurists and scholars of Hadith, ta'wll is equated with tafsir (exegesis).
(iii)- In the Qur'anic usage, ta'wll is employed to designate the entity or the
referent in the external world to which the expression is referring. 1
Among these three different senses of ta'wll, it is only the first that concerns us
here. Ta'wll in this sense is a kind of interpretation that typically involves a diversion
from the apparent (al-zahir) meaning of an expression to an ulterior meaning of that
expression by virtue of contextual evidence. In PF, the term al-zahir belongs to a
cluster of terms designed to describe the supposedly different levels of clarity of texts.
Muslim legal theorists offer two main different versions of the possible levels of
clarity in which the message of the speaker appears to the hearer: the mainstream
version and the Hanafl's version.
According to the mainstream version, the speaker's message can either be
determinate or indeterminate. In the latter case, it is typically sensitive to more than
one reading. In those instances where there is no room for other interpretations, the
meaning (or sometimes the expression itself) is called nass (prominent),2 which is
literally derived from the verb nassa meaning to raise something and make it manifest
(jrafa'a wa-'azhara), though 'unequivocal' would be a better translation for this
technical term in this context. If the speaker's message, by contrast, is indeterminate,
the hearer has to take the first meaning that comes to mind as the most probable
intended meaning; and this meaning is usually referred to as al-zahir (the apparent).
However, it may be the case that none of the possible interpretations is qualified to
outweigh the other set of interpretations. This typically happens when the speaker's
utterance contains a homonym without there being a guiding context by which one can
ISee Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 3/55-57, 5/35-36, idem, Dar' Ta'arud al-'Aql wa-1-
Naql, 1/14; al-Mawsili, 1/11-14.
2fn addition to this sense, the term nass is very often used to refer to what is usually
translated as text (e.g. nass qur'anl (Qur'anic text)).
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select one of the meanings over the others. Ta'wll in this case is not applicable
because it is only al-zahic, according to the mainstream, that can be made liable to
ta'wll. For ta'wil, as understood by the mainstream, is a process of switching from
discerning an ostensible meaning to the postulation of a more probable meaning on the
basis of supporting evidence, but since there is no ostensible meaning in the case of
homonyms, by virtue of the fact that all the meanings of a homonym are literal, it
follows that none of the meanings can be the apparent meaning. However, since
'apparent meaning' is generally regarded as equivalent to 'literal meaning', we are
inclined to accept al-Ghazall's view that "each process of ta'wll involves a diversion
from haqlqah-mode to majaz-mode".l
The Hanafi's version, on the other hand, compromises four levels of clarity:
zahic, nass, mufassar and muhkam; although it is only the first three that are relevant
here. The difference between zahic and nass is explained by reference to the
distinction between meaning and intention: the term zahic is employed to describe the
level of clarity of the linguistic meaning while nass is used to describe the level of
clarity of the speaker's intention. Viewed from these different perspectives, the same
utterance can be regarded as zahic and nass at the same time. Consider the following
example:
(11) That is because they say:
"Trade is like usury",
But Allah hath permitted trade
And forbidden usury.2
The utterance "wa-'ahalla Allahu 1-bay'a wa-haccama 1-dba" (But Allah hath
permitted trade and forbidden usury) is considered to be zahic because any native
speaker of Arabic would understand the linguistic meaning (al-ma 'na 1-lughawi) of
this utterance without calculation {mm ghayci ta'ammul).3 The same utterance is
-Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/387.
2Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 2/275.
^Al-Samarqandi, 1/505.
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regarded as nass in view of the fact that the context (i.e. "they say: "Trade is like
usury"") indicates that the utterance is intended to state that trade is distinct from
usury. Thus, the accessibility of the grammatical structure and the clarity of the lexical
meaning of the utterance qualify it to be classified as zahir; while the context, which is
assumed to make the speaker's intention manifest renders it as nass. It is important to
notice that in the Hanafis' framework both zahir and nass are liable to ta'wil.
Therefore, what is understood from the zahir in the above Qur'anic verse, that is, the
unqualified permission of trade and the unqualified forbidding of usury can in fact be
qualified, and, consequently, subjected to ta'wil depending on other contextual
indicators that show that some forms of trade were forbidden and some forms of
usury were permitted. Equally, what is indicated by the context, that is, the
unqualified denial of the similarity between trade and usury, can be laid open to
ta'wil.
What distinguishes mufassar (lit, uncovered) from zahir and nass, however, is
its being completely clear and definite, and, consequently, its being unavailable for
ta'wil. A very much-quoted example in this context is the word "eighty" in the
following verse:
(12) And those who launch
A charge against chaste women,
and produce not four witnesses
(to support their allegations), _
Flog them with eighty stripes;
And reject their evidence
Ever after: for such men
Are wicked transgressors. 1
There is no way here to go beyond the literal meaning of "eighty" since any
attempt to cancel, increase or decrease the number would provoke a contradiction
between what the expression conventionally denotes and what the hearer construes,
1Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 24/4.
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which is considered by the legal theorists to be a violation of one of the conditions of
the proper ta'wil, more of which later.
Hanafi scholars distinguish between two types of m ufassar. one whose clarity is
due to structure, which has already been illustrated; the other is one whose clarity is
due to contextual evidence. In order to illustrate the latter type, let us consider the
following example:
(13) fa-sajada 1-mala'ikatu kulluhum 'ajma'un
So the angels prostrated themselves,
All of them together. 1
The word al-mala'ikatu (the angels) per se can be taken to refer to some, rather
than all, of the angels, but since it was followed by the phrase 'all of them', this
possibility is ruled out. Yet, without the addition of the word "together" the
possibility of ta'wll is still open, for it is not clear yet whether the angels prostrated
separately or together; it is only by the existence of the word "together" that the
utterance has become determinate.^
To sum up what has already been said about the degrees of the clarity of texts, it
can be said that while the Hanafis hold that both zahir and nass are liable to ta'wll,
the mainstream believe that ta'wil is applicable to zahir only. However, the term
zahir in the mainstream framework covers both zahir and nass in the Hanafi use of
these terms, while the Hanafi term mufassar is an equivalent to nass in the
mainstream sense.
iAli's Translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN, 15/30.
■^See 'Abu Bakr Muhammad b. 'Ahmad al-Sarakhsi, 'Usui al- Sarakhsi, ed. 'Abu 1-
Wafa' al-'Afghani (Beirut, Dar ai-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1993), 1/163-165; Ibn al-
Malik, p. 353.
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4.9.1.1. The limitations of ta'wil
Ta'wll is one of the most controversial topics in PF as well as in most, if not all,
of the domains of the Muslim intellectual pursuit. The legal theorists' controversies
over ta'wll can be attributed to differences over the possible range in which ta'wll
operates, methodological and terminological canons and, not infrequently, the actual
applications of ta'wll.
Before proceeding further, it is worth pointing out that the legal theorists seem to
agree that any process of ta'wll should be regarded as a deviation from the norm
('asi), but they entertain different views concerning the range to which the interpreter
can go beyond the apparent meaning. There are at least three different views on this
issue. On the assumption that the SalafI view is the moderate one,1 there would be
two extreme views- the Zahiri view, which is generally known as having an anti-
ta'wil attitude, and the mainstream view,2 which are criticised by the Salafis for
making ta'wll on some Qur'anic and Hadlthic texts that should be taken in their
apparent meanings. Among the mainstream proper, there are often different positions
on various issues, which provokes some arguments and mutual criticisms specially
between Shafi 'Is and Hanafls where the former criticise the latter for going too far
beyond the apparent meaning in their interpretations of a number of texts.3
With respect to the Zahiri approach, 'Abu Muhammad AH Ibn Hazm (the most
distinguished advocate of the Zahiri school (d. 456/ 1064)) considers any diversion
from the linguistic meaning of an expression (mafhumih fi 1-lughah) as distortion
(tahrlf).4 In his discussion of ta'wll, Ibn Hazm maintains that language is
established for al-tafahum (communication) and for making the speaker's intention
manifest to the hearer. This can happen only if each expression has a specific
'This assumption is based on purely linguistic and communicative considerations.
^See note (1) p. 9.
^For the Shafi'Is' arguments, see al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/389-401. For the
Hanafls' arguments, see al-'Ansarl, 2/22-32.
4'Abu Muhammad 'All Ibn Hazm al-Zahirl, al-'Ihkam fi 'Usui al-'Ahkam, 3/304.
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meaning; otherwise bayan (i. e. the speaker's making of his intention manifest to the
hearer* (cf. 3.5.1.1)) would never take place. The main contention of the Zahiri
school is that the intention of the speaker is obtainable in the apparent meaning (al-
ma'na 1-zahir) of his utterance (and hence the name zahiri),2 and, therefore, the
hearer need not make much calculation to recover it. In other words, all the hearer has
to do in order to grasp his addresser's intention is to follow the conventions of the
language. Thus, extra-linguistic context, according to Zahiris, has almost no role to
play in communication. Furthermore, the general intentions (including those of
Shari'ah in the case of interpreting the Qur'anic and Sunnaic texts) are generally
ignored by zahiris in the process of interpreting a particular text.
As to the mainstream view, ta'wil is assumed to be applicable to any utterance
containing an equivocal expression (i.e. zahir-expression, according to the non-
Hanafis, and zahir-expression and nass-expression in the Hanafi sense of these
terms) provided that there is a contextual indicator to support the process of ta'wil. It
is widely accepted that an act of ta'wil involves a departure from the most immediate
interpretation to the hearer's mind, which presupposes the assumption that the speaker
is not co-operating sufficiently in communication. This assumption attracts strong
criticism from the Salafis on the grounds that it is not consistent with the Principle of
the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest,3 which is regarded by all
parties as the primary principle behind any process of successful communication.
Thus, within the mainstream, the Shafi'is distinguish between three types of
ta'wil: accessible (qarib), far-fetched (ba Id) and impossible (muta 'aclhdhir)A
Although both accessible and far-fetched ta'wil can be acceptable (sa'ighah) if they
are supported by appropriate contexts, accessible ta'wil is, nevertheless, less in need
*A1-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 26 (bayan ).
2lt is important here to notice that the derivational relationship between zahir
(apparent) and Zahiriyyah (the name of the school) is suggestive.
^See Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 6/361-362.
^Ibn al-Hajib, 2/69; al-'Ansari, 2/22.
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of contextual evidence to become more preponderant than a far-fetched one.
However, there are at least three conditions that have to be met in order for ta'wil to
be acceptable; if any of these conditions fail to be fulfilled, ta'wll will be classified as
muta 'adhdhir (impossible). These conditions are
(i)- the expression must be capable of accepting ta'wll, that is, it must be zahir-
expression or even uass-expression in the Hanafl sense of the term;
(ii)-the expression must be capable of bearing ta'wll; that is to say, the non-
apparent meaning which the interpreter assumes to be the intended meaning must be
one of the possible meanings of the expression; and
(iii)-ta'wIl should be based on sufficient contextual evidence to make the non-
apparent, rather than the apparent, meaning the intended one. 1
Salafls accept these three conditions, but differ from the PF mainstream in
postulating the possibility that the speaker who conforms to make his intention
manifest may prefer to be less forthcoming in co-operating with the hearer putting the
onus on him in recovering the intention behind the utterance. The Salafis believe that
it is not wise for the speaker to do so,2 whereas the PF mainstream think that it is
possible. Applying this to Allah as a speaker, the 'Ash 'aris hold that Allah does what
He wishes while the Mu 'tazilis say that it is possible that there is a concealed purpose
behind making His speech indeterminate. 3 In a special chapter devoted to elucidating
how that the speaker's supposed intention to make the addressee take his utterance in
its non-apparent meaning contradicts the intention of exposition and guidance, Ibn al-
Qayyim argues that
*See 'Abd al-Karim Zaydan, al-Wajiz fi 'Usui af-Fiqh (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-
Risalah, 1987), p. 341; Fathi 1-Darini, al-Manahij al-'Usuliyyah fi al-Ijtihad bi-1-
Ra'y fi 1-Tashri' al-'Islami (Damascus: Dar al-Rashid, 1976), 1/204-220; Weiss,




Since the goal of al-khitab (communication) is to guide the hearer and
introduce the speaker's intention into his mind through the utterance [...] in
the most accessible ways, communication then hinges upon two things: the
speaker's making of his intention manifest and the hearer's success in
understanding. If the speaker's making of his intention manifest does not
take place or it does take place but the hearer does not manage to
understand, the speaker will not achieve his purpose [...]. Therefore, if
Allah or His Prophet had not intended his discourse to be taken in its
proper and apparent meaning (haqlqatih wa-zahirih), which the speaker
can understand, they would have commanded the addressee to understand
his intention through a non-indicative means, or even through what
signifies the contrary of his intention. 1
Moreover, the Salafls and the PF mainstream disagree on the nature of the
expression which is liable to ta'wil. As explained earlier, the PF mainstream hold that
ta'wil is applicable to any zahir-expression, provided that there is a contextual
indicator that the apparent meaning is not the meaning intended by the speaker. For
the Salafls, this is not necessarily true. They confine ta'wil to those zahir-
expressions whose signification in a particular context appears, as Ibn al-Qayyim puts
it, to be different from its equivalents (kharijan 'an naza'irih). Ta'wil is, thus,
viewed as an attempt "to return the anomaly to its [normal] equivalents".2 This
returning can be carried out by making use of the knowledge of the speaker's habit, by
which one can know what the speaker consistently means by the respective utterance
in such an occasion. To put it another way, if the hearer notices that the apparent
meaning of the utterance is not in conformity with what the speaker habitually means
by such an utterance in such a situation, then he has to interpret it in line with the
speaker's own lexicon ('urf al-mukhatib) and 'his consistent habit' ('adatih al-
muttaridah)3 This is the only circumstance, according to the Salafls, in which
ta'wil accurately operates. Of the other examples designed to show how the





seeing of Allah' as the seeing of his reward 1 in such texts as "tarawna rabbakum"
(you will see your Lord), "tanzvruna 'ila rabbikum " (you will look at your Lord)
and " 'ila rabbiha ndzicah" (Looking at their Lord) is invalid because 'the seeing of
his reward' does not obtain in any Qur'anic and Hadlthic text in a way which
sanctions the use of 'reward' instead of 'Allah'.2
Ibn Taymiyyah ascribes the misapplication of ta'wll to the emphasis placed on the
possible linguistic meanings of the expression instead of the speaker's intention (cf.
4.9). He goes further to say that any ta'wil not intended to disclose the speaker's
intention through the proper means and ways by which the speaker's intention is
recoverable, means that the interpreter is distorting the speaker's utterance.^
However, what Ibn Taymiyyah has in mind when he talks about 'the means and ways
by which the speaker's intention is recoverable' is not very clear, but we may find
some clues as to what he means in Ibn al-Qayyim's explanation of a similar issue.
Following the contextual approach to meaning and interpretation, Ibn al-Qayyim
stresses that "the speaker expresses his intention through his utterance, and his
utterance signifies via its system (or structure)" (fa-l-mutakallimu ddllun bi-kaldmih,
wa-kalamuhu ddllun bi-nizdmih). And in order to know whether the speaker intends
to make his intention manifest through the apparent meaning of his utterance, the
hearer refers to the speaker's habitual use of utterances (wa-dhdlika yu'rafu min
'ddati 1-mutakallimi fi 'alfdzih).4
But the question that arises here is how can the hearer be certain that the speaker
speaks in accordance with his habit? Ibn al-Qayyim develops the following two points
to establish this knowledge:
lln Islamic theology, some Muslim sects, noticeably the Mu'tazilah and 'Ibadiyyah,
strongly deny the seeing of Allah in the hereafter, thus appealing to the ta'wil of the
Qur'anic and Hadlthic texts whose apparent meanings refer to that possibility.
^See al-Mawsill, 1/68-69.
^Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar' Ta'drud l-'Aql wa-1-Naql, 1/12.
^Al-Mawsill, 1/120.
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First, the signification of the expression is founded upon the speaker's
habit, which is observed in his words and upon the rationale behind his
language in which he habitually speaks. If the hearer knows the meaning
of the expression and knows that it is the speaker's habit to use that
expression in its meaning, he will then know for certain that that meaning is
the speaker's intention. Otherwise no speaker's intention can ever be
known, which is impossible.
Second, If the goal of the speaker is to make his utterance understood
by the hearer, and the addressee [...] knows via the speaker's character and
the way he speaks that the speaker wants to make his intention manifest and
not to deceive him, the addressee will, given he obtains the knowledge of
both the above matters [i.e. he knows the meaning of the expression and
knows that it is the speaker's habit to make his intention manifest], be fully
certain of the speaker's intention and never to doubt it. If, by contrast, he
fails to recover the speaker's intention, it would mean that there is
something wrong either with his knowledge of the meaning of the
expression or with his knowledge of the speaker's way of speaking, his
character and his goal. 1
Thus, the Salafis' main contention is that if the hearer knows that the speaker is
able and willing to make his intention manifest, it would be wise to think that he
intends his utterance to be taken in its apparent meaning.
It is essential here to note that by virtue of their neutralisation of the distinction
between wad' and use, 'apparent' within the Salafis' framework is usually equated
with immediate. This practice, however, is not in agreement with the mainstream
framework, where being apparent does not necessarily entail being immediate to the
mind, for the quality of being apparent is given to the expression by virtue of wad'
and the bases, while the quality of being immediate is applicable only in the actual
communicative situation. Therefore, one may, according to the mainstream view, veer
away from the apparent meaning (i.e. literal meaning) without violating the Principle
of Immediacy (cf. 3.5.1.4), which typically happens when a diverting context and a
guiding one signal that.
This methodological difference between the Salafis and the mainstream thinkers
may well explain why they may agree as to the interpretation of an utterance, but still
^Al-Mawsili, 1/120.
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differ with regard to the methodologies by which this is achieved. Thus, what the
former regard as ta'wll, the latter consider as literal interpretation.
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Chapter Y
5. Ways of signification
5.1. Introduction
"Signification' is meant to be a rough translation to the Arabic term dalalah, which
is inherently ambiguous. The wide-ranging application of this term in different
domains of the Arabic intellectual tradition contributes considerably to its looseness.
There are at least three distinct meanings assigned to dalalah: signification,
implication and demonstration. It is only the first two meanings that concern us here,
since they are the meanings that dalalah is intended to cover when we deal with what
is known as turuq al-dalalah (ways of signification). It is important to highlight that
the sense of the English word 'signification' has been so widened here to incorporate
the sense of 'implication', which is not usually recognised as a standard meaning for
'signification' in the current use of the word, as well as one of its standard meanings,
namely 'the act of signifying (meaning)'.
Muslim legal theorists discuss two different models of significational
classification: the first is a text-based categorisation; the other represents a semiotic
viewpoint adopted from the traditional Arab philosophers. Since we are interested in
the pragmatic thinking and the textual analysis in the works of the legal theorists, the
former model will be given most of the space allocated to this chapter; the latter will
only briefly be discussed.
Signification is commonly defined as "the fact of something being in a state where
the cognition of it necessarily implies the cognition of something else" (kawnu 1-
shay'i bi-halatin yalzamu mina 1- 'ilmi bi-hi 1- 'ilmu bi-shay'in 'akhar).1 The word
'ilm in this definition is frequently regarded as synonymous with 'idrak (cognition),
which covers both 'conceptualisation' (or non-propositional apprehension)
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 55; see also al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/203; al-
'Asnawl, 2/31; al-TahanawI, 1/486.
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(tasawwur) and 'judgement' (or propositional apprehension) (tasdlq). Al-Tahanawl
mentions four possibilities in which the cognition of a signifier necessarily implies the
cognition of the signified associated with it:
(I) the conceptualisation of a signifier necessarily implies the conceptualisation of a
signified ('an yalzama min tasawwuri 1-dalli tasawwuru 1-madlul), e.g. the
signifier 'apple' necessarily implies the signified 'apple', i.e. the particular fruit;
(II) the propositional apprehension of a signifier necessarily implies the
propositional apprehension of a signified ('an yalzama mina 1-tasdiqi bi-l-dalli 1-
tasdiqu bi-l-madlul), e.g. the signifier 'the apples are red' necessarily implies the
signified 'the apples are red', i.e. the proposition of this statement;
(III) the conceptualisation of a signifier necessarily implies the propositional
apprehension of a signified (an yalzama min tasawwuri 1-dalli 1-tasdiqu bi-l-
madlul), e.g. the signifier 'ah 'ah (i.e. coughing) in some circumstances necessarily
implies that the utterer has a chest problem; and
(IV) the converse of (III).1 That is to say, the propositional apprehension of a
signifier necessarily implies the conceptualisation of a signified. Examples of this
possibility are hard to find, specially if al-Tahanawi means by tasdlq the apprehension
of a statement consisting of subject and predicate. However, he may mean the
apprehension of idioms where a single concept is derived from a construction, e.g.
jaban al-kalb (having a coward dog) means karim (generous).
Since conceptualisation is thought to be a precondition for propositional
apprehension, (I) would be the most frequent process of signification as it operates in
all the above possibilities.
1 Al-Tahanawi, 1/486; see 'Adil Fakhuri, 'Ilm al-Dalalah 'ind al-'Arab: Dirasah
Muqarinah ma'a al-Simya' al-Hadithah (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1985), p. 39.
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5.2. The semiotic classification of signification
It may be helpful to begin this section with highlighting the fact that in traditional
Arabic literature, there is a general tendency among philosophers, the legal theorists
and linguists to talk about the process of signification instead of talking about the
'sign' itself, as is the case in modern semiotics and linguistics. This tendency would
be appreciated if it is seen as part of a more general and consistent approach to the
study of communication from the standpoint of communicative processes rather than
from the standpoint of the objects and participants proper. To take an example, while
the legal theorists devote a large space of their work to such topics as waduse,
interpretation and signification, which are held to be the components of the
communicative process, they pay comparatively little attention to the establishes user,
interpreter and sign. The reason behind this procedure seems to relate to the fact that
the legal theorists see language as a system of significations rather than a system of
signs, as it is seen by Ferdinand de Saussure and his followers in modern linguistics.
The difference between these two positions has to do with the fact that Ferdinand de
Saussure views language as an abstract system of signs, and assigns the realisations
of these signs to a different domain, which he calls parole,1 whereas the legal theorists
see language as a complex system pertaining partially to the primordial establishment
(including general and special conventional establishment) and partially to the actual
processes of use. Muslim thinkers seem to have found 'signification' more suitable
than 'sign' to incorporate such elements as intention, non-existence and rationality,
thus preferring to say intentional, non-existential, or rational signification than to say
intentional, non-existential, or rational sign.
^F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye
and Albert Riendlinger, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983), pp. 13-15.
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Muslim scholars distinguish two types of signification: verbal (dalalah lafziyyah)
and non-verbal signification (dalalah ghayr lafziyyah). Each type is subdivided into
further types: verbal signification is classified into wad'-based (wad'iyyah), rational
('aqliyyah) and natural (tab! iyyah) types. Non-verbal signification, on the other
hand, is classified into wad '-based and rational types. For the linguists and legal
theorists wad '-based verbal signification (or linguistic signification) is the most
important type of signification. As mentioned earlier, a distinction is commonly made
between three different types of this kind of signification: 'equivalence-signification'
(dalalat mvtabaqah), 'incorporational signification' (dalalat tadamnum) and
'implicational signification' (dalalat iltizam) (cf. figure 5.1).1









Although this is the common classification of signification, it is, nevertheless, not
the only one. Al-'Amidi and Ibn al-Hajib, for example, distinguish between verbal
and non-verbal signification and divide the former into 'equivalence' and
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 1/120-121; see also, al-
'Asnawl, 2/31.
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'incorporational', while treating 'implicational' signification as a non-verbal category
(cf. figure (5.2).1




I 1 1 1
equivalence incorporational implicational
Let us now sketch out what is meant by these types of signification:
I. Verbal signification is any type of signification derived from a sound whether it
is linguistic or not. Therefore, it applies to the production of any non-linguistic sound
indicating a particular state of affair (e.g. screaming) as well as the utterance of any
linguistically meaningful element.
II. Rational signification is a kind of signification involving an intrinsic
relationship ('alaqah dhatiyyah) between a signifier and a signified. 'Intrinsic
relationship' refers to that kind of relationship by virtue of which the existence of a
signifier necessarily implies the existence of a signified, without the need to invoke
external coding. As is clear from figure (5.1), rational signification can be verbal, or
non-verbal. An example of the former is the relationship between the speaker's
production of a particular sound and his existence or his being alive; an example of the
latter is the causal relationship between smoke and fire.
^Al-'Amidi (1986), 1/36-37; Ibn al-Hajib, 1/120; al-Sharif al-Jurjam, Hashiyah 'ala
Sharh al-'Adud, 1/121.
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III. Natural signification is a kind of signification involving a natural relationship
by virtue of which the mind switches from a signifier to a signified. The term
'natural' in Arabic is imprecise and misleading. One consequence of this is that there
is a clear overlap between the 'extension' of this kind of signification and rational
signification. One way of drawing the line between these two kinds of signification is
to confine natural signification to that resulting from the sounds created by animals, or
instinctively produced by human beings, indicating a particular psychological state or
temper. Interpreting natural signification in this narrow sense would justify and
explain why it is restricted to verbal signification and not subsumed under the non¬
verbal type in the above majority model (cf. figure 5.1). Those who adopt this
narrow interpretation of natural signification say that natural signifiers (which are
called 'symptoms' ('awarid)) are part of the psychological state of the utterer. Thus,
the cry of pain, for example, is believed to form one operator in a complex
psychological process. The reason why it is called 'natural' relates to the fact that it
occurs instinctively.1
There are others, however, who extend natural signification to cover cases such as
redness as an indication of being shy, and yellowness as an indication of being in fear.
The direct outcome of this procedure is to render natural signification able to
accommodate both verbal and non-verbal signification, thus adding a third subdivision
to the two already subsumed under the non-verbal type, namely wad '-based and
rational signification. And this is exactly what Hasan al-Harawi does in his
commentary on al-Jurjanl.2 Another outcome is to undermine to some extent the
distinction between verbal and non-verbal signification, since all kinds of
signification, whether wad '-based, rational or natural, can be verbal or non-verbal (cf.
figure 5.3).
lAl-Tahanawi, 1/488; see 'Adil Fakhuri, op. cit., p. 27.
^Al-Harawl, 1/121.
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wad'-based rational natural wad'-based rational natural
Thus, the distinction between rational and natural signification does not seem to be
very well-founded, since it is very hard to see any real difference between redness as a
sign of being shy, which is seen as a natural signifier and smoke as a sign of fire,
which is viewed as a rational signifier. Al-Tahanawi's explanation of this is that a
particular signification could be seen as natural, rational or even wad '-based
depending on the viewpoint under consideration.1
IV. Wad '-based signification: 'wad -based' can 'extensionally' be taken to mean
conventional, for all that which is wad -based is in fact conventional. However, there
is a respected tradition in medieval Arabic literature which sanctions the use of the
neutral term 'wad'-based' (wad'iyyah), rather than conventional (istildhiyyah or
muwdda'iyyah), to avoid the controversy concerning whether language is invented by
Allah or set up by people, as well as the controversy concerning the way in which it is
set up for those who say that language is conventionally established.
As is clear from figures (5.1) and (5.3), wad'-based signification can be verbal or
non-verbal. In PF, there is nothing to say about the latter type, apart from
emphasising the fact that it is based on a wad '-based, rather than intrinsic or natural,
lAl-TahanawI, 1/488.
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relationship, and offering some examples: hand gestures to tell numbers,1 sunset as a
sign for the time for al-maghrib prayer, and the use of dhira' (lit, arm)2 for a given
measurement.3 As for the former type, it will be taken up in the next section.
5.2.1. Wad'-based verbal signification
' Wad -based verbal signification' is the most important type of signification from
both the communicative and linguistic points of view. It is the type which is usually
meant when the word 'signification' is unqualifiedly used.4 Muslim thinkers offer at
least two common definitions of this kind of signification. According to the first,
"signification is the ability of an expression to be meaningful when it is produced"
(kawnu 1-lafzi bihaythu 'idha 'utliqa dall). According to the second, "signification
is the hearer's understanding of the exact meaning, or the entailment or the implication
of the exact meaning, of an expression from the speaker's utterance" (fahmu 1-sami'i
min kalami 1-mutakallimi kamala l-musamma 'aw juz'ahu 'aw lazimah).5
If we are to make comparison between these two definitions, which are traced
back to Ibn Slna, and are widely quoted in PF, we will notice that the former
emphasises the potential ability of a sign to be meaningful and interpretable without
invoking any interpersonal, social or contextual element, whereas the latter equates
signification with interpretation, rendering signification as process made by the hearer
instead of seeing it as a quality of the expression itself. The advocates of the latter
definition argue that judging whether an expression signifies something depends on
'Al-Sharlf al-Jurjanl, Hashiyal1 'ala Shark al-'Adud, 1/120.
2Dhira' differs as we pass from one Arab country to another: in Syria, for example, it
equals (.68 m); in Egypt, there is baladi dhira' which equals (.58) and istanbull
dhira' which equals (665m) etc.; see J M. Cowan (yd.), Arabic-English Dictionary:
The Hans Wehr Dictionary ofModern Written Arabic (Ithaca, New York: Spoken
Language Services, Inc. 1976), (dhira').
^Al-'Asnawi, 2/31.
^See Mullakhusru, 1/198.
^Al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqih, p. 23; see also, al-'Asnawi, 2/31-32.
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whether something is understood from it: i.e., an expression can be said to signify
something if and only if speakers understand something from it. This demonstrates,
the argument continues, that the connection between the signification of an expression
and the understanding of it is similar to the connection between names and their
nominata, thus, signification can be rendered as a name for understanding. The
advocates of the former definition reject this argument on the grounds that signification
and understanding are two different things, since the former is a quality of the
expression while the latter is an attribute of the hearer.1
Moreover, signification is an established relationship ('alaqah
makhsusah) between expression and meaning. It is in effect a
quality which makes an expression meaningful. This being so, it is
possible to see the signification of an expression as a cause for the
understanding of it. And, since the same thing cannot be the cause
and the effect at the same time, it follows that signification is
something different from the understanding of a meaning from an
expression and consequently cannot be used as a label for it".2
The first part of the above criticism applies also to Ibn Hazm who defines
signification as "the action of the signifying agent" (fi'l al-dall),3 thus assigning
signification to the speaker instead of the expression. It is worth mentioning,
however, that although Ibn al-Qayyim applies 'signification' to both the speaker's
action (the use of the utterance) and the hearer's action (the hearer's understanding of
the meaning of the utterance),4 he, nevertheless, is not liable to the above criticism.
The reason is due to the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim's position is consistent with his
salafite contextual framework within which signification is anchored to the actual use
of the language in communicative situations, which requires the existence of a speaker
and hearer. As was explained in the previous chapter, the Salafls always insist on the
participants and context as indispensable elements in any communicative process. The
PF mainstream, on the other hand, distinguish between 'signification' and other
1 See al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqlh, p.23.
^Al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/204.
3'Abu Muhammad 'All Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri, al-'Ihkam fl 'Usui al-'Ahkam, 1\41.
^Al-Mawsili, 2/68. Ibn al-Qayyim remarks that it is common to devote dilalah (bi-
kasri 1-dal) to the former sense and dalalah (bi-fathi 1-dal) to the latter (2/68).
181
processes which operate in communication: while the participants and context are
essential elements for use and interpretation, signification may operate in isolation,
since [wad'-based] signification, as they say, is "chronologically prior to use"
(mutaqaddimatun 'ala 1-isti 'mal).1 Accordingly, wad '-based verbal signification in
the mainstream sense is the result of the interaction between three elements only:
(i) expression;
(ii) meaning; and
(iii) wad' (the assignment of a meaning to an expression).2
The legal theorists often employ dalll (sign) to refer to a meaningful expression
which, in reality, is the product of the assignment of a meaning to an expression. And
in order to maintain consistency and derivational symmetry in their terminology, they
tend to use dall (signifier) and madlul (signified), which share with dalll (sign) and
dalalah (signification) the same derivational root, in preference to lafz (expression)
and ma 'na (meaning).
Since the language comprises elements pertaining to use as well as wad '-based
material, wad'-based signification constitutes only part of linguistic meanings; the
other part being the inferences drawn from communicative situations. Therefore,
sentences which represent the wad'-based aspect of the language on the syntactic level
do not have to preserve their predetermined established meanings when they are
actualised in real communicative situations. Thus, as 'All al-Subki (d. 756/1355) and
Taj al-DIn b. 'All b. al-Subki (d. 771/1369) put it, although establishing a particular
sign means making it potentially capable of signalling its meaning when it is actually
used by the speaker in the primordially determined way, what is actually informative
in reality (al-mufidu fl 1-haqiqah) is the speaker. The expression is nothing but the




means by which the speaker can inform.1 Accordingly, in order for the utterance
qama 1-nas (the people stood up) to be meaningful, three conditions have to be met:
i- the utterance is not contradicted by a preceding one ('an la yabtadi'ahu bi-ma
yukhalifvh)-,
ii- the utterance is not contradicted by a following one ('an la yakhtimahu bi-ma
yukhalifuh)\ and
iii- the utterance is intentionally produced ('an yakuna sadiran 'an qasd).2
One can, therefore, say that the meaning of an utterance is not determined by the
wad-based signification of that utterance alone, since non-wad '-based components
such as the context, are ultimately the determining factor for recovering the intention of
the speaker. However, there is disagreement among Muslim thinkers as to whether or
not signification can operate without intention. Generally speaking, linguists tend to
make intention as a necessary condition for signification, since "signification, in their
view, is the understanding of intention, not meaning in its unqualified sense",3 (cf.
the distinction between meaning and intention 1.3.1). Logicians, on the other hand,
believe that signification is "the understanding of meaning whether it is intended by the
speaker or not".4 As for the legal theorists, although it is very difficult to make
generalisations,5 one may be tempted to say that the Salafls strongly deny that
signification is obtainable in isolation of a particular communicative situation, while
most scholars hold that there are some meanings which can be abstracted from actual
utterances and identified as wad '-based. There is no clear-cut view about what kind





5ln PF, one may find some statements which indicate that Muslim legal theorists adopt
the linguists' rather than the logicians' view, Mullakhusru, for example, points out that
"signification, according to legal theorists, [..] is regarded if and only if it is joined
with intention" Mullakhusru, 1/227. However, this is not unqualifiedly true.
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single words,1 but this would involve what is called 'individual wad" only and would
fall short of accommodating 'subsumptive wad" on the syntactic level (cf. 2.2.1).
Furthermore, Muslim legal theorists entertain different views as to whether majdz-
meaning is based on wad' or use or is partially related to wad' and partially to use.
Those who adopt the latter view say that majdz is an outcome of the interaction
between 'subsumptive wad" and use, thus emphasising that an expression taken
before use and after wad' cannot be characterised as haqlqah or majdz (al-lafzv qabla
1-isti'mdl ba'da 1-wad' la yusammd bi-wahidin minhumd).2 As indicated in the
previous chapter, this view is criticised by the Salafls (cf. 4.8.2).
5.2.1.1. Types of wad'-based verbal signification
Following Muslim logicians, legal theorists distinguish between three types of
signification: 'equivalence-signification' (daldlat mutabaqah), 'incorporational
signification' (daldlat tadammun) and 'implicational signification' (daldlat iltizam)?
If the expression rajul (man), for example, is used to refer to an 'adult human male',
the expression is said to be used to signify its equivalent meaning, since this is the
meaning to which the expression is assigned. In addition to this meaning, the legal
theorists say that the word rajul entails each one of the following features: 'adult'
'male' and 'human'. Drawing inferences this way is commonly referred to as
'incorporational signification', which is widely seen as a relationship between the
specific and the general, where the specific word incorporates (tatadamman) the
general one. In PF, one can find some logical rules relating to this type of
signification. The following are some of these:
1Al-Sharbini, 1/236.
^Ibn al-Halabi, p. 370; see also Ibn al-Malik, p. 369.
^See al-Qarafi, Sharb Tanqih, p. 24; al-'Ansari, 1/181-182.
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a- the assertion of the specific necessarily entails the assertion of the general,1 so,
(1) entails (2), (3) and (4):
(1) there is a man in the house.
(2) there is an adult in the house.
(3) there is a male in the house.
(4) there is a human in the house.
b- the negation of the general necessarily entails the negation of the specific,2 so
each one of (5), (6) and (7) entails (8).
(5) there is no adult in the house
(6) there is no male in the house.
(7) there is no human in the house.
(8) there is no man in the house.
As will be explained later, this particular rule (and may be the following one too)
does not seem to lend itself to the definition of incorporational signification. It is one
of what I will call inclusional signification (cf. 5.2.1.2).
c- the assertion of the general does not necessarily entail the assertion of the
specific,3 so (2), (3) or (4) does not entail (1).
d- the negation of the specific does not necessarily entail the negation of the
general,4 so (8) does not entail any of (5), (6) or (7), since (8) does not deny that there
could be a child, female or animal in the house.
Incorporational signification is widely defined as "the process in which an
expression signifies one of the components of its nominatum" (dalalatu 1-lafzi 'ala





juz'i musammah).1 This definition does not seem to be precise, because it would
imply that incorporational signification covers both entailment and presupposition as
they are commonly defined in modem semantics and pragmatics, while it is designed
to introduce the former notion only. Let us introduce a brief explanation of the
differences between the two notions. Entailment is a relation between two sentences
(p) and (q) such that p entails q if the truth of q arises from the truth of p.2 Consider
these two sentences where (9) (p) entails (10) (q) such that whenever (9) is true, (10)
must be true.
(9) I can see a dog.
(10) I can see an animal.3
The difference between entailment and presupposition can be briefly explained by
saying that if p is false, entailment requires that q may be true or false, while
presupposition requires that q must be true. Thus, the relationship between (9) and
(10) is of entailment, since it is the case that if (9) is false, (10) can be true (if one can
see any other kind of animal) or false (if one cannot). The relationship between (11)
and (12), by contrast, is of presupposition, since it is the case that even if (11) is false,
(12) must be true.
(11) He has stopped beating his wife.
(12) He has beaten his wife.4
' Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 25.
^For definitions of 'entailment' see John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics: An
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), P. 117; idem,
Semantics, 1/165; Ruth M. Kempson, Semantic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), p. 39; David Crystal, A Dictionary of Linguistics and
Phonetics, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 122 (entailment); Stephen C.
Levinson, Pragmatics, pp. 174-175; Hadumond Bussmann, Routledge Dictionary of
Language and. Linguistics, trans and ed. Gregory P. Trauth and Kerstin Kazzazi
(London: Routledge, 1996) p. 220-221 (implication).
^See Kempson, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Crystal, op. cit., (entailment) p. 122; Stephen C.
Levinson, Pragmatics, pp. 174-175.
^See Crystal, op. cit., (entailment) p. 122.
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It is clear that (12) is part of the meaning of (11), which means that the above
definition of incorporational signification is applicable to presupposition.
In PF, there is a notion similar to the notion of presupposition in the above sense
commonly called iqtida' (requirement). The notion of iqtida', which is placed under
the third type of wad'-based signification, is very often illustrated by the following
pair of sentences where (13) presupposes (or more precisely 'requires' (taqtadl))
(14).
(13) I manumit this slave.
(14) I own this slave.1
According to the Islamic Sharl'ah, if somebody says 'a'taqtu hadha l-'abd (I
manumit this slave), it would mean that he already owns or commits himself to own
the slave, and he, by virtue of the law, sets the slave free.2 There are three kinds of
iqtida', which will be dealt with later, however let us now deal with 'implicational
signification' as the third kind of wad '-based signification.
Implicational signification is loosely defined as "the process in which an
expression signifies its implication" (dalalatu 1-lafzi 'ala lazimih).3 The notion of
implication (iltizam) is intended to cover all that which is excluded from equivalence
and incorporational signification. Broadly speaking, the implications of a given word
are the connotations associated with it: 'courage', for example, is an implication
(lazim) of 'lion',4 and 'capable of learning' is an implication of 'human'.5 As we
have already seen, the signified in incorporational signification is one of the essential
and defining components of the concept (e.g. 'man' signifies 'adult', 'human' or
'male') while it is the sum of the entire components of the concept in equivalence-
iSeeal-Razi, 1/82-83.
^To put these utterances into context, it should be noted that this constitutes a part of
policy to curb slavery and liberate as many slaves as possible.
^Al-'AsnawI, 2/32.
4IbidI
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 56 (al-dalalah al-iafziyyah al-wad'iyyah).
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signification (e.g. 'man' signifies an 'adult human male'). The signified in
implicational signification, by contrast, is not an essential or defining feature of the
concept.
Implicational associations (al-lawazim) are of two different kinds: mental
(dhihnl) like the association between sight and blindness, and external (kharijl) like
the association between blackness and crow. However, implicational associations can
be both mental and external at the same time as is the case between 'lion' and
'courage', and between 'bed' and 'height' where it is customarily impossible, say the
legal theorists, to imagine or to find in the actual world a Hon without courage or a bed
without height. Although both Muslim logicians and legal theorists agree that mental
implicational associations serve as the bases for several kinds of implicational
signification, they are, nevertheless, in disagreement over external implicational
associations; thus, while the legal theorists see them as valid bases for implicational
signification, logicians say they are not. The legal theorists argue that disregarding
external implicational associations would narrow the scope of implicational
signification, since several kinds ofmajaz are based on them. Logicians reject this
argument saying that non-literal meanings are not, in fact, purely external, but also
mental, implicational associations, although context is essential for an external
impHcational association to become majaz.
In his explanation of the relationship between implicational association (al-luzum)
and implicational signification, al-Ra/I points out that the former is not a cause (mujib)
for the latter but only a condition for it. 1 To put it another way, although implicational
signification cannot be possible without there being implicational association, the
iAl-Razi, P. 1/76.
188
speaker's production of the utterance 1 and the contextual evidence^ are the actual
causes behind the engendering of implicational signification (cf. 3.5.1.4).
It is worth noting, however, that saying that implicational signification is not
obtainable without the production of an utterance and setting up a context implies that
intention is a basic element in the generation of implicational signification, which is
another bone of contention between Muslim logicians and legal theorists. This
contention is usually ascribed, as has already been discussed, to disagreement over the
definition of signification in general. However, there is a dispute among the legal
theorists themselves concerning whether all the three types of signification, or only
equivalence-signification, are/is taken to be intentional: while the majority of them
hold that all types of signification are intentional,3 the Hanafls believe that only
equivalence-signification is intentional. In his clarification of the Hanafite view,
Harun al-Marjanl (d. 1306/1889) states that
The expression is used for equivalent meaning (al-ma'na 1-mutabiqi)
only which it primarily conveys and to which it calls attention. It is only
equivalence-signification that can be regarded as independent and relevant
to intention and use. Incorporational and implicational meanings, in
contrast, are never meant to be conveyed as the primary import of the
expression; they are only indirectly and secondarily intended and can be
only subordinately and implicitly understood from the equivalent-meaning.4
What al-Marjanl seems to be trying to say is that if somebody says (15), his
statement will 'incorporationally signify' (16) and 'implicationally signify' (17), no
matter whether he intends that or not; but if he says (18), the utterance can
'equivalently signify' (19) or (20) depending on the intention of the speaker which is
recoverable by means of contextual information.
(15) there is a man in the house.
(16) there is an adult in the house.
^Al-'Asnawi, 2/32.
2See Mullakhusru, 1/303; Muhammad Bakhit al-Mutl'I, Sullam al-Wusul li Sharh
Nihayat al-Sul, 2/35.
2See Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'I, Sullam al-Wusul li Sharh Nihayat al-Sul, 2/34.
^Al-Marjani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-Tawdih 'ala 1-Tanqih, 2/29.
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(17) there is a potential smoker in the house.
(18) there is a lion in the house.
(19) there is a 'large yellow flesh-eating cat' in the house.
(20) there is a 'brave man' in the house.
Thus, the difference between figurative signification, which is considered to
belong to the equivalence-signification type, on the one hand, and incorporational and
implicational signification on the other, is that the latter may function in isolation of
context while the former is a context-dependent notion. So, (15), 'incorporationally
signifies' (16) and 'implicationally signifies' (17) in any possible situation in which it
is uttered, while (18) 'equivalently signifies' (20) only if the speaker intends to convey
this figurative meaning.
Al-Marjani's view is similar to that of al-Qarafi, which is based on his distinction
between SBE and SE (signifying by expressions and the signification of expressions).
According to al-Qarafi, the classification of signification into figurative and non-
figurative has nothing to do with its classification into implicational, incorporational or
equivalence type: while the former is related to SBE, the latter is related to SE. And
since intention is required, not in the case of SE but, in the case of SBE, (cf. 3.3), it
follows that intention is irrelevant to the classification of signification into
implicational, incorporational and equivalence type. Thus, if someone says zaydun
jabasiu 1-kalb (Zayd has a coward dog), the implicational signification (i.e. Zayd is
generous) may be derivable, whether the utterance is meant to be taken literally or not.
Recovering the speaker's intention, however, is always dependent on determining
whether the speaker is speaking figuratively or not.
It is important to notice that the sense in which the term 'equivalence-signification'
is being employed here is so general as to cover figurative as well as non-figurative
use. However, equivalent meaning will vary according to whether the discourse is
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figurative or not. In non-figurative discourse, equivalent meaning is the literal
meaning, while in figurative discourse equivalent meaning is the non-literal force.
Finally, we may conclude by saying that the equivalent meaning of an utterance is
its truth-value (or its propositional content). Thus, (21) and (22) are synonymous in
terms of their equivalent meanings because they have the same truth-values, since (21)
can be true if and only if (22) is true and vice versa. This means that just as the
assertion of one of this pair of sentences necessarily implies the assertion of the other,
the negation of one also implies the negation of the other.
(21) there is a man in the house.
(22) there is an 'adult human male' in the house.
In contradistinction, the relationship between (23) and (24) is different from that
between (21) and (22), for, although the assertion of (23) necessarily implies the
assertion of (24), the reverse is not true. Furthermore, the negation of (23) does not
necessarily imply the negation of (24), though the reverse is true.
(23) there is a man in the house.
(24) there is an adult in the house.
5.2.1.2. Criticisms of the classification
The following criticisms may be levelled against the above triadic classification of
signification:
First, the classification is by no means exhaustive. To furnish the proof for this
claim, al-Qarafi points out that this classification does not embrace the kind of
signification in which the general (slghat al-'umum) signifies one of its individuals.
The way in which al-mushrikln (the polytheists), for example, signifies 'the
polytheist Zayd' in particular as one of the individuals to which this word may refer is
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not subsumable, according to al-Qarafi, under any category of this classification.1 In
other words, the above classification scheme has nothing to offer to explain how (1)
entails (2)
(1) there is no polytheist in the house.
(2) Zayd is not in the house.
Although al-Qarafi is perhaps right in his remark that the classification is not
exhaustive, his explanation, nonetheless, does not appear to be correct, simply
because the kind of signification he mentions is irrelevant here. The reason for this
has to do with the fact that the above threefold classification of signification deals with
meaning independently of non-linguistic factors, while the inclusion of a given
individual (e.g. Zayd) in a corresponding general term (e.g. the polytheists) is
something pertaining to knowledge about the world. That is to say, the assumption
that Zayd is a polytheist or not is not a logical or linguistic fact, but an assumption
derived from the background knowledge. Therefore, it is an instance of reference
rather than of signification.
In fact, the signification which is not captured by the above classification is not the
process in which the general refers to an individual or particular included in its
extension (i.e. the one to which al-Qaraft refers), but that kind of signification in
which the general intensionally embraces the specific. Consider the following two
utterances, where (3) necessarily entails (4).
(3) there is no adult in the house.
(4) there is no man in the house.
As this kind of signification, which I shall call 'inclusional signification', does not
fall within the scope of any of the three types of signification recognised by the
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tasiqih, p. 26.
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Muslim logicians and legal theorist as verbal wad '-based signification, there will be
four kinds of signification:
i- equivalence-signification (e.g. man » 'adult + human + male');
ii- incorporational signification (e.g. man » 'adult', 'human', or 'male');
iii- implicational signification (e.g. man » 'potential smoker' or 'potential
laugher'); and
iv- inclusional signification (e.g. no adult » no 'man' and no 'woman').
An alternative way of covering the kind of signification in which the general
intensionally embraces the specific is to extend the definition of incorporational
signification to accommodate both incorporational and inclusional signification. If we
do so, we will have what modern semanticists call 'entailment' as defined earlier (cf.
5.2.1.1), which is not restricted to the cases in which the speaker incorporates the
general.
Second, the above classification is based on a false assumption that implicational
signification is verbal. This criticism comes from al-'Amidi and Ibn al-Hajib who
argue that the import of implicational signification is drawn not from the signifier itself
but from the signified.1 To put it in 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani's terms, an implicational
import is in fact a meaning for a meaning rather than a meaning for an expression (cf.
3.5.1.4). This amounts to saying that the relationship between the signifier and the
signified in implicational signification is rational rather than conventional (or lwad'-
based' to use the Muslim thinkers' terminology). Consequently, implicational
signification is not subsumable under verbal wad'-based signification (cf. figure 5.2).
Al-RazI and his followers, however, go much further to claim that it is only
equivalence-signification that can be characterised as wad '-based, arguing that both
^Al-'Amidi (1986), 1/36-37; 'Adud, 1/120; al-Shanf al-Jurjani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh
al-'Adud, 1/121
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incorporational and implicational types of signification are rational.1 There is no
justification, according to them, to classify incorporational signification as verbal, and
implicational signification as rational, since both are based on the same principle. Al-
RazI and his followers argue that the claim that incorporational signification is verbal is
based on one of the following assumptions:
A- the signified is understood from the expression,
B- the expression is primordially assigned to it;
C- the expression can be employed to refer figuratively to it; or
D- the signified (which is one of the sense-components of the expression) is
included in the nominatum.
Therefore, the claim that incorporational signification is verbal is unwarranted
because (A) and (C) are applicable to implicational signification as well, (B) is false,
and (D) is a purely dogmatic contention.2
This disagreement is, however, taken by some scholars to be terminological,3
because, it is argued, if we take the three different types of signification as being
engendered by virtue of the intermediation of the wad' of a meaning to an expression,
all types of signification would be characterised as wad '-based. If we, however,
consider the fact that the understanding of an implication - whether it is a defining
feature (dakhil (a component included in the definition)) or a non-defining feature
(.kharij (an excluded component)) - is based on a mental switch from the meaning of
the expression to the implication, which is a rational process, then equivalence-
signification would be characterised as wad '-based, while incorporational and
implicational signification as rational.
^See al-RazI, 1/58; Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki, Matn Jam' al-Jawami'
(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1982), 1/238; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/203; al-Mahalli, 1/238; al-
Bannanl, 1/238-239.
^See al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/203.
3See al-Bannanl, 1/239; al-Mutl'I, op. cit., 2/31.
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Finally, since determining the type of signification rests on judging whether the
signified represents
(a) the components of the corresponding concept (in which case, signification is
said to be of equivalence type); or
(b) one of its defining components (in which case, signification is referred to as
incorporational signification); or
(c) one of its non-defining components (in which case, signification is called
implicational signification),
the point which needs answering concerns the basis for regarding a given component
as a defining or non-defining feature. In dealing with this issue, which perplexes so
many Muslim scholars, al-Qarafi points out that there is no way that the distinction can
be drawn by mere reason.1 There are only two ways by which one can include a
particular feature in, or exclude it from, a definition:
First, to learn from the establisher of the expression that the expression
is assigned to the [sum of] two components, thus concluding that each is
included in the nominatum [...]. It is understood, for example, that the
Arabs have assigned 'insan (human being) to 'the potentially speaking
animal' (al-hayawan al-natiq), the feature 'potentially speaking' is thus
included and 'potentially laughing' is excluded. Accordingly, if it was the
case that it was understood that the Arabs have assigned 'insan for the
'potentially laughing' instead of the 'potentially speaking animal', [the
reverse would be true].
Second, the mind invents a concept consisting of two [or more]
components and assumes that any feature except these components are
excluded.2
It seems to me that what al-Qarafi has in mind is consistent with the distinction
drawn by modern linguists between universal sense-components and sense-
components specific to a particular language. This distinction, which is based on the
assumption that linguistic meanings are to a notable extent culturally dependent,
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, pp. 12-13.
2Ibid., p. 13.
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implies that a universal sense-component, which is typographically marked by small
capitals (e.g. human) is not necessarily equal to, or, equivalent with, a language-
specific one (e.g. human).1 To take al-Qarafi's example, the sense-components of
oxymel (sakanjabin (i.e. a home-made medical syrup used by Medieval Arabs as a
cure for yellow fever) vary according to the ingredients that go into it. Should the
ingredients of which this mixture is made differ across cultures, the sense-components
would vary accordingly. A comparison between al-Qarati's own definition of oxymel
(a mixture of sugar and vinegar) and that provided by the Oxford English Dictionary
"syrup compounded of vinegar and honey, sometimes with other ingredients"2 shows
how the sense-components of the same concept are culturally dependent, thus backing
up al-Qarafi's claim. There seems to be no semantic field which may be said to be
safe from being conceptualised differently across cultures. Not only social customs
and activities, such as marriage and divorce, but also apparently universal concepts
such as 'boy' and 'girl' may have different definitions in different linguistic
communities.3
Following his rigorously contextual approach, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that there is
no reliable criterion by which one can judge whether a given component is a defining
or non-defining feature. As has already been pointed out, definitions in Ibn
Taymiyyah's view are context-dependent: the defining features of a concept are
determined by the speaker's intention, which is recoverable by contextual information
as well as the knowledge of the speaker's habitual use of the language. So, instead of
saying that determining the type of signification rests on judging whether the sense-
components are defining or non-defining features, Ibn Taymiyyah says determining
whether the sense-components are defining or non-defining features rests on whether
the speaker intends the sense-component to be signified incorporationally or
ISee John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics, p. 108.
2j.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary, XI/20.
^See John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics, pp. 114-116.
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implicationally.1 But the problem with this contention is that Ibn Taymiyyah does not
explain how one can know whether the speaker intends the sense-component to be
signified incorporationally or implicationally.
5.3. The text-based classification of signification
In the previous section we discussed the predominantly semantic classification of
signification as introduced by Muslim logicians, and adopted and developed by the
legal theorists. In this section, we shall be concerned with the rigorously pragmatic
classification of signification, which is put forward by the legal theorists on their own
initiative. The difference between 'semantic' and 'pragmatic' is interpreted here as
elsewhere as a distinction between what pertains to the study of sentences in isolation
of context and what pertains to the study of sentences in context. This being so, it
would be important to mention that describing the classification of signification dealt
with in the preceding section as 'predominantly' rather than 'purely' semantic is due to
the fact that some, if not most, of the legal theorists do not exclude context in their
explanation of that classification despite the fact that the original formulation of the
classification as made by the logicians is of strictly formal and semantic nature. It
would also be important to point out that the ongoing classification is deliberately
described as 'rigorously pragmatic' in order to emphasise the fact that it is based on
the meanings and inferences drawn in what the legal theorists call al-maqamat al-
khitabiyyah (communicative situations).2 This fact manifests itself in many ways:
the legal theorists' (specially the Hancifis') emphasis on the employment of the term
nass (text) with each type of signification, their acknowledgement of the speaker's
intention, their distinction between 'what is said' (al-mantuq) and 'what is implicated'
(al-mafhum) and so on.
ISee Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, 1/64.
^This term is frequently used in the PF, see for instance, al-RuhawI, p 516.
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In PF, there are two common proposals for what I have called 'text-based
classification of signification': the majority proposal known as the Shaft'1 method of
dividing signification (which is sometimes called the speculative theologians' way
(tarlqat al-mutakallimin) of dividing signification) and the Hanafi one. I shall begin
with a relatively brief discussion of the Hanafl classification
5.3.1. The Hanafl method of dividing text-signification
The Hanafi scholars distinguish four types of meaning at the textual level:
(i) the express meaning ('ibarat al-nass);
(ii) the alluded meaning ('isharat al-nass);
(iii) the inferred meaning (dalalat al-nass); and
(iv) the required meaning (iqtida' al-nass).1
5.3.1.1. The express meaning of text
Broadly speaking, this is the meaning which is taken to be the main import the
speaker intends to convey by his utterance. To put it more literally, the meaning "at
which the utterance is driven" (al-masuqu lahu 1-kalam).2 It should be noted,
however, that it is very frequent in PF's terminology to speak of 'expression',
'utterance' or 'text' as being driven at some meaning, but driven to somebody. The
meaning of 'driven' (masuq) in the former phrase is said to be somewhat similar to
the meaning of 'intended' (murad or maqsud). The difference between the two words
relates to their being used in different contexts: while the former is employed for
' The last three terms have been adopted from Kamali, but for methodological reasons
1 would prefer to use 'the express meaning' instead of 'the explicit meaning' which he
applies for ('ibarat al-nass); see Muhammad. Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts society, 1991), p. 124.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 79.
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expressions, the latter is used for meanings.1 On the surface, what the text is 'driven
at' is thus tantamount to what the speaker intends to convey, but the reality is that they
are two quite different matters. In order to be aware of the difference, we need to
distinguish three different levels of 'intentionality' in which 'meaning' may be seen.
According to al-Tahanawi, the meaning signified by an expression can either be
a- primarily intended;
b- subordinately intended; or
c- presupposed
(a) and (b) are illustrated by the following Qur'anic text:
(1) That is because they say:
"Trade is like usury",
But Allah hath permitted trade
And forbidden usury.2
Among the meanings inferred from this Qur'anic verse is the permission of trade
and the forbidding of usury, and the distinctness of trade from usury, the former
belonging to (b) while the latter belonging to (a), (c), on the other hand, is illustrated
by the Prophet's saying:
(2) "The price of a dog is ill-gotten property" ('inna min al-suhti thamana 1-kalb),
where one may infer the legal validity of this sale.
According to al-Tahanawi, while the meaning of type (a) is always 'driven at'
(masuq 'ilayh), the meaning of type (c) can, on no account, be said to be 'driven at'.
As for (b), it can be looked upon as being 'driven at' on the grounds that the speaker
designs it to be an integral part of his communicative intention and it can, by contrast,
be regarded as 'non-driven at' since it is necessarily embodied to impart the speaker's
primary intention rather than being specifically intended.3
ISee Ibn al-Malik, p 522.
2Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 2/215.
^See al-Tahanawi, 2/1407 (nass).
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Although the Hanafis agree that the above verse conveys at least two meanings:
(i) an apparent meaning: the permission of trade and the forbidding of usury; and
(ii) an unequivocal one: the distinctness of trade from usury
they are, nonetheless, in disagreement as to whether only (ii) is, or both (i) and (ii)
are, to be regarded as being 'driven at'. 'Ubayd Allah Sadr al-Sharl'ah (d. 747-
1346), who holds the former view, says that (i) is derivable from the express meaning
and (ii) from the alluded meaning of the text (more of which later), whereas the
majority believe that both (i) and (ii) are conveyed by the express meaning of the text.1
This amounts to saying in more technical language that, by virtue of the majority
definition, both nass (unequivocal meaning) and zahir (apparent meaning) fall within
the scope of 'express meaning' while only nass is captured by Sadr al-Shari'ah's
definition (cf. 3.9.1).
It may be important here to mention that the notion of 'driving' (al-sawq) always
involves a context-dependent import. In order for the audience to get this import in a
particular situation, he has to take into account the overall drift of the speaker's
utterance and the relevant contextual information. And the cardinal issue the addressee
has to consider in this direction concerns the relevance of the speaker's utterance.
Applying this to the above verse would show that it seems more plausible to share
Sadr al-Shaii'ah's view that the above verse is 'driven at' (ii) than to concur with the
majority that both (i) and (ii) are 'driven at' since the passage is clearly designed to be
an answer to those who say "Trade is like usury".
Finally, it may also be worth mentioning that the difference between 'what is
driven at' and 'what is not driven at' corresponds in some way or another to the
1 See Muhibb Allah, 1/407; Sadr al-Shan'ah, 2/1-2; al-Taftazam, Hashiyat al-Talwih,
2/2-4; al-Ruhawi, p 522; al-Muti'I, op. cit., 2/195.
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distinction drawn by some modern linguists between what is presupposed and what is
in focus.1
5.3.1.2. The alluded meaning of text
This term is used by the Hanafi scholars to refer to the meaning which, according
to Hafiz al-Din al-Nasafi (d. 710/1310), is "conveyed by the linguistic construction of
the utterance, but does not represent the intention of the speaker at which the text is
driven" (ma thabata bi-nazmi 1-kalami 1ugha tan, lakinnahu ghayru maqsudin wa-la
siqa lahu 1-nass).2 This definition, which is adopted by al-Sharlf al-Jurjanl in his
encyclopaedic dictionary,3 compromises two defining specifications: 'conveyed by
the linguistic construction of the utterance' and 'being unintended'. We have already
dealt with the latter specification in the preceding subsection, so we shall be
concentrating here exclusively on the former. As we shall see later, according to the
Hanafi classification of signification, express and alluded meanings are derivable
from the linguistic construction of the utterance, inferred meaning is derivable by
deduction, and required meaning is at least partly deducible by inference together with
the knowledge of the relevant aspects of Shari'ah (the revealed Islamic law). Hence,
if the phrase 'conveyed by the linguistic construction of the utterance' is proven to be
inaccurate, then the validity of this version of the classification will be questionable.
However, it should be pointed out that there are two possible interpretations for the
above phrase: an apparent one, by virtue of which 'what is conveyed by the linguistic
construction' (ma thabata bi-nazmi 1-kalami lughatan) is taken in a relatively narrow
sense, and a more probable one in which the phrase is taken to include the implicated
^see John Lyons, Semantics, 2/503.
2'Abu 1-Barakat Hafiz al-Din al-Nasafi, Matn al-Manar (n.p. al-Matba'ah al-
'Uthmaniyyah, 1319 A.H.), pp. 521-522.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 16; see also, al-BazdawI, pp. 174-175; al-
Bukhafi, pp. 174-175.
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aspects of the utterance meaning. In what follows we will examine some examples
given to this kind of signification to see whether or not it is based purely on the
linguistic construction of the utterance in its narrow sense, then we shall turn to the
more probable interpretation.
(1) "Wa-1-walidatu yurdi'na 'awladahunna hawlayni kamilayni li-
man 'arada 'an yutimma 1-rada'ata wa-'ala 1-mawludi laJiu rizquhunna
wa-kiswatuhunna bi-l-ma 'ruf"
(The mothers shall give suck to their offspring for two years if they
wish to complete the term, but it is the duty of the person to whom they are
born to bear the cost of their food and clothing on equitable terms).1
This Qur'ajiic verse is a well-studied example of alluded meaning, in which the
phrase 'to whom they are born' is said to allude to the implication that the child's
descent (nasabuh) is attributed not to the mother but to the father. This inference is
derived from the use of the above underlined phrase instead of 'father' which is seen
by Muslim scholars as a deliberate departure from a common wording to a less
common, but more indicative, one to indicate this implication.2 However, it is
doubtful that this type of meaning is conveyed by purely formal expression, since this
meaning cannot be ascribed to any grammatical or lexical form in that phrase as its
conventional meaning. Moreover, there are allegedly other alluded meanings drawn
from the above phrase, among which is the inference that the father is permitted to take
what he necessarily needs from his child's possessions without having to take his or
her permission.3 So, if this meaning was also conveyed by the linguistic construction
of the utterance in its narrow sense, what would be its corresponding form? And how
would it be related directly or indirectly to this form and to the form of the first alluded
meaning on a mere linguistic basis? It is very unlikely to find any, let alone
lTHEHOLYQUR 'AN, 2/233; see Ali's Translation, 2/233.
^See al-SarakhsI, 1/237; al-Bukhari, pp. 178-179; Ibn al-Malik, p 523; al-RuhawI, p
523; Ibn al-Halabl, pp. 523-524; 'Abu 1-Barakat Hafiz al-Din al-Nasafi, Tafsir al-
Nasafi 1/117-118.
^This inference is very frequently supported by the Prophet' saying: "you and your
property belong to your father". See al-SarakhsI, 1/237; al-BazdawI, pp. 178-179;
Ibn al-Malik, p 523; al-Ruhawi, p 523; Ibn al-Halabi, pp. 523-524; Kamali, op. cit.,
p. 125.
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convincing, answers to such questions. However, one may raise the same questions
for those express meanings which are derivable by way of incorporation and those
derivable by implication, since they are similarly irrecoverable by the linguistic
construction alone. Consequently, both express and alluded meanings should be seen
as capable of being non-linguistically conveyed, a conclusion which would be
unacceptable to the Hauafis who hold that both these types of meaning are linguistic
meanings (thabitun bi-slghati 1-kalam). It is true that the Hanafls distinguish
between express and alluded meaning in that the former, unlike the latter, is immediate
and incalculable, but this is only because the former is 'driven at' and the latter is not.
As we will make clear, 'non-calculation' ('adam al-ta'ammul) and 'immediacy' (al-
tabadur) (cf. 3.5.1.4), are very important tests to prove that a particular meaning is
intended to be indeterminate, but not sufficient to prove that it is inferential rather than
being linguistically constructed (cf. 5.3.3.1.2.2).
In any case, in order to understand the linguistically constructed meaning of an
utterance, one needs to know its lexical and grammatical meaning. Thus, to
understand the phrase 1-mawludi lahu (to whom they are born), we need to know, for
example, the meaning of the lexeme walada (bear), that I (to) means 'for the sake of
and that mawlud (were born) is passive participle, and so forth. However, if we
widen the sense of 'linguistic' a little so as to include reference assignment and
disambiguation, we may also need to identify the reference of hu (whom) and know
that the whole phrase means 'father'. But, if one wishes to account for how the
alluded meaning(s) in this phrase is/are generated, one has to go beyond all that, that
is, the lexical and grammatical meaning, the assignment of the reference and the
linguistic disambiguation. Particularly, one has to reason out the purpose of the use of
this phrase in preference to walid (father) which is more common and more relevant in
this context (specially if we take into account the use of walidat for 'the mothers' in
the same verse). Hence, the non-linguistic contexts, specially the co-operation
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maxims and the background knowledge, will play the essential role in recovering the
allusions imported by the phrase.
However, so far we have been employing 'linguistic construction' in its narrow
sense, but we should point out here that by virtue of the broad interpretation of the
phrase 'conveyed by the linguistic construction', which is more likely to represent
what the Hanafls have in mind, all the above constituents of the alluded meaning are
taken to be part of the linguistic construction. To fortify this interpretation, we need to
consider what is exactly meant by 'construction' (nazm). According to al-Sharlf al-
Jurjani, nazm in its technical sense is the composition of words and sentences such
that their meanings are semantically systemised and their significations are arranged in
accordance with the requirements of reason".1 That is to say, to put words and
sentences in a coherent and cohesive way. Thus, in order for the hearer to
'deconstruct' the speaker's message, he has not only to decode the conventional
meaning, but also to reason about the rational way in which the utterance is
constructed. This may involve a consideration of the shared background knowledge
and the communication principles governing the linguistic construction of the text.
Another example of alluded meaning is the following Qur'anic verse:
(2) "li-l-fuqara'i 1-muhajirina -lladhina 'ukhriju min diyarihim wa-
'amwalihim ".
(Some part is due)
To the indigent, the Muhajirs,
Those who were expelled
From their homes and their property.2
The express meaning of this Qur'anic passage is that a portion of the booty is due
to those who were expelled from their homes and their property. The alluded
meaning, on the other hand, is that their properties and wealth left in Makkah (their
' Al-Shanf al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 126 (nazm).
2THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 59/8; see Ali's Translation, 59/8.
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fatherland) are no longer counted as being held by them. I would assume that the
pattern of reasoning by which this allusion is generated runs as follows:
A) these people are referred to as 'the indigent';
B) since there is no 'diverting evidence' to the contrary, this description is meant
to be taken literally (the Literalness Principle);
C) since this describing reference is fresh rather than mutually known reference, it
follows that the expression 'the indigent' is being used attributively rather than
referentially (the Principle of Unknown Reference plus the Principle of 'I'mal);
D) as those people were expelled from their homes and their property (shared
background knowledge), the relevant allusion engendered from their being described
as 'indigent' will be that their properties and wealth left in Makkah are no longer
counted as being under their control (conclusion).
With the exception of what I call 'the Principle of Unknown Reference', all the
above communication principles have already been dealt with. I will shortly explain
what I mean by 'the Principle of Unknown Reference', but before that I need to point
out that referring to those people as the Muhajirs would have been enough to identify
them since this is the most common and well-known defining feature for their
identification; this raises the point as to the communicative aim behind the use of the
expression 'the indigent'. According to 'the Principle of Unknown Reference', for a
describing reference to be interpreted by the hearer as being used purely referentially,
the hearer must be in a position which enables him to believe that the speaker assumes
that the hearer knows that the describing reference is sufficient to make him identify
who, or what, is being talked about. In our present example, the describing reference
does not satisfy the above condition, because the people referred to are unknown to be
poor. In fact, what the audience know about them is that they left homes and
possessions in Makkah. So, the reference is innovative rather than mutually known
and the audience would, accordingly, take this use of describing reference as an act of
attribution rather than an act of reference. That is to say, the expression would be
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interpreted as being used to attribute the quality of indigence to the Muhajirs. To put
it another way, the expression alludes to the fact that the properties and wealth of the
Muhajirs left in Makkoh are no longer counted as being under their control and,
consequently, they should no longer be regarded as being comfortably off.
One condition appears to be necessary for this kind of structure (i.e. 'the x'
structure) to be regarded as being used attributively, that is, it must be followed by a
defining clause. Consider the following examples;
(3)- The teacher who saved the drowned yesterday was very brave.
(4)- On my way to the university this morning, I saw the teacher who saved the
drowned yesterday.
Provided that the speaker believes that the hearer knows 'who saved the drowned
yesterday' but does not know the fact that he is a teacher, 'the x' structure in (3) and
(4) will be taken as being used attributively. As in the above Qur'anic example, the
alluded meaning is engendered by wondering on the part of the hearer about the
purpose of the use of 'the teacher', instead of a more general term such as 'man' or
'person'.
To sum up, there are at least four necessary, though not sufficient, characteristics
which should hold for a communicative import to be regarded as alluded meaning:
(I) it must be presupposed rather than 'driven at';1
(II) it must be derivable from the linguistic construction of the utterance;2
(III) it must be calculable;3 and
1'Abu 1-Barakat Haiz al-DIn al-Nasaft, Main al-Manar, pp. 521-522; al-Sharif al-
Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 16; see also al-BazdawI, pp. 174-175; al-Samarqandi, 1/567;
'Muhibb Allah, 1/407; Sadr al-Shari'ah, 2/1.
2'Abu 1-Barakat Hafiz al-DIn al-Nasafi, Main al-Manar, pp. 521-522; al-Sharif al-
Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 16; see also al-BazdawI, pp. 174-175; Sadr al-Shari'ah, 2/1.
-^Al-Sarakhsi, 1/236; Ibn al-Malik, p 522; al-Samarqandi, 1/567.
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(IV) it must not be immediate.1
There will be more elaboration on (II) when we discuss the Shafi 'I method of
dividing text-signification, where the distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is
implicated' will be more technically relevant.
5.3.1.3. The inferred meaning of text
Several definitions are offered to pinpoint the notion of inferred meaning, each
emphasising some features of the notion, but without any of them being sufficiently
exhaustive. So, I will selectively consider two of these definitions in order to give
some indication of the properties the Hanafls have in mind when they are discussing
inferred meaning.
According to 'Ala' al-Dln al-Bukhari's definition (d. 730/1330), inferred meaning
is "the understanding of an unstated meaning from the stated meaning on the basis of
the consideration of the context and the illocutionary import of the utterance" (fahmu
ghayri 1-mantuqi mina 1-mantuqi bi-siyaqi 1-kalami wa-maqsudih).2 It is obvious
that this definition, which appears to be a modified form of al-Ghazali's definition,3 is
based on equating signification with understanding, a view which is rejected by some
Muslim thinkers on the grounds that signification and understanding are two different
constructs (cf. 5.2.1). However, I will be concentrating on three different notions
involved in al-Bukhari's definition, each of which represents a distinct form of
meaning in the broad sense of the term. These notions are
(i) the stated meaning (al-mantuq);
lAl-Samarqandl, 1/567.
^Al-Bukhari, p. 184.
^Al-Ghazali defines this type ofmeaning as "the understanding of an unstated meaning
from the stated meaning by an indication from the context and the illocutionary import
of the utterance" (fahmu ghayri 1-mantuqi mina 1-mantuqi bi-dalalati siyaqi 1-
kalami wa-maqsudih). Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/190.
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(ii) the unstated meaning (ghayr al-mantuq),
(iii) the illocutionary import of the utterance (maqsud al-kalam).
In order to illustrate these different forms of meaning we need to consider the
passage "Say not 'uff lo them" in the following Qur'anic verse:
(l)Thy Lord hath decreed
That ye worship none but him,
And that ye be kind
To parents. Whether one
Or both of them attain
Old age in thy life,
Say not 'uff to them, nor repel them,
But address them
In terms of honour.1
The stated meaning of this passage is the prohibition of saying 'uff (Fie) to
parents, a meaning which is encoded in the conventional wording of the utterance.
But this clearly stated meaning amounts to something else, that is, the prohibition of
striking them, insulting them, and so forth. The prohibition of each one of such
despicable acts is considered by the legal theorists as an unstated meaning of the
utterance. Such meanings are said to be generated by a consideration of the context,
which leads in turn to the realisation of the illocutionary import of the utterance. In the
above Qur'asiic verse, it is clear that the whole context is driving at urging people to
respect their parents. This being so, the illocutionary import of the passage will be the
prevention of harm to parents. Once one grasps this illocutionary import of the
passage, it will be clear for him that any act or behaviour causing harm to parents will
fall within the scope of the prohibition intended in the above Qur'ajiic verse.
In a similar definition, 'Abd al-Shakur interprets inferred meaning as "the result of
attributing the rule of the stated meaning to the unstated meaning on the strength of the
consideration of the effective cause on a linguistic basis" (thubutu hukmi 1-masituqi
li-lmaskuti li-fahmi l-manati lughatan).2 What is striking about this definition is that
1 THEHOLY OUR 'AN, 17/23; see Ali's Translation, 17/23.
2Muhibb Allah, 1/408.
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it renders the consideration of 'the effective cause' (al-manat) as the basis for
generating an inferred meaning. It should be pointed out here that there is a long¬
standing controversy in the PF concerning whether Sharl 'ai?-related analogical
reasoning (al-qiyas al-shar'i) or only linguistic considerations are the key to inferred
meaning. At first sight, Muhibb Allah, b. 'Abd al-Shakur (d. 1119/1707) appears to
opt for the former view, but a moment of reflection would show that this is not the
case. In fact, the qualification "on a linguistic basis" (lvghatan) seems to be
deliberately made to display his rejection of this view. Before we spell out the
positions of each part of the controversy, it is worth mentioning that not only the
Hanafis, but also the Shafi'Is, are divided over this issue. So in order to avoid
repeating the same thing during the discussion of 'congruent implicature' (mafhum al-
muwafaqah), i.e. the Shafi'I counterpart of 'inferred meaning', all the arguments
concerning this controversy whether they are advanced by the Shafi 'Is or Hanafis
will be dealt with here. Those who hold that inferred meaning is derived through
purely linguistic considerations base their view on the argument that, unlike Sharl 'ah-
related analogical deduction (al-qiyas al-shar'I), inferred meaning has the following
properties:
(i) It needs no knowledge about Sharl'ah, thus, any speaker of the language,
whether he is a jurist or not, is capable of deriving this type of meaning.1
(ii) The process of deriving this type of meaning does not involve a great deal of
calculation.2
(iii) It is a necessary condition for this kind of inference that the point of
resemblance (al-ma'na 1-mnnasib li-l-hukm) (i.e. "the governing consideration" or
"the concern to promote rationality"3) is more relevant to the derivative than it is to the
^Al-Baji, 2/440; al-SarakhsI, 1/241; al-Samarqandl, 1/570; Ibn al-Malik, p 528, al-
Ruhawi, p 526; Zadah, p 528.
^Al-Baji, 2/440; al-Samarqandl, 1/570;
^Weiss, the Search, p. 490.
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antecedent.1 To go back to our example, the prohibition of striking parents is more
relevant to the prevention of harm to them than saying 'uff to them.
(iv) The antecedent, in the case of this kind of inference, can be subsumed under,
or made part of, the derivative.2 According to al-'AmidI, if a master says to his slave
"do not give someone a grain", it is understood that the slave is disallowed to give any
larger amount including a single grain.3
The advocates of the rival view, on the other hand, equate this kind of inference
with deduction by analogy because
(a) it involves some sort of calculation; and
(b) it necessitates the same pillars involved in analogical reasoning, namely 'the
antecedent' (al-'asl) (e.g. saying 'uff), 'the derivative'(al-far') (e.g. striking) and
common effective cause ('illah jami 'ah mu'aththirah) (e.g. the prevention of harm
to parents).4 But, since this kind of inference is so plain, it is called 'manifest
analogy' (qiyas jail).
In response to the arguments (i) and (ii), 'Abu 'Ishaq al-Shirazi ascribes the
accessibility of inferred meaning to ordinary speakers to its being plain and apparent, a
quality which should not, according to him, prevent it from being subsumed under
analogical reasoning.5 As for (iii) and (iv), they are, I would say, invalid arguments
because the properties assigned to inferred meaning in those two arguments do not
contradict the very nature of analogical reasoning. It is true that the notion of inferred
meaning (or 'congruent implicature', according to the Shafi'Is) is remarkably
lAl-'AmidI (1986), 3/77; see Weiss, the Search, p. 490.
^Al-'Amidl (1986), 3/77; see Weiss, the Search, p. 490; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud,
2/173; al-'Amidl (1986), 3/77; see Weiss, the Search, p. 490.
3AO'AmidI (1986), 3/77; see Weiss, the Search, p. 490.
4A1-Bukharl, p. 185.
^Al-ShlrazI, Sharh al-Luma', 1/425; al-Shirazi, al-Tabsirah, pp. 227-228.
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embodied in the above properties, but this does not disqualify it from being a special
kind of analogy.
Some scholars, however, treat this type of inference as a kind of majaz,
subsuming it under what they call 'the use of the specific to indicate the general'. To
return to our example, the specific is 'do not say 'uff and the general is the prohibition
of causing harm to one's parents.1 This account is invalidated on the grounds that it is
a necessary condition for an expression to be a majaz that the literal meaning is truth
conditionally disregarded on the strength of a diverting context, but what we have here
is a case in which both the literal and figurative meanings are included in the speaker's
intention of the utterance.2
However, one may be tempted to say that the prohibition of saying 'uff to one's
parents is not necessarily derived from the literal meaning, but could be tacitly
understood from the more general meaning, that is, the prohibition of causing any
kind of harm to one's parents, since the verse is primarily driven at the prohibition of
causing any kind of harm to one's parents rather than to the prohibition of saying 'uff
in its strictly literal form. This assumption can be accurate if and only if al-Gazali's
claim that the unstated meaning is more immediate than the stated meaning is
accurate.3 But this is very unlikely, because it is very hard to imagine that the unstated
meaning (the prohibition of striking one's parents), which represents just one of the
possible manifestations of the illocutionary import (the prohibition of causing any kind
of harm to one's parents), strikes the mind before the literal meaning (the prohibition
of saying 'uff), by means of which the illocutionary import itself is recovered. This
being the case, both the literal and non-literal meanings are integral to what the speaker
is intending, which means that the above criticism (i.e. that this kind of expressions
iAl-Mahalli, 1/244.
^Al-Sharbini, 1/244.
3See al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/191.
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cannot be counted as majaz for their literal meanings are integral to what the speaker is
intending) still holds.
Furthermore, classifying such inferences under the heading of majaz would be
open to another criticism: the distinction between haqlqah and majaz is something
different from the distinction between stated and unstated meaning, the former is
drawn from the classification of use, while the latter is drawn from the classification of
signification. To put it al-Qarafl's way, the former is related to SBE, while the latter is
related to SE (cf. 3.3).
To sum up, inferred meaning is a special case of analogical reasoning in which an
unstated meaning is derived on 'all-the-more-reason basis' from a stated meaning by
virtue of the consideration of the context and the speaker's Elocutionary import. This
definition represents the outcome of modifying and integrating the two separate
definitions developed by al-Bukhari and 'Abd al-Shakur in the light of the above
discussion.
5.3.1.4. The required meaning of text
The term iqtida' al-nass (the required meaning of text) is commonly used to refer
to the semantic content of ellipted parts of an utterance which is believed to be essential
to the meaningfulness of the whole utterance. As explained earlier (cf. 3.5.1.3),
Muslim legal theorists lay great importance on the addressee and his role in the
communicative process. Chief among the tasks expected from him is the function of
"making sense of the expressions". This function which is formulated in the
'Principle of 'I'mal (cf. 3.5.1.3) is particularly important in interpreting those
utterances whose apparent meanings do not appear to be compatible with the
rationality or the legal validity of the text, or the principle of the speaker's truthfulness.
Relying on the immediate context and his background knowledge, and motivated by
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the principles of communication, the addressee is assumed not only to divert the
expression from its face-value meaning, but also to enlarge the discourse such that it
becomes most relevant to the communicative situation. In the case of 'required
meaning', the hearer is believed to assume that the speaker omits some parts of the
utterance on the strength that the speaker is capable of recovering them from the
context. The hearer's assumption that some parts of the utterance are omitted and
intended to be part of the force of the speaker's utterance is envisaged by the legal
theorists as an extension (ziyadah) to the actual discourse. The motive behind- or the
requiring for (al-muqtadi), to use the legal theorists' terminology- this 'extension' is
"the maintenance of communication" (siyanat al-kalam) and "its prevention from
balderdash" (siyanatuh 'an al-laghw).1 In other words, it is the participants' need for
proper communication which constrains the existence of this type of meaning.
Having outlined the notion of 'required meaning, we need to examine some of the
definitions offered by the Hanafls to explore the idea further. According to 'Abu
Bakr al-Sarakhs! (d. 490/1097), the required meaning (al-muqtada) is "a presupposed
extension to the stated proposition, whose being presumed is a necessary condition for
the utterance to be meaningful (or for its illocutionary force to occur), and without
which the utterance does not make sense".2 For example, the Qur'anic verse (1) must
be taken to mean that 'unlawful to you is the marriage of your mothers, daughters...'.
(1) "Prohibited to you are your mothers, daughters, sisters...",3
The recovery of the unmentioned word 'marriage' is dependent on a set of
assumptions and communication principles:
(i) that the apparent meaning is inaccessible (diverting context);
^ Al-Bukhari, p. 189; al-TahanawI, 2/1239 (al-muqtada).
^The Arabic text reads as follows: "huwa 'ibaratun 'an ziyadatin 'ala l-mansusi
'alayhi yushtaratu taqdlmuhu li-yaslra l-manzumu mufldan 'aw mujiban li-lhukmi,
wa-bi-dunihi la yumkinu 'i'malu l-manzum". Al-Sarakhsl, 1/248
3THEHOLY QUR'AN, 4/23.
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(ii) that the speaker is truthful (the Principle of Truthfulness) and has a particular
communicative intention to convey (the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make
his Intention Manifest).
(iii) that there must be an ulterior meaning for the utterance (the Principle of
'I'mal); and
(vi) that the verse must be taken to mean that 'unlawful to you is the marriage of
your mothers, daughters...' (guiding context).
Among the points to notice in al-Sarakhsi's definition is his distinction between
the value of the utterance (fa'idat al-kalam) and its legal illocutionary force (hukmuha
1-shar'I) where the former refers to the intended meaning of the utterance whereas the
latter refers to its legal effect (which is here the prohibition of marrying the mother).
Contrary to the case of the above Qur'anic verse where the value of the utterance and
its illocutionary force are almost the same, it is very frequent in Islamic jurisprudence
that jurists, while agreeing about the value of the text, differ in determining its legal
illocutionary force. I will not go into the details of this issue, but it suffices here to
point out that both the value of the utterance (which represents the speaker's intention)
and its illocutionary force are different from its meaning in that the latter does not
require a great deal of reflection and calculation to grasp.
Another point in al-Sarakhsi's definition is his use of the term 'i'mal where he
makes the assumption that some parts of the utterance's structure are omitted as the
only way to make sense of the utterance. The term 'i'mal (making sense of the
expression) refers here (as elsewhere) to the process in which the addressee assesses
all the possible interpretations on the strength of the context in which the utterance is
uttered (cf. 3.5.1.3).
The second definition to be introduced here is the one quoted by al-Bukhari
without mentioning who suggested it. According to this definition, the required
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meaning (al-muqtada) is "that which is assumed to have been omitted for some
purposes such as the preservation of the speaker's truthfulness" (ma 'udmira fi 1-
kalam darurata sidqi 1-mutakallimi wa-nahwih)} The significance of this definition
lies in highlighting the addressee's tendency to take the speaker's utterance as an
informative message even in a situation in which the speaker's utterance appears
inaccessible, which tacitly implies the importance of the Principle of 'I'mal to the
process of interpretation. More important is the reference to the assumption of the
speaker's truthfulness as a chief principle for communication. A very much-quoted
example to clarify this point is the Prophet's saying:
(2) "Error and forgetfulness have been removed from my community".
In order to preserve the Prophet's truthfulness and make his massage clear and
informative, the assumed missing element 'the blame for' ('ithm) has to be supplied
so that the utterance reads as follows: the blame for error and forgetfulness has been
removed from my community. Without retrieving the missing element, the utterance
would not be taken to be true, given the actual occurrence of error and forgetfulness in
the everyday life of the members of his community.2
The final definition to be discussed here is 'Abd al-Shakur's definition. As he
defines it, requirement (iqtida') is a state in which a stated meaning signifies that
which constitutes a necessary condition for its rationality or legal validity (dalalatu 1-
mantuqi 'ala ma yatwaqqafu sihhatuhu 'alayhi 'aqlasi wa-shar'an).3 The first
thing to be noticed about this definition is the fact that, unlike the above two, it is a
definition of requirement (iqtida') rather than the required (al-muqtada). Some
Hanafi legal theorists distinguish between the requiring (al-muqtadi), the required
(al-muqtada) and requirement (iqtida') as follows: "the requiring is the text",
lAl-Bukhari, p. 188.
^Al-Sarakhsl, 1/251; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/347-348; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/72; see
Weiss, the Search, p. 483; al-Qarafi, Shark Tanqih, p. 55.
^Muhibb Allah, 1/411.
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according to some legal theorists,1 and "the maintenance of communication",
according to others,2 the required is a condition without which the text does not make
sense; and requirement is a relation between the requiring and the required.3 In the
light of this definition of requirement, 'Abd al-Shakur's definition can be reformulated
in the following form: requirement is a relation by virtue of which a stated meaning
signifies that which constitutes a necessary condition for its rationality or legal
validity.
In any case, the important points in this definition are
(i) It makes the relation between the stated meaning and the assumed meaning of
presupposition type.
(ii) It renders the text rather than any other communicative factors as the requiring
for the presumably missing elements. However, some legal theorists say, as has just
been pointed out, that the need for the missing elements arises to maintain a proper
communication.4
(iii) It implies that the supply of the assumed object contributes to the rationality of
a text as in (A) or to its legal validity as in (B).
(A) In the Qur'anic passage (3), the text requires, according to the majority view,
the assumption of the phrase 'ahl (the people of) before the phrase "al-qaryata" (the
town) in order for the text to make sense since, as al-Shafi'i remarks, "the town and
the caravan [by themselves] cannot tell what the truth was".5
(3) "Ask the town where we have been, and the caravan with which we have
come" (wa-s'ali 1-qaryata -llati kunna fiha wa-l-'ira -llati 'aqbalna ftha.6
llbn al-Malik, p. 534.
^Al-Bukhari, p. 189.
^Ibn al-Malik, p. 534.
^Al-Bukhari, p. 189.
^Al-Shafi'i, Treatise, p. 103.
6THEHOLY QUR'AN, 12/82.
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However, some legal theorists, notably Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, argue
against this account. Following their strictly contextual approach, they say that the
word qaryah (town) can be applied to the place or the people who live in that place,
relying in this regard on the contextual evidence.1 Incidentally, this seems to be the
common practice in the most authoritative dictionaries of English.2 There is no need,
according to Ibn al-Qayyim, for the assumption of ellipsis since
(i) "the utterance is independent";
(ii) "what is assumed to be omitted is in fact implicated"; and
(ii) "expressions signify by implication as well as by their explicit meanings".3
This approach is applied also to cases such as the following;
(4) "Prohibited to you are dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine, and that
on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah, that which hath
been killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a headlong fall, or by
being gored to death...".4
(5) "Lawful unto you are all four-footed animals, with the exceptions
named".5
(6) "Prohibited to you are your mothers...".6
The speaker's intentions in all these Qur'anic verses, Ibn al-Qayyim tells us, are
recovered from the conventional meaning, the habitual use of the utterance and the
way the utterance is constructed.7 In other words, the grasp of the intended meaning
dose not hinge on an assumption of ellipsis ('idmar), omission (hadhf), reflection
(.tafkir) or calculation (taqdlr).8 Thus, once the above verses are heard, the mind
goes immediately to the prohibition of the consumption of the items listed in (4), the
ISee Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 20/463; al-Mawsili, 2/98-99.
^See, e.g., J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary,
(town); Delia Summers and others, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
2nd edn. (Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, 1987), (town); Patrick Hanks and
others, Collins Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edn. (London: Collins,
1986), (town).
^Al-Mawsili, 2/100.
4THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 5/3; see Ali's Translation, 5/3.
5THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 5/2; see Ali's Translation, 5/2.




permissibility of the consumption of all four-footed animals in (5) and the prohibition
of the marriage of mothers in (6). What makes these particular interpretations
determinate is their relevance to the communicative situation (cf. 4.9).
(B) Consider the following talk-exchange in which an owner of a slave is asked
by a magnanimous person who wants the slave to be freed to sell him the slave and
liberate him on his behalf in a single transaction:
(7) a- Set your slave free on my behalf for a thousand.
b-1 have set him free.
The utterance 'a'taqtu (lit, I have set free) is seen institutionally as a performative
utterance ('insha'iyyali) and institutionally characterised by Muslim jurists as one of
the so-called siyagh al-'uqud, wa-l-fusukh (lit, forms of contracts and revocations) as
by virtue of its use in the above manner the speaker commits himself to set a slave
free. The point here, however, is that once (7b) is performed the slave is sold to the
speaker of (7a) and simultaneously freed on his behalf.1 Clearly, what we have here
is a case of a pragmatic presupposition where the speaker performs one of siyagh al-
'uqud to produce two illocutionary forces at once: the conventional illocutionary force
by virtue of which the slave has become free and the presupposed one by virtue of
which the slave has been sold.
Finally, it should be pointed out that some scholars draw a distinction between
'requirement' and 'the assumption of ellipsis' ('idmar), or omission (hadhf) on the
grounds that the former is governed by extra-linguistic factors, such as the
preservation of the legal validity of the text, while the latter is motivated by purely
linguistic considerations.2 Others, on the other hand, make the distinction on different
' ATSarakhsi, 1/249-250; al-Samarqandi, 1/5734; al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih,
1/23-24; Ibn al-Malik, pp. 538-541; al-RuhawI, pp. 538-540; al-'Ansari, 1/412.
^Al-Sarakhsi, 1/251-53; al-Bazdawi, pp. 188-194; al-Samarqandi, 1/573-576.
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bases, but all the distinctions suggested are of little practical importance, not to
mention their being questionable.1
To sum up, the legal theorists distinguish three types of required meaning:
(i) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the speaker's
truthfulness;
(ii) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the rationality of
the text (al-sihhah al- 'aqliyyah)\ and
(iii) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the legal validity
of the text (al-sihhah al-shar'iyyah).2
5.3.2. The Shafi'1 method of dividing text-signification
Prior to commencing the discussion of the present proposal for the classification
of signification, it should be born in mind that what we mean by the Shafi i method is
the approach which is followed not only by the Shafi 'is, but also by the Maliki,
Hanbali, and Mu'tazili scholars. In so doing, we are conforming to the common
practice in PF according to which the term Shafi 'I is applied in this context to those
legal theorists whose approach to the issues of PF, unlike the Hajiafi's, is dominated
by speculative and theological trend.
Seeking to ascertain the valid inferences upon which to formulate the law, the
Shafi 'is (in the broad sense of the term) introduce a number of different versions of
significational classification which are propounded by different scholars. Although
Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 204/ 820), the founder of the Shafii school of law
and arguably the real founder of PF, touches on some types of meaning in his
^For a discussion of these distinctions, see Ibn al-Malik, pp. 535-538; al-Ruhawi, pp.
536-538; Ibn al-Halabi, pp. 535-538.
^Al-Bukhari, pp. 191-192; al-Mahalli, 1/239; al-Bannanl, 1/239.
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influential Risalah,1 his brief outline of these types cannot, nevertheless, be rendered
as a properly classificatory proposal. In fact, a complex classification does not seem
to have appeared before the tenth, or perhaps, the eleventh century. Among the
figures who lay the foundation for the Shafi '1 significational classification scheme in
the eleventh century are the Mu'tazill scholar 'Abu 1-Husayn al-Basri,2 the MalikI
'Abu l-Walld al-Baji (d. 474/1081),3 and the Shafi 'I (in the narrow sense of the term)
'Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni.4 I shall not discuss the first two in the present work,
instead I will consider al-Juwaynl's proposal as it constitutes the basis for two more
common and highly developed proposals which will be the focus of our discussion in
this section, namely those put forward later in the thirteenth century by al-'Atnidi and
Ibn al-Hajib. Besides, I shall be discussing al-Ghazali's classification, as it forms the
connection link between al-Juwayni's and al-'Amidi's proposals.
5.3.2.1. Al-Juwayni's classification
The important thing to note in al-Juwayni's proposal, and in most versions of the
Shafi 'I classification, is the distinction between the meaning of 'what is said' and the
meaning of 'what is implicated', or, more precisely, the signification of 'what is
articulated or pronounced' (dalalat al-mantvq) and the signification of 'what is
understood' (dalalat al-mafhum). Unlike many other Muslim legal theorists and
modern pragmatists who attempt similar distinctions,5 al-Juwayni has a clear, though
1Muhammad b. Idns al Shafi'i, al-Risalah , ed. 'Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, 2nd
edn. (Cairo: Dar al-Thurat, 1979), pp. 512-517; al Shafi'i, Treatise, pp. 102-103,
308-309.
^See al-Basri, 1/296-299.
^See al-Baji, pp. 438-441.
4See al-Juwayni, 1/448-453.
^For profound discussions of the distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is
implicated' in modern pragmatics, see, e.g., Grice (1991), pp. 305-315; Robert M.
Harnish, "Logical Form and Implicature", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A
Reader, pp. 316-364; Jerrold M. Sadock, "On Testing for Conversational
Implicature", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader, pp. 365-376; Francois
Recanati, "The Pragmatics of What Is Said", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A
Reader, pp. 106-107.
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not necessarily accurate, picture of the difference between stated and implicated
propositions. Any inferred proposition which represents either the analogue or the
opposite of what is said would be characterised, according to al-Juwaynl's
classification, as an implicated proposition. Any other proposition would, in contrast,
be seen as either an explicitly or implicitly stated meaning. Consider the following
examples where each utterance given an odd number implicates the utterance that
directly follows it. The group (A) of these examples is meant to illustrate congruent
implicature (mafhum al-muwafaqah), while the group (B) is designed to illustrate
counter implicature (mafhum al-mukhalafah).
(A)
(1) If you give him a single penny, he will not return it to you.
(2) If you give him two pence, he will, with stronger reason, not return them to
you.
(B)
(3) Those who passed the exam will be rewarded.
(4) Those who did not pass the exam will not be rewarded.
(5) If Zayd passes the exam, he will be rewarded.
(6) If Zayd does not pass the exam, he will not be rewarded.
(7) The lecture will continue until midday.
(8) The lecture will not continue after midday.
(9) Zayd has two children.
(10) Zayd has not three children.
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signification
signification of what is said signification of what is implicated
apparent unequivocal congruent implicature counter-implicature
apparent unequivocal
Figure (5.4) al-Juwaym's classification of signification
Since implicature, within the Gricean framework, covers all kinds of pragmatic
inferences that are not truth-conditional,1 a great number of implicatures in the Gricean
sense will, therefore, fall within the scope of 'what is said' in al-Juwayni's use of the
term (compare figure (5.4) with (5.5)).
Among implicatures that are not captured by al-Juwayni's use of 'implicature' are:
(I) - Conventional implicatures: those which, in contrast to conversational ones,
are inferred from particular expressions associated with them such as 'but',
'therefore', 'even' etc., without recourse to certain co-operative principles. The use of
'therefore' in the following example commits the speaker by virtue of its meaning "to
its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an
Englishman".2
(II) He is an Englishman, he is, therefore, brave.
In PF, the meanings of such expressions are commonly regarded as conventional
and discussed under the heading of ma'am 1-huruf (the meanings of particles).
ISee Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 127.
2Grice (1991), p. 307.
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However, there are some controversies concerning whether the implications derived
from utterances containing some articles are conventionally assigned to them or
derived from extra-linguistic considerations. For instance, there are some debates
concerning whether or not wa (and) can be interpreted as (and then), and other debates
concerning how many and what kind of interpretations can be given to 'aw (or).1
(II) - Particularised conversational implicatures: "cases in which an implicature is
carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the
context".2 In modern pragmatics, it is generally accepted that "all implicatures that
arise from the observing of Relevance are particularised, since utterances are relevant
only with respect to the particular topic or issue at hand".3 To take one of Grice's
examples for particularised implicature:
(12) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
According to Grice (who is regarded as the first to have developed a theory of
what he coined 'implicature'), "B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend
in New York".4 The type of implicature illustrated by the above example would
probably be called in PF and Arabic rhetoric ta 'rid (intimation) and subsumed under
what is implicitly said. Ta'rid, as defined by al-Sharlf al-Jurjani, is "that by means of
which the speaker implicitly makes his intention manifest to the hearer".5 A good
example of ta 'rid is (13) where B, blaming A for harming another Muslim, implicitly
indicates the falsehood of A's statement by citing a Prophetic saying:
^For an extended discussion of wa-conjunction, see al-'Amidl (1986), 1/96-102; Ibn
al-Hajib, 1/189-192, 'Adud, 1/189-192; al-Taftazanl, Hashiyah 'alaSharh al-'Adud,
1/190-192; al-Sharif al-jurjaru, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh ai-'Adud, 1/190-192. And for a
discussion of (the meanings of particles) in general, see al-'Amidi (1986), 1/94-105;
Taj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki, Main Jam ' al-Jawami", 1/335-365; al-MahalH,
1/335-365; al-Bannani, 1/335-365; al-Sharblni, 1/336-365.
2Grice (1975), p. 56.; Grice (1991), p. 314.
^Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 127.
4Grice (1991), p. 311.
^Al-Sharif al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 33 (al-ta'rid)', al-Tahanawi, 2/1287 (al-
Kinayah).
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(13) A: 'ana Muslim (I am a Muslim).
B: "al-Muslimu man salima 1-muslimun min lisanihi wa-yadih" (A Muslim is
that who causes no harm to other Muslims either by tongue or by hand).1
However, most, if not all, of what Grice calls 'generalised conversational
implicatures' are subsumable under the signification of 'what is understood' (dalalat
al-mafhum). Generalised implicatures arise from observing the maxims of co¬
operation, particularly the Maxim of Quantity.2 Grice illustrates his notion of
generalised conversational implicature by the following example where (14) normally
implicates (15):
(14) x is meeting a woman this evening.
(15) The woman is not his wife.3
Figure (5.5) Grice's classification of meaning.4
meaning
! ' I







Thus, the idea of implicature which al-Juwayni and many other Muslim thinkers
have in mind is much narrower than that of Grice.
^Al-Tahanawi, 1/216.
^See Peter Grundy, Doing Pragmatics (London: Edward Arnold, 1995), p. 45.
3See Grice (1975), p. 56.; Grice (1991), p. 314.
4See Grice (1975), pp. 43-58; Grice (1991), pp. 306-315; Jerrold M. Sadock, "On
Testing for Conversational Implicature", pp. 365-367; Stephen C. Levinson,
Pragmatics, p. 131, Peter Groundy, Doing Pragmatics, 48.
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5.3.2.2. Al-Ghazall's classification
Al-Ghazali distinguishes three types of meaning: 'composed meaning' (al-
manzum), 'implied meaning' (al-mafhum) and rationalised meaning (al-ma'qul).1 By
'composed meaning' al-Ghazali means 'the wad'-based meaning of the utterance', or
to use modern linguistic terms, 'the semantic content of the utterance'. This meaning
is derived, according to al-Ghazali, from the primordial wad' and the wording of the
text (al-slghah).2 'Rationalised meaning' can roughly be defined as an unstated
meaning arising from applying assertively or negatively the rule of the stated meaning
to it on an analogical basis by virtue of a valid common feature between the two
meanings.3 As has already been explained, while some legal theorists view
'congruent implicature' (or 'inferred meaning' in the Hasiafi model of classification)
as a kind of analogical reasoning (or 'rationalised meaning' according to al-Ghazali's
classification) , al-Ghazali and others are careful not to confuse them (cf. 5.3.1.3).
Congruent implicature, like any other implied meaning (mafhum), is engendered by
applying certain communication principles over and above the consideration of the
relevant contextual information. It is natural, therefore, that al-Ghazali does not place
'rationalised meaning'- which requires special knowledge of Islamic law and a great
deal of reflection much more than that usually needed for communicative purposes-
under implied meaning.
Obviously, al-Ghazali employs the term (mafhum) in a sense similar to Grice's
implicature, which is much broader than the standard sense of (mafhum) in PF. But
since al-Ghazali sometimes uses (mafhum) in its narrow sense, in order to avoid or at
least minimise terminological confusion, I will use 'implied meaning' for (mafhum) in
al-Ghazali's wide sense and 'implicated meaning' for (mafhum) in its standard





Figure (5.6) al-Ghazali's classification of signification
meaning
I" 1 '
composed meaning implied meaning rationalised meaning
(what is said) .
I ' I I I
required meaning alluded meaning indicated meaning implicated meaning
,
congruent implicature counter-implicature
Required meaning (iqtida') and alluded meaning ('isharah) have already been
dealt with in the discussion of the Hanafl model of classification (cf. 5.3.1.4 and
5.3.1.2), and there is nothing of importance that can be added to what was spelt out
there. Implicated meaning, on the other hand, will be considered in the section
devoted to the types of implicature (cf. 5.3.3.1). As for indicated meaning ('Ima'), it
will be dealt with within the discussion of al-'Amidi's classification as his in-depth
elaboration of this type of meaning will be crucial to our discussion (cf. 5.3.2.3).
5.3.2.3. Al-'Amidi's classification
Echoing al-Ghazall, al-'Amidl divides signification into two types: composed
(dalalat al-manzum) and non-composed (dalalat ghayr al-manzum). Composed
signification comes in two varieties: 'equivalence-signification' (dalalat mutabaqah),
and 'incorporational signification' (dalalat tadammun) (cf. 5.2.1.1). Non-
composed signification could be unintended or intended. Under the former category,
al-'Amidi places only one class of signification, namely 'alluded signification' (dalalat
al-'isharah). Under the latter, he subsumes three different classes: required
signification (dalalat al-iqtida'), indicated signification (dalalat al-tanblh wa-1-
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'ima') and implicated signification (dalalat al-mafhum).1 Al-'Amidi draws the
distinction between the last three classes of signification as follows:
"If [the signified] is integral to what the speaker is intending to get
across, then either it is such that the truthfulness of the speaker and the
correctness of his speech depend on it, in which case it is called [...]
dalalat al-iqtida' or it is not. If the latter, then either the implication
arises directly from the explicit meaning of the text, in which case it is
called dalalat al-tajiblh wa-l-'ima', or it does not arise directly from the
explicit meaning, in which case it is called dalalat al-mafhum " 2
As we have learnt from the above quotation, indicated signification is to be
contrasted to implicated signification, which means that a large number of implicatures
which do not represent the analogue or the opposite of what is said will be
characterised as indicated significations. But, as we will shortly explain, the
implications derived by 'Ima' are, practically speaking, exclusively limited to a
particular class of meaning. So, al-'Amidl's classification does not exhaust all the
kind of implicature linguistic utterances can bear.
















^Weiss, the Search, p. 482; al-'Amidl (1986), 3/71.
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Indicated signification is regarded as one of the valid methods for determining 'the
cause' (al-'illah), which is specifically pertinent to the formulation of the law on the
basis of analogy. Among the other methods is the explicit signification of the text,
where the legislator either explicitly states that the cause behind a particular rule is
such-and-such, or uses one of the particles 'establishmentally' designed to indicate the
cause (hvruf al-ta'lil), such as li (for the reason) in the following Qur'amcexample:
(1) "wa-ma khalaqtu l-jinna wa-l-'insa 'ilia li-ya'budun" (I have created
jinns and men only for the reason that they may worship Me).1
Clearly, the distinction made here between explicit and indicated signification is
based on the distinction between composed and non-composed signification: while
explicit signification pertains to composed signification, indicated signification relates
to non-composed signification. Theoretically speaking, implicated causes are not the
only implications that can be derived from indicated signification, but since the
ascertaining of the cause is of paramount importance in PF- because it is essential for
juridical analogy (qiyas), by means of which a large number of legal rules are
derivable- the legal theorists are fully preoccupied by it and pay no attention to other
meanings that may be derived in the same manner.
According to the legal theorists, indicated meaning arises from implicitly
connecting a particular rule with a particular quality in a way suggesting the
involvement of a causal relationship, or as Ibn al-Hajib puts it, "in such a manner that
the assumption of the involvement of any relationship other than causation (al-ta'lil)
as the purpose behind this association seems to be farfetched".2 One of the many
examples provided by al-'Amidi, for this type of meaning is the following:
(2) "saba rasulu Allahi (salla Allahu 'alayhi wa-sallam) fi 1-salati fa-
sajad" (The Prophet neglected [to perform an integral part of the
prayer] in his prayer and so he prostrated).
1 THE HOLY QUR 'AN, 51/56, see Ali's Translation, 51/56.
^See Ibn al-Haiib, 2/171, 'Adud, 2/172, al-Taftazanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
2/172.
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The Arabic conjunction fa, which is usually interpreted as (and so), implies in the
above example that the prostration took place after, and as a result of, the Prophet's
unintentional omission of some parts of the prayer. Similar examples are
(3) "wa-l-sariqu wa-l-sariqatu fa-qta'u 'aydiyahuma" (As for the thief,
male or female, [fa ] cut off their hands).1
(4) The Prophet's saying, "man 'ahya 'ardan mayyitatan fa-hiya lah"
"Whoever revives dead land, [fa] it is his."2
According to al-'Amidl, indicated signification is implicated by the 'established
meaning' of the expression, rather than being 'establishmentally signified' by the
expression. Accordingly, the causal relationship derived from fa, which
conventionally indicates the involvement of temporal succession in examples of the
above kind is not due to its being conventionally assigned to it but because it is
implicationally associated with it. it seems to me that what we are dealing with here is
a kind of what Grice calls 'conventional implicature' which has been outlined above
(cf. 5.3.2.1). However, some of al-'Amidl's examples, because they are cancellable,
do not lend themselves to Grice's conventional implicature. In fact, they are probably
allied to conversational implicatures. Consider the following:
(5) A Bedouin who came to the Prophet said,
(a) I am doomed and have caused another to be doomed.
The Prophet said,
(b) What have you done?
He said,
(c) I had sexual intercourse with my wife intentionally, in the daytime
during Ramadan.
The Prophet said,
(d) Free a slave.3
The indicated signification in (5) is that the cause behind the Bedouin being
required to free a slave is the fact that he had sexual intercourse. But in order for this
signification to obtain, one has to assume that (d) is relevant to (c). In other words,
1 THE HOLY QUR 'AN, 51A1, see Ali's Translation, 5/41.
^Weiss, the Search, p. 600; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/279.
-^Weiss, the Search, p. 601; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/280.
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the derivation of this signification is based on our knowledge that the Prophet's
delivery of the rule was a response to the Bedouin's enquiry. So, in a situation in
which a slave says to his master:
(6) (a) Has the sun arisen?
and the master replies,
(b) Give me some water to drink.
the slave will not, according to al-'Amidl, take (b) as an answer to, or as being
stimulated by, (a). He will, rather, take it as a refusal to answer his question either
because of absence of mind or because of an opt out from the conversation. This
possibility is unlikely in the case of the Prophet for he, as prophet, is not usually
distracted and does not delay necessary information.1
The difference between (5) and (2)-(4) has to do with the degree of the
unequivocalness of the text: In al-'Amidi's view, the degree of probability attaching to
the indicated signification in each one of (2)-(4) in which the fa is actually used is
much greater than that attaching to the indicated signification in (5) where the fa is only
assumed.2 As a matter of fact, unlike that of (5), the indicated signification in each of
(2)-(4) is certain. This can be proven by 'the cancellability test' (cf. 5.3.3.1.2.2)
where the indicated signification in (5) in contrast to (2)-(4) can be cancelled. For
example, in a hypothetical situation similar to that of (5) the Bedouin could be
answered as follows:
(7) Free a slave, and remember it is not because you had sexual intercourse with your
wife that you were asked to free a slave, but because you were rather impolite in
your reporting of the incident.
The rest of al-'Amidi's examples seem to be best classified as presuppositions.
Consider the following Qur'anic verse,
(8) "Keep away from women
In their courses, and do not
iAl-'Amidi (1986), 3/280-281.




The indicated signification in (8) is that menstruation is the reason why women
cannot be approached. There is no conventional element in the verse to which this
signification can be assigned. So, this indicated signification is either conventionally
or conversationally implicated. It is unlikely that it is conventionally implicated in the
Gricean sense of the term, because the speakers of Arabic do not intuitively attach this
signification to this kind of structure, that is, they do not feel that the speaker who
says
(9) I fast until sunset.
commits himself to its being the case that the daytime is the reason behind his fasting
in the same way the person who says (10) commits himself "to its being the case that
his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman".
(10) He is an Englishman, he is, therefore, brave.
And since the indicated signification in (8) is derivable irrespective of the context,
it follows that it cannot be particularised conversational implicature. It is also unlikely
that this type of signification is subsumable under generalised conversational
implicature for the reason that it cannot be cancelled, that is, one cannot deny it
without causing contradiction. Thus, one cannot say (11) without committing
contradiction.
(11) Do not have sexual intercourse with your wife until she is clean, and the reason
has nothing to do with menstruation.
The reason why classifying this type of example as presupposition is the best way
to handle it relates to the fact that it survives negation, which is taken by most
pragmatists to be the most workable test for identifying presupposition. Thus, the
'Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 2/222.
231
negation of (12) affects its truth-conditional content, while the presupposition that
menstruation is the reason why women can/cannot be approached remains unaffected.
(12) He does not have sexual intercourse with his wife until she is clean.
To take two slightly different examples, (13) presupposes that anger is the cause
behind the disallowance of passing judgement, and (14) presupposes that their being
scholars is the cause behind their being honoured.
(13) The Prophet's saying, "A judge must not pass judgement when he is angry"
(14) The scholars should be honoured.
5.3.2.4. Ibn al-Hajib's classification
The essential difference between al-'Amidl's classification and Ibn al-Hajib's lies
in their different conceptions of what is said. At the practical level, Ibn al-Hajib,
unlike al-'Amidi, places most kinds of implied inferences- including alluded
signification, required signification, and indicated signification- under the signification
of 'what is said'. Following al-Juwayni, Ibn al-Hajib applies the term masituq (what
is said) in a very broad sense. According to his proposal of significational
classification, with the exception of congruent and counter implicatures, all inferences
drawn from linguistic utterances are either explicitly or implicitly stated. 'What is
explicitly said' is meant to refer to conventional meaning. This includes both
equivalence-signification and incorporational signification. By 'what is implicitly
said', Ibn al-Hajib refers to the kind of inference which is conveyed by implicational
signification. To put it Ibn al-Hajib's way, "that which is implied from the meaning to
which the expression is assigned"1 (i.e. the conventional meaning). However, since
implicational signification is a very obscure and confusing idea, saying that 'what is
llbn al-Hajib, 2/171, 'Adud, 2/171-172, al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
2/171.
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implicitly said' refers to what is signified by implication would not be a great help to
clarify the distinction between 'what is explicitly said' and 'what is implicitly said'. In
fact, it raises doubt about the accuracy of the distinction between 'what is implicitly
said' and 'what is implicated'. It is true that 'what is implicated' is employed
exclusively to inferred propositions which represent either the analogue or the opposite
of what is said, but what is the difference between what is implicated by way of
congruence or opposition and what is implicated by any other way? Al-Taftazani,
though he describes the distinction between 'what is implicitly said' and 'what is
implicated' as questionable (mahallu nazar), says that the difference lies in that in the
case of al-mafhum ('what is implicated' i.e. congruent implicature and counter
implicature), the illocutionary force (al-hukm) is assigned to an unmentioned object,
while in the case of 'what is implicitly said', "the illocutionary force, even if it is not
stated, constitutes one of the affairs and rules of the mentioned object" (fa-'inna 1-
hukm flhi wa-'in lam yudhkar wa-lam yuntaq bihi lakinnahu min 'ahwali 1-
madhkuri wa-'abkamih).1 I find it difficult to understand what he exactly means by
the affairs and rules of the mentioned object, but let us, nevertheless, take some
examples to see whether there is any real difference between 'what is implicitly said'
and 'what is implicated'.



















Figure (8) al-Ibn al-Hajib's classification of signification
(1) The Prophet's saying: "Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep".
The counter implicature here is that alms-tax is not due upon sheep that are not
free-grazing, that is, stall-fed sheep. The illocutionary force (al-hukm) in this
implicature, which is the exemption from alms-tax, is assigned to an unmentioned
object, that is, stall-fed sheep.
(2) If you give him a hundred pounds, he will return it to you.
This implicates that if you give him ten pounds, he will, with more reason, return
it to you. The unmentioned object in this congruent implicature is 'ten pounds' and
the illocutionary force is the implication that he will, with more reason, return to you.
(3) A- My car is out of petrol.
B- There is a garage round the corner.
According to Grice, "B would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he
thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he
implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open".1 This is one of Grice's
examples of implicature which is not viewed as an implicature in the Muslim legal
1 Grice (1991), p. 311.
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theorists' narrow sense of the term. The reason behind this, according to al-
Taftazani's account of the difference between 'what is implicitly said' and 'what is
implicated', has to do with the fact that the illocutionary force, which is here the
implication that the garage is open, even if not stated, constitutes one of the affairs and
rules of the mentioned object, namely the garage. One of the other relevant affairs
and rules of the garage could be that it has petrol to sell.
Thus, determining whether a given inference is implicitly stated or implicated
depends on whether the illocutionary force is assigned to a mentioned or unmentioned
object: in the former case the inference is regarded as implicitly stated, while in the
latter it is regarded as implicated. In the following sections I will examine the two
types of implicature, namely congruent implicature and counter implicature as well as
the subclasses of counter implicatures.
5.3.3. Implicature
There are three senses in which the term dalalat ai mafhum (implicature) is
applied in PF:
(i) a very broad sense: 'the signification of what is implied' versus 'the
signification of what is said';
(ii) a broad sense: 'the signification of what is implicated', which involves both
(and only) congruent implicature and counter implicature.
(iii) a narrow sense: where it refers exclusively to counter implicature.
From now on, we will use the term al-mafhum (implicature) in the sense (ii), but
during the discussion of the types of counter implicature, we will use it in the sense
(iii). So we will say, for example, the Implicature of a Condition, instead of the
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counter implicature of a condition. In doing so, we are, in fact, conforming to the
common practice in the PF.
5.3.3.1. Types of implicature
5.3.3.1.1. Congruent implicature
Congruent implicature (mafhvm al-muwafaqah) is the Shafi 'I equivalent of what
the Hanafls call 'inferred meaning' (cf. 5.3.1.3). Although the Shafi'Is' treatment of
this type of signification is similar for the most part to that of the Hanafls, the Shafi 'Is
still have something different to offer in terms of its definition, its relationship with
other types of meaning and its manifestations.
A good definition is that which is capable of pinpointing the distinctive features
which set the definiendum (the concept defined) apart from its partners involved in the
same classification scheme. And one of the relatively good definitions of 'congruent
implicature' is al-Juwaynl's definition, which is based on the following brief outline
of the notion made by Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'i.1 Rendering congruent
implicature as the strongest kind of analogy, al-Shafi'I says
The strongest kind [is the deduction] from an order of prohibition by
God or the Apostle involving a small quantity, which makes equally strong
or stronger an order of prohibition involving a great quantity, owing to the
[compelling] reason in the greater quantity. Similarly the commendation of
a small act of piety implies the presumably stronger commendation of a
greater act of piety; and similarly an order of permission involving a great
quantity would render permissible something involving a smaller quantity.2
Putting this rough outline into a definition form, al-Juwaynl sates that 'congruent
implicature' is "that which indicates that the rule of the unstated meaning is congruent
with the rule of the stated meaning with greater reason (ma yadullu 'ala 'anna 1-
^Muhammad b. Idris al Shafi'I, al-Risalah , ed. 'Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, pp.
512-517; al Shafi'I, Treatise, pp. 308-309.
^A1 Shafi'I, Treatise, p. 308.
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hukma ft 1-maskuti 'anhu muwafiqun li-l-hukmi ft 1-mantuqi bi-hi min jihati 1-
'awla)} The main point in this definition is that 'congruent implicature' rests on
equating the rule of the unstated meaning with the rule of the stated meaning. The
qualification "with greater reason" is designed to stress the assumption that the
common rule which the unstated and stated meaning share should be more appropriate
to the unstated than to the stated meaning. However, this assumption is not always
true, for there are some instances of 'congruent implicature' at least in one sense of
this term in which this assumption does not seem to be applicable. Consider the
following Qur'anic verse:
(1) Those who unjustly
Eat up the property
Of orphans, eat up
A Fire into their own
Bodies: they will soon
Be enduring a blazing fire!2
It seems sensible to infer from this verse that the destruction of the property of
orphans in any way is also forbidden, but there is no evidence that setting fire, for
example, to the property of orphans is more conducive to its destruction than eating it
up. This is an instance in which the common rule ('the destruction' in this example)
cannot be safely said to be more relevant to the unstated than to the stated meaning.
Some legal theorists term this type of meaning lahn al-khitab (the implicit meaning of
the discourse) distinguishing it from fahwa 1-khitab (the import of the discourse),
where the unstated meaning is stronger (or more relevant to the common rule) than the
stated meaning. Both lahn al-khitab and fahwa 1-khitab', according to this view, are
included under 'congruent implicature'.3 However, for others including al-'AmidI
lAl-Juwayni, 1/449.
2Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 4/10.
^Taj al-DIn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki, Matn Jam' al-Jawami', 1/240-241; al-Subkis,
al-'Ibhaj, 1/368-369; al-Mahalll, 1/240-242; al-Bannanl, 1/241-242; al-'Ansarl,
1/409.
^See al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/203.
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and Ibn al-Hajib, there is no way to subsume lahn al-khitab in the above sense1 under
'congruent implicature', since they make as a necessary condition for 'congruent
implicature' that the common rule must be more relevant to the unstated than to the
stated meaning.2 Thus, 'congruent implicature' in this narrow sense manifests itself
exclusively into two forms:
(i) 'hinting at the higher by means of the lower' (al-tanbih bi-l-'adna 'ala l-'a'la);
and
(ii) 'hinting at the lower by means of the higher' (al-tanbih bi-l-'a'la 'ala 1-
'adna)}
A very well-studied example of (i) is the following Qur'anic verse:
(2) Then shall anyone who
Has done an atom's weight
Of good, see it!
And anyone who
Has done an atom's weight
Of evil, shall see it.4
It is understood from this verse that those who have done greater than an atom's
weight of good or evil will a fortiori see it. Among the examples al-'AmidI provides
to illustrate this type of meaning are the following: if a master tells his slave "do not
give Zayd a grain", the slave would immediately understand that he is disallowed to
give what exceeds a grain. In like manner, it is understood "from the Prophet's
saying, "[Distribute] thread and needle," that one is to [distribute] baggage and money
' Some legal theorists employ lahn al-khitab to refer to 'congruent-implicature', (al-
'Amidi (1986), 3/74; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/172), others, on the other hand, use it as
synonymous with 'counter-implicature' (al-'Asnawi, 2/205).
^Al-'Amidl (1986), 3/77; see Weiss, the Search, p. 490; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud,
2/172-173, al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al- Adud, 2/173.
^Hallaq employs 'a minori ad. maius' for (i) and 'a maiori adminus' for (ii). See Wael
b Hallaq, "Non-analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyas", Arabica, 36 (1989),
286-306, p. 289; see also Weiss, the Search, p. 486.
4Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 99/7-8.
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and the like, and from his saying, "whoever steals the stick of a Muslim must return
it," that what exceeds a stick must also be returned".1
The form (ii) of congruent implicature, on the other hand, is commonly illustrated
by the following Qur'amc passage:
(3) Among the People of the Book
are some who, if entrusted
With a hoard of gold,
Will (readily) pay it back.2
The implicit meaning of this passage is that those who pay back a hoard of gold
will, with a yet stronger reason, pay back what is less than that.
The legal theorists maintain that in order for one to generate this type of meaning
in either of its two forms illustrated above, one has to go beyond the explicit meaning
of the text. This, as has already been pointed out (cf. 5.3.3.1.1), involves a scrutiny
of the relevant intended illocutionary import of the utterance (al-ma'na 1-munasib al-
maqsud mina 1-hukm), which is always looked upon as the effective cause which
promotes the attribution of the rule of the antecedent to the derivative. Thus, if one is
to infer that those who have done greater than an atom's weight of good or evil will
see it, one has to presume on the strength of the context that the illocutionary import at
which the verse is driving is the determination to reward the well-doer and punish the
evildoer. Similarly, the inference that those who pay back a hoard of gold will pay
back what is less than that rests on the assumption that the illocutionary import of the
utterance is the attribution of trustworthiness to some of the People of the Scripture.3
The point to be made here is that the illocutionary import is looked upon as one of
a set of premises which should be combined together to generate a congruent
implicature. The epistemological status of a congruent implicature is always
determined by each premise in the set. Accordingly, there is a correlation between the
IWeiss, the Search, p. 488; 'Amidi (1986), 3/76.
^Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 3/75.
^See 'Adud, 2/173.
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definiteness of the relevant intended illocutionary import of an utterance and the
determinacy of its congruent implicature: the more definite the illocutionary import,
the more determinate the congruent implicature will be. On the other hand, any doubt
raised about the illocutionary import will influence the congruent implicature. This
being the case, in order for one to be certain of the conclusion (derived from the above
verse concerning parents) that killing one's parents is forbidden, one has to be certain
of the following:
(i) the illocutionary import of "do not say 'Fie' to them" is 'do not harm them'
(contextual information);
(ii) killing one's parents causes harm to them (knowledge about the world).
With respect to this particular Qur'anic verse, the legal theorists seem to be in
agreement that both (i) and (ii) certainly hold and have no doubt, consequently, about
the determinacy of the inference that killing one's parents is forbidden. But, as al-
' AmidI remarks, there could be a situation in which a king commands his executioner
to kill his father if he knows for sure that his father is to fight him over his kingship.
And it is conceivable for the king in such a situation to ask his executioner not to say
'Fie' to his father while he is carrying out the order of the execution.1 As al-Ghazali
points out, the difference between situations of the type illustrated by the Qur'anic
verse and this situation lies in that in the latter case, the king might well say to the
executioner without contradicting himself; "do not say 'Fie' to my father, but kill
him".2 But in situations such as that of the Qur'anic verse, it is not possible to say
'do not say 'Fie' to your parents, but kill them" without logical contradiction. This
comparison between two different situations is designed to show:
lAl-'Amidl (1986), 3/75; see Weiss, the Search, p. 487.
2Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/190
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(a) that congruent implicature is not part of the explicit (or the stated) meaning of
the utterance but is derivable from the context.1
(b) that congruent implicature can be deterministic (qap'I) as is the case with the
last two Qur'anic examples quoted above, or probabilistic (zasini) as is the case with
the above hypothetical situation.2 Al-Juwaynl employs nass (unequivocal) and zahir
(apparent) instead of deterministic and probabilistic respectively.3 If the context
indicates that the congruent implicature is deterministic, the congruent implicature
cannot be cancelled, but if the context indicates that the congruent implicature is
probabilistic, the speaker will be able to deny it without creating a contradiction.4 Al-
Juwaynl reports that some scholars consider probabilistic congruent implicatures to be
invalid inference for formulating the law.5
5.3.3.1.2. Counter implicature
The notion of counter implicature (mafhvm al-mvkhalafah) is highly relevant to
what is called in contemporary pragmatics 'scalar implicature'. In fact, the two ideas
seem to be two faces of the same coin. Although the legal theorists' designation of the
notion appears to be more precise, the fact that we have two different designations
underlying different approaches is very advantageous since each designation
stimulates great insights into the subject. Hopefully, the insights developed by
Muslim legal theorists and their approach to the subject will contribute considerably to
the development of 'scalar implicature'. In particular, they may, at least, lead to
expanding the notion to cover all the types regarded by the legal theorists as types of
counter implicature.
Al-Juwayni, 1/451-452; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/190; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/75; see
also, al-Mahalli, 1/243-244; al-Bannani, 1/243-244; al-Sharblni, 1/244.





5.3.3.1.2.1. The pillars of counter implicature
Each instance of counter implicature consists of the following pillars:
(i) The mentioned case (al-madhkur) e.g. 'free-grazing sheep' in (1).
(1) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
(ii) The rule of the mentioned case (hukm al-madhkur) e.g. 'being taxable' in (1).
(iii) The qualification (al-qayd) which can be, for example, a condition, stated
number, time limit, etc., e.g. 'free-grazing' in (1).
(iv) The unmentioned case (ghayr al-madhkur) which represents the opposite of
the mentioned case, e.g. 'sheep that are not free-grazing' in (1).
(v) The rule of the unmentioned case (hukm ghayr al-madhkur) which represents
the opposite of the rule of the mentioned case, e.g. 'being not taxable' in (l).1
5.3.3.1.2.2. The validity of counter implicature
One of the issues which Muslim legal theorists concern themselves with is
whether or not counter implicature is a valid inference for the formulation of the law.
While the majority of the Shafi 'Is rely on at least some types of counter implicature in
their derivation of the rules from the Qur'anic and Hadlthic texts, most of the
Hanahis say that counter implicature is a weak source to rely on for the formulation of
the law, though it can be used as a valid inference in non-legal discourse. Within the
present section, I will discuss the most important arguments put forward by the two
parties to the controversy and will begin with the Hanafis' arguments against the
validity of counter implicature. It should be pointed out here that the following
1 See Fathi 1-Darini, al-Manahij al-'Usuliyyah fi 1-Ijtihad bi-l-Ra'y fl 1-Tashn' al-
'Islaml, p. 403.
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arguments are applicable to all kinds of counter implicature, other arguments which
concern certain types of counter implicature will be dealt with later when we discuss
the types of counter implicature.
(I) There are three basic recognisable types of signification only, namely
equivalence-signification, incorporational signification and implicational signification;
each textual inference can be traced back to one of these types, but counter implicature
does not fit in in any of the above three types of signification. Clearly, counter
implicature cannot belong to the first two types since it represents the opposite, rather
than the equivalent, or the partial, meaning of what is said. Furthermore, counter
implicature cannot be regarded as implicational signification, for it is a necessary
condition for a proposition to be regarded as an instance of implicational signification,
to occur immediately to the mind once the expression is produced" (li-'aiwa shartahu
sabqu 1-dhihni mina 1-musamma 'ilayh), but in the case of 'alms-tax is due upon
free-grazing sheep' "the hearer may conceive the obligation of paying alms-tax for
free-grazing sheep, while failing to conceive the rule of stall-fed sheep in any negative
or assertive way, in fact, he may not think of stall-fed sheep at all".1
Flowever, some of the Shafi'is, notably Ibn al-Hajib, seem to view counter
implicature as a distinct kind of inference not pertaining to any of the three basic
recognisable types of signification just mentioned;2 others, on the other hand, state
clearly that counter implicature belongs under implicational signification.3 Among the
arguments advanced to prove that counter implicature is of implicational type are:
a) The attribution of the rule to a qualified, rather than an unqualified, object
implies a correlation between the rule and the qualification. So, it is reasonable that
the absence of the qualification implies the negation of the rule. This argument is
^Al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/375-376; al-'Asnawi, 2/215; see al-'Ansari, 1/417.
^Ibn al-Haiib, 2/171, 'Adud, 2/171-172, al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
2/171.
\See, e.g., al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 56; al-'Asnawi, 2/215.
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refuted on the grounds that the correlation between the rule and the qualification is not
determinate since there could be other justifications for the qualification.1 For
example, there could be a situation in which (2) comes as an answer to (1).
(1) Is alms-tax due upon free-grazing sheep?
(2) Yes, alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
(3) Alms-tax is not due upon sheep which are not free-grazing
Thus, (2) does not implicate (3), for the qualification 'free-grazing' is not made
for the exclusion of stall-fed sheep, but because it was the subject of the question
made in (1). However, the Shafi'is do not deny that the validity of counter
implicature is constrained by certain conditions which will be dealt with later, and that
the above example is nothing but an instance of invalid counter implicatures which are
constrained by these conditions.
b) Implication is that which the mind switches to and is understood by means of
calculation, irrespective of whether it is mental (cihihnl) or conventional ('vrfi). In
this extended sense of implication, counter implicature, which is conventional, can be
covered by the term.2 'Conventional' should be understood here in its very broad
sense such that it covers all kinds of non-logical inferences.
(II) The non-existence of the rule in the unmentioned is not derived from the
attribution of the rule to the mentioned; it is rather due to the maintenance of the status
quo before the statement is made.3 This amounts to saying that the rule of the
unmentioned is not affected in any way by the rule of the mentioned. So determining
whether alms-tax is due or not due upon sheep which are not free-grazing rests upon
the addressee's knowledge of the rule before the statement is made and the saying of
what is said does not alter this knowledge. Should the addressee have no previous
knowledge about the rule, he will, according to this view, presume the primordial
ISee al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/376; al-'AsnawI, 2/215-216.
^See al-'Ansari, 1/417.
^See al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/208-209; al-Mahalli, 1/255; Ibn al-Malik, p 552.
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non-existence (al-'aciam al-'asli). To back up this argument, al-'Amidl points out
that if a master says (4) to his servant, it would not be reasonable for the servant to
buy a non-black slave.1
(4) Do not buy for me a black slave.
Similarly, (5), according to this view, does not implicate (6)', for "the assertive
rule does not follow from the primordial non-existence" (al-hukm al-thubuti la
yumkin 'an yathbut bina'an 'ala l-'adam al-'asli)1
(5) Alms-tax is not due upon stall-fed camels.
(6) Alms-tax is due upon camels which are not stall-fed camels.
(Ill) If the attribution of the rule to the mentioned implicated its negation with
respect to the unmentioned, making any statement indicating the attribution of the rule
of the mentioned to the unmentioned after attributing it to the mentioned would be a
contradiction, but since this is false, the attribution of the rule to the mentioned does
not implicate its negation with respect to the unmentioned.3 In other words, if (i) (i.e.
saying that p implicated that not-q ) was true, then (ii) (i.e. explicating that q after
saying that p would be a contradiction) would be true, but since (ii) is false, then (i) is
false. To give examples, if (7) implicated (8), (9) would be a contradiction to (7).
Equally, if (10) implicated (11), (12) would be a contradiction to (10).4
(7) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
(8) Alms-tax is not due upon sheep which are not free-grazing
(9) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep and sheep which are not free-grazing.
(10) Pay alms-tax for free-grazing sheep.
(11) You do not have to pay for sheep which are not free-grazing.
ISee al-'Amidl (1986), 3/85.
^See Sadr al-Shari'ah, 2/35.
^See al-Shirazi, al-Tabsirah; p. 223; al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/437; Ibn al-Hajib,
2/179, 'Adud, 2/179-180, al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/179-180.
4See al-'Amidl (1986), 3/91-92; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/179; 4Adud, 2/179-180; al-Taftazani,
Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/179-180; al-'Ansarl, 1/416.
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(12) Pay alms-tax for free-grazing sheep. Pay alms-tax for sheep which are not
free-grazing.
This argument is refuted on the grounds that (i) does not necessarily produce (ii),
for counter implicature, as any other apparent proposition (zahir), is so weak that it
can be cancelled without contradiction. It is a property of probabilistic signifiers that
they are cancelled without committing contradiction when they are in conflict with
deterministic or more probabilistic ones.1 In contrast, deterministic propositions
cannot be cancelled without contradiction. So, (14), to take al-Basri's examples,
contradicts (15).
(13) I have beaten Zayd now in this place.
(14) I have not beaten Zayd now in this place.2
According to al-Juwaynl, "counter implicature is not self-dependent and not part
of the discourse (al-khitab) itself, but an implication from the expression, so if it is
cancelled for some reason, the expression and its other implications will not be
affected".3 If, by contrast, the signification of what is said is cancelled, the
implicature derived from it will consequently be cancelled.4
In modern pragmatics, Grice and his followers take cancellability as one of the
defining properties of conversational implicatures. For some Muslim legal theorists,
this is implausible since not only implicatures but all kinds of 'apparent propositions'
(zawahir) (cf. 4.9.1) are cancellable.5 As has already been pointed out,
presupposing a given interpretation to be apparent has a practical importance in the PF,
for apparent meanings are taken to be the intended meanings unless they are cancelled
by verbal or non-verbal contexts. In the case of 'what is said', it is very often to take
ISee al-Shirazi, al-Tabsirah; p. 223; al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/437-438, al-
'Amidi (1986), 3/92; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/179, 'Adud, 2/180, al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala
Sharh al-'Adud, 2/180; al-'Ansari, 1/416.
^See al-Basri, 1/155-156.
^Al-Juwayni, 1/473-474.
^See al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/442.
^See, e.g., ibid., 1/438; al-Juwaynl, 1/473.
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one interpretation of an indeterminate utterance to be its apparent meaning. The
immediacy test, which is highly intuitive, is commonly recognised as a practical
method to check whether or not a given meaning is the apparent meaning of the
utterance. According to this test, any interpretation which strikes the mind first will be
regarded as the apparent meaning of the utterance. In the case of 'what is implicated',
the implicature is taken to be apparent and intended meaning unless there is evidence to
the contrary, which causes the implicature to be cancelled.
Another way of attacking the above argument is to say with Ibn Taymiyyah, that
"it is not reasonable to consider a speaker's utterance before he is completely silent or
a writer's work before he completely finishes".1 Following his strict contextual
approach, and emphasising his pragmatic dictum that "an expression can be regarded
as a signifier if and only if it is complete and disconnected from what follows it"2 (wa-
quti'a 'an-ma ba'dah), Ibn Taymiyyah argues that a part of an utterance (like 'alms-
tax is due upon free-grazing sheep' in (9)) cannot be taken to be meaningful without
its complementary clause (like 'and sheep which are not free-grazing'). So in cases
like (9), it would be wrong to say that a part of an utterance contradicts another.3
(IV) It is typically appropriate for the hearer to ask the speaker about the rule of
the unmentioned after hearing the rule of the mentioned. If counter implicature was a
valid inference, enquiring about the rule of the unmentioned would not be
appropriate.4 To take al-Ghazali's examples, if (15) implicated (16) why would it be
appropriate for the hearer of (15) to say (17)?5
(15) If Zayd hits you intentionally, hit him back.
(16) If Zayd hits you unintentionally, do not hit him back.
(17) But if he hits me unintentionally, shall I hit him back?
llbn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 31/114.
2Ibid„ 31/140.
3See ibid., 31/113-114, 117-118, 140; see also al-'Amidi (1986), 3/91.
^Al-Shirazi, al-Tabsicah; p. 225; al-Shlrazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/438.
^See al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/192-193.
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In response to this argument the advocates of counter implicature raise several
objections, of which I shall mention only two:
a) The reason why the enquiry in cases like (17) is appropriate relates to the fact
that implicatures are probabilistic rather than deterministic.1 So, it is similarly
appropriate for the hearer of (18) to say (19) although the answer to his enquiry is
explicitly said in (18), which means that the appropriateness of enquiry (husn al-
istifham) in (17) is not due to the invalidity of counter implicature, but rather to its
indeterminacy.
(18) I saw the sultan entering the town.
(19) Did you see the sultan himself or only his procession.2
b) Enquiry could be motivated by the search for new information or for seeking
assurance for uncertain information already obtained by the enquirer;3 (17) is one of
the latter kind.
(IV) It is possible to say
(20) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep, but not upon stall-fed sheep.
If (7) implicated (20), the clause 'but not upon stall-fed sheep' would be
redundant.
One of the objections raised to this argument is that the validity of counter
implicature does not conflict with the wad' of a special expression to express the same
meaning, since wad'-based expressions are more informative and more appropriate
for conveying communicative intentions.4 Another objection is that the
appropriateness of reinforcement (husn al-ta'kld) is not confined exclusively to
implicatures, but can equally be applied to the signification of 'what is said'. Consider
ISee al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/438-439; al-'Amidl (1986), 3/90.
^See al-'Amidl (1986), 3/90.
^See al-Basri, 1/216-217; see also, al-'Amidi (1986), 3/90.
4See al-'Amidi (1986), 3/92-93.
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(21) where the word 'himself' is designed to confirm that Zayd, rather than anybody
else, has come,1 and (22) where the same word adds force to the word 'manager'.
(21) Zayd himself has come.
(22) I need to speak to the manager himself.
The notion of the appropriateness of reinforcement is similar to that of
'reinforceability' proposed by Sadock as an additional test, not mentioned by Grice,
for identifying conversational implicatures. According to Sadock,
Since conversational implicatures are not part of the conversational
import of the utterances, it should be possible to make them explicit without
being guilty of redundancy. Conversational implicatures, that is, ought to
be reinforceable, whereas conventional implicatures should not. In the
clear cases, this test accords well with intuition. Thus, the second clause of
It's odd that dogs eat cheese and they do is redundant because it restates
what is conventionally implicated by the first clause. But no redundancy
shows up when a clearly conversational implicature is made explicit, as in
Maggie ate some, but not all, of the cheddar.2
Coinciding with the Muslim legal theorists view, Sadock points out that
reinforceability, like cancellability, does not "distinguish conversational additions from
privative ambiguities".3
The advocates of counter implicature, on the other hand, advance a number of
arguments to support their view, among which are the following:
(i) Speakers commonly infer (24) from (23) and (26) from (25).4
(23) Buy a small house for me
(24) Do not buy a big one.
^See al-Basri, 1/218-219. It should be pointed out here that al-Basri did not raise this
objection to the above particular argument but to a similar one, but is quoted here
because it is equally applicable.
^Jerrold M. Sadock, "On Testing for Conversational Implicature", in Steven Davis, p.
374; see Ellen L.Barton, Nonsentential Constituents: A Theory of Grammatical
Structure and Pragmatic Interpretation, p. 148.
^Jerrold M. Sadock, "On Testing for Conversational Implicature", in Steven Davis, p.
374.
^For this argument and similar examples, see al-ShirazI, al-Tabsirah; p. 222; al-
Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/432-433; al-Juwaynl, 1/461-462; al-Ghazali, al-
Mustasfa, 2/199; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/84-85.
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(25) If you enter the house, you will be divorced.
(26) If you do not enter the house, you will not be divorced.
As was explained in (II), the opponents of counter implicature reject that (24) and
(26) are associated with the saying of (23) and (25) respectively, arguing that they had
already been held before (23) and (25) were said since speakers, by virtue of the
principle of istishab, presume a past state to remain until a diverting indicator
emerges.1
(ii) It would be very odd or/and funny to say (27), (29) or (31) when all people
equally have the same properties attributed to the Sudanese in (27), the Jews in (29)
and the tall in (31). If (27), (29) and (31) did not implicate (28), (30) and (32)
respectively, why is this so?
(27) When the Sudanese feel thirsty, they will not be sated until they drink.2
(28) When other people feel thirsty, they will be sated without having drink.
(29) Dead Jews cannot see.3
(30) Other dead people can see.
(31) Tall men cannot fly.4
(32) Short men can fly.
In response to this argument al-Ghazall says that the oddness of utterances like
(29) is not due to singling out a particular person or group, but to staying a very self-
evident fact. Thus, it would be similarly odd to say utterances like (33).5
(33) The dead cannot see.
ISee al-Juwaynl, 1/462; al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/199; al-'Amidl (1986), 3/85.
^See al-Juwayni, 1/463.
^See al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/211; al-Subkls, al-'Ibhaj, 1/374.
4-Sadr al-Sharl'ah, 2/31; al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/31.
5See al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/211-212.
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Clearly, al-Ghazali's response to the above argument is defective, for the oddness
of (29), in contrast to that of (33), is certainly not fundamentally due to its being self-
evident, but because it gives rise to a false implicature (30).
(iii) The saying of (34) would annoy the Hanafls. Were it not for that the
Hanafls infer (35) from (34), they would not be annoyed.
(34) The Shafi '/jurists are righteous.
(35) The HanafI jurists are not righteous.
The opponents of counter implicature admit that the Hanafls may be annoyed at
(34), but they say that the annoyance is not because that (34) gives rise to (35), but
because the saying of (34) leaves the hearer wondering whether the HanafI jurists are
also righteous or not.1 But the question that should be raised here is why is it that the
hearer wonders whether the HanafI jurists are also righteous or not? Is it not because
that (34) is one possible implication of (35) regardless of its degree of probability? In
any case, nobody claims that counter implicature is deterministic.2 In fact, it is
generally accepted that the derivation of a counter implicature is probabilistic rather
than deterministic.3 And this is the only reason why cancellability, the
appropriateness of reinforcement and the appropriateness of enquiry are taken to be its
defining properties.4
(iv) Since speakers are assumed to be rational and their contributions are taken to
be informative, and since a rational speaker must have a reason for connecting a rule
with a particular attribute, in saying (Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep) the
speaker, therefore, must have some purpose for qualifying 'sheep' by mentioning the
ISee Ibn al-Hajib, 2/176, 'Adud, 2/177; al-Marjanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-Tawdlh
'ala l-Tanqlh, 2/2213; Muhibb Allah, 1/420; al-'Ansari, 1/420.
^Al-Ruhawl, p. 564.
^See, e.g., al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Lvma', 1/438; al-Juwayni, 1/473; 'Adud, 2/180; al-
Taftazanl, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/182; Muhibb Allah, 1/416; al-'Ansari,
1/416.
4See al-'Amidi (1986), 3/90-91.
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attribute 'free-grazing', instead of using 'sheep' in an unqualified way. The purpose
can only be that he intends to exclude sheep that are not free-grazing.1
The problem with this line of reasoning, say the opponents of counter implicature,
is that it could be applied to counter implicature derived from a designation (mafhum
al-laqab),2 which is rejected by the vast majority of the legal theorists, although it is
believed by a small minority to be the weakest type of counter implicature. According
to the advocates of this type of counter implicature, (36) implicates (37), (38) etc.
(36) Alms-tax is due upon sheep
(37) Alms-tax is not due upon cattle
(38) Alms-tax is not due upon camels.
Al-Shirazi responds to the above rejection by distinguishing between counter
implicature derived from a designation and counter implicature derived from a
restrictive attribute. He mentions three differences between them, but only one is
important here. In the case of counter implicature derived from a designation, the
speaker does not 'descend' from a general concept to a specific one (lam yanzil 'an
ismin 'ammin 'ila ismin khas), while in the case of counter implicature derived from
a restrictive attribute he does. So, unlike the latter case, there is no intention of
'indicating contrast' (al-mukhalafah) involved in the former.3 However, if there is
contextual evidence indicating a departure from a general concept to a specific one,
counter implicature will be irresistible no matter whether the implicature-bearing
expression is a name or otherwise. Thus, according to al-Shlrazi's account, in (39)
the Prophet was in a position to say (41) but he departed from it to (39) in order to
implicate (40), though the implicature-bearing expression is a name.4
ISee al-Basn, 1/158; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/85-86, Weiss, the Search, p. 497; 'Adud,
2/175; al-Sharblni, 1/249; Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 31/182.
^See al-Baji, 2/449; al-Juwaynl, 1/463; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/200-201; al-
Taftazanl, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/31-32.
^See al-Shlrazi, Sharh al-Luma', 1/436; al-Shirazi, al-Tabsirah; pp. 222-223.
^See al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma\ 1/436.
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(39) All land has been ordained for us to be a place for prayers and its sand as a
substitute cultic purifier (wa-ju'ilat lana l-'ardu masjidan wa-turabuha lana
tahura).
(40) Not all the land (but only its sand) has been ordained for us to be a substitute
cultic purifier.
(41) The land has been ordained for us to be a place for prayers and a substitute
cultic purifier.
5.3.3.1.2.3. The bases for counter implicature
The ultimate conclusion that a hearer seeks when he is involved in the process of
working out a counter implicature is to see whether or not the propositional converse
of the speaker's utterance is an integral part of his message. In this section, we will
examine how this type of inference has been generated and the assumptions on which
it is based. A large portion of the discussion to be introduced here can be looked upon
as a continuation of the arguments for the validity of counter implicature outlined in the
preceding section.
Before proceeding, it is important to point out that counter implicature is not,
strictly speaking, a logical inference. It is rather a communicative (or conversational)
implicature (mafhum khitabi)1 constrained by, and based on, 'the principles of
communication' (qanun al-khitabiyyat) rather than 'the principles of demonstration'
(qanun al-istidlal), to use al-Taftazani's terms.2 It might be helpful at this point to
say that modern pragmatists do share the Muslim legal theorists' view that implicatures
are not logical inferences.3 The difference between conversational implicatures and
demonstrative deductions are drawn in the following manner: communicative
iAl-Sharblni, 1/257.
^Al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/183.
^See, e.g., Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles of Pragmatics, p. 85; Jacob L. Mey,
Pragmatics: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackweel, 1993), 102.
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implicatures are informal inferences which derive from specific communicative
assumptions shared by the participants, while demonstrative deductions are formal
inferences obtained by applying logical rules to given premises. Considering how the
actual examples of counter implicature are accounted for and the way scalar-
implicature, which, I assume, is the closest modern notion to counter implicatures, is
treated, the Maxim of Quantity, among Grice's co-operative maxims, seems to play
the essential role in generating counter implicatures. In PF, this generally seems to be
true to a considerable extent. However, other principles, such as the Principle of
Relevance and the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention
Manifest are also important. Furthermore, different scholars, as we shall see, place
emphasis on different principles.
(i) The Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest and
the Principle of Tmal.
The speaker is rational and has interest in making his intention manifest (the
Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest),1 so the hearer
will take the utterance to be as informative as possible (the Principle of 'I'm a/),
assuming that 'increasing the information import' (takthir al-fa'idah) is consistent
with the very essence of communication and the intentions of rational
communicators.2 Furthermore, the hearer will take any qualification made by the
speaker to be operative, since ignoring it will amount to the assumption that the
speaker's qualification is based on a random choice (tarjlhan min ghayri murajjih),3
which means that the speaker behaves arbitrarily. The 'i'mal of ('making sense of)
the expression in this case, the argument continues, can be made only if the hearer
1 See al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/200; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/85. For the involvement of
the Principle of the Speaker's Making of his Intention Manifest in such inferences, see
also Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa, 1/135, 138.
^See Ibn al-Hajib, 2/174, 176, 'Adud, 2/175-176; al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih,
2/31-32.
^See al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/31-32.
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takes counter implicature to obtain, since it is the sole communicative import (al-
fa'idah) derived from the qualification.1
At this point, we should say something about the notion of fa'idah in PF, which
can roughly be translated as (communicative import). According to this notion, which
is motivated by the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention
Manifest and the Principle of 'I'mal, any utterance in the actual communicative
situation involves a communicative import ( e.g. assertion, negation, questioning,
congruent implicature, counter implicature). Communicative imports vary in terms of
their importance. Assertion and negation, for example, are said to be essential
communicative imports to any declarative sentence, while al-mukhalafah (contrasting
or, technically speaking, counter implicature) is the weakest communicative import.
So, when there is a conflict between a counter implicature and another communicative
import, preference must be given to the other communicative import.2
However, grammatical construction is not the only way by means of which a
communicative import is imparted; there are also pragmatic ways such as
- The departure (al-'udul) from a common construction or grammatical order,
where the addressee understands from the addresser's transgression of the common
order, for example, a particular implicature.3
- Setting a context (nasb qarinah).
- Silence (sukut al-mutakallim), where the relevant silence of the speaker during
the conversation is treated by some scholars as an informative process and is,
consequently, given a certain communicative function, (cf. 4.7)
'See al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/200-201; 'Adud, 2/175; al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-
Talwlh, 2/31-32; al-Subkls, al-'Ibhaj, 1/375.
^See Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173; 'Adud, 2/174; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 174; al-Taftazani,
Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/ 28, 33-35; al-Mahalli, 1/246-247; al-'Ansarl, 1/414.
3See al-Sharbini, 1/257.
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It should be noted, however, that the term fa'idah is occasionally employed,
especially in the discussion of counter implicature, in an extended sense where it refers
to the purpose or the motive behind the speaker's qualification. In this extended sense
of fa'idah, extra-linguistic purposes and motives such as fear of the consequences of
the use of an unqualified statement are captured by this term.1
(ii) The Principle of Quantity.
It is a general principle that speakers are taken to speak as much as is required.
Consequently, it is normally wise to take all the speaker's words to be meaningful.2
Thus, when someone says (1), he usually means (2), for if the rule of free-grazing
camels was the same as that of camels which are not free-grazing, the speaker would
be taken to be talking too much with a little meaning, or to use Ibn Taymiyyah's terms
"he would be taken to lengthen the form and reduce the content" (la-kana qad
tawwala 1-lafza wa-naqqasa 1-ma'na)?
(1) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing camels.
(2) Alms-tax is not due upon camels which are not free-grazing.
Similarly, in utterances like (3), it is self-evident, says Ibn Taymiyyah, that the
rule would be taken to be applicable exclusively to Muslims. In contrast, in the
Prophet's saying (4), and if somebody initially says (5), counter implicature is
perhaps invalid, for the speaker, in singling out Muslims rather than others, is taken to
comply with the common practice by virtue of which people talk about Muslims rather
than others owing to the fact that they live in a Muslim community.4 This and similar
constraints on counter implicature will be discussed later.
(3) People are of two kinds: Muslims and unbelievers, as for Muslims you have to
be very kind to them.
ISee Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud, 2/174; al-Mahalli, 1/245; al-Bannanl, 1/245.




(4) "Unlawful to a Muslim is every thing belonging to another Muslim: his blood,
his property and his honour".
(5) You must be kind to Muslims.
Taking a similar position, Grice holds that implicatures attaching utterances like
(3) are derived as a result of a flouting of the first Maxim of Quantity: "Make your
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange)".1
His typical example of this kind of implicature is the following:
[6] A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a
philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: 'Dear Sir, Mr. X's
command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been
regular. Yours, etc.' (Gloss: A cannot be opting out, since if he wished to
be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot be unable, through
ignorance, to say more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that
more information than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be wishing to
impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is
tenable only if he thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, what
he is implicating.).2
Since first introduced by Grice, the Maxim of Quantity has been revised. I shall
be introducing Harnish's revised version and Gazdar's account of this maxim in order
to cast light on its role in generating counter implicatures. Combining it with the
Maxim of Quality "(Have evidence of what you say)" and the Maxim of Relevance
"(Be relevant)", Harnish proposes what he calls 'the Maxim of Quantity-Quality:
"Make the strongest relevant claim justifiable by your evidence".3 In a more
straightforward account, Gazdar states that
anyone uttering an a-sentence who was in a position to utter a d-sentence
would be being less informative than he could be since the d-sentence
makes a stronger claim about the world than the a-sentence. Thus, if the
speaker is being cooperative and observing the Maxim of Quantity, it
follows that in uttering a he is implicating the negation of d. The negation
of d is simply b, so b is an implicature of the utterance of a.4
iGrice (1975), p. 45.; Grice (1991), p. 308.
2Grice (1975), p. 52.; Grice (1991), p. 311.
^Robert M. Harnish, "Logical Form and Implicature", in Steven Davis (ed.),
Pragmatics: A Reader, p. 340.
^Gerald Gazdar, Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form, (New
York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 51.
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As Leech points out, "'strength' here refers to the amount of information
communicated [...]: 'If P entails Q and Q does not entail P, then P is stronger than
Q".1 To put it the legal theorists' way, the general is stronger than the specific. Thus,
descending (nuzul) or switching (intiqal), as al-Shlrazi subtly formulates it, from a
general concept to a specific one ('an ismin 'ammin 'ila ismin khas), would be the
basis for generating this kind of implicatures.2 In other words, if the speaker
descends from a general proposition to a specific one, he will be taken to implicate the
negation of the general proposition. Leech provides the formulation of this rule this
way: "THE WEAKER PROPOSITION IMPLICATES THAT S BELIEVES THE NEGATIVE OF
THE STRONGER PROPOSITION".3 So, (7) implicates (8).
(7) Jill ate some of the biscuits.
(8) Jill did not eat all the biscuits.
(9) Jill ate all the biscuits.
Leech explains how implicatures like (8) are generated in the following formula:
(a) s has uttered a weaker proposition Q [(7)] where 5 could just as
easily and relevantly have uttered a stronger proposition P [(9)].
(b) By the Maxim of Quantity-Quality, this, in the absence of contrary
information, means that the evidence s has does not justify the assertion of
P [(9)], but does justify the assertion of Q [(7)].
(c) This leads to the implicature that 5 believes P [(9)] to be false, i.e.: s
believes that not-P [(8)].4
(iii) The Principle of Relevance.
Among Muslim legal theorists, al-Juwaynl holds that relevance (al-munasabah) is
essential to generate a valid counter implicature. By relevance al-Juwayni means the
connection between the rule and the mentioned case. According to him, the reason
why counter implicature is obtainable in (10) has to do with the fact that the property
of being free-grazing is a relevant cause to being taxable since free-grazing sheep are
^Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics, p. 85.
2See al-ShirazI, Shark al-Luma', 1/436; al-ShirazI, al-Tabsirah; pp. 222-223.
^Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics, p. 85.
AIbid„ p. 85-86.
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far less costly than stall-fed sheep. Similarly, delaying an overdue debt for a person
who is capable of payment in (11) is a relevant cause to being unjust, since he has no
excuse for procrastination.
(10) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
(11) "It is unjust for a finder (a person who is able to pay) to procrastinate an
overdue payment" (layyu 1-wajidi zulm). (A Prophetic saying).
Contrastly, there is no connection between whiteness and becoming full in (12),
since all people become full if they eat. So, (12), in al-Juwayni's view, does not
implicate (13).1
(12) White man becomes full if he eats
(13) Non-white man does not become full if he eats.
However, as pointed out in the discussion of the second argument of the
advocates of counter implicature, the oddness of utterances like (14) and (12) is due to
the fact that they give rise to false implicatures such as (15) and (13). If this is true, it
will, then, be wrong to subscribe to al-Juwayni's view that (12) does not implicate
(13).
(14) Dead Jews cannot see.
(15) Other dead people can see.
5.3.3.1.2.4. The conditions for the validity of counter implicature
We have already seen that counter implicature is a weak inference and can,
therefore, easily be cancelled. In this section we shall be discussing the conditions of
the validity of counter implicature, the lack of each of which represents a constraint on
its validity and causes it to be cancelled. These conditions are as follows:
ISee al-Juwayni, 1/466-469.
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i- the unmentioned is neither more fitting to the rule than the mentioned nor equal
to it.1 So in the Qur'anic verse (1) where the rule (the prohibition of killing children)
is more relevant to the unmentioned (killing children without fearing poverty) than the
mentioned (killing them for fear of poverty), counter implicature (2) is invalid.2
(1) "Kill not your children for fear of poverty".3
(2) It is permissible to kill your children if you do not fear poverty.
The cancellation of counter implicature here is governed by a well-established rule
by virtue of which: when a stronger signifier is in conflict with a weaker signifier, the
weaker must be overruled by the stronger.4 And since the counter implicature here is
in conflict with a stronger implicature, that is, the congruent implicature in (3), it must
be cancelled.
(3) With a yet stronger reason, do not kill your children if you do not fear poverty.
A similar example would be (4) which does not give rise to (5).
(4) If you fail the exam, you will not be punished.
(5) If you pass the exam, you will be punished.
ii- The qualification is not due to a dominant custom, otherwise it will be regarded
as a description rather than a condition. Thus, the qualification (under your
guardianship) (allati fi hujurikum) in the Qur'anic verse (6) is said to be made not to
exclude step-daughters that are not under guardianship but to describe the common
custom according to which step-daughters live with their mothers and their step¬
fathers.5
llbn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud, 2/174; al-Qarafl, Sharh Tanqih, p. 174; Ibn Taymiyyah,
Fatawa, 31/138; Ibn al-Malik, pp. 547-548; Ibn al-Halabi, p. 547; al-'Ansari, 1/414.
2Al-'Amidi (1986), 3/94.
3THE HOLY QUR'AN, 17/31.
^See al-Juwaynl, 1/512-513; Weiss, the Search, p. 495.
^Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud, 2/174; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 174; Ibn Taymiyyah,
Fatawa, 31/138; al-Taftazanl, Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/34; al-Mahalll, 1/246; Ibn al-
Malik, p. 548; al-'Ansari, 1/414.
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(6) "Prohibited to you are your mothers, [...], your step-daughters under your
guardianship, born of your wives to whom you have gone in".1
In an attempt to account for the invalidity of counter implicature in such a
situation, al-Qarafi says that this is
because of the fact that the dominant property of an entity is associated
with it in the mind [...]. So, if the speaker recalls the entity in order to
attribute something to it, the entity conjures the property up. The speaker,
therefore, mentions the property not to indicate the negation of the rule with
respect to the unmentioned case but because of its association in his mind
with that entity.2
To take another example, the clause 'in my pocket' in (7) is not said to exclude the
money deposited in the bank, simply because it is very common to express oneself in
this way in such situations.
(7) a- Are you going abroad this summer?
b- It depends on how much money I have in my pocket.
iii- The text containing the qualification is not uttered in response to a particular
question or event.3 So, (8), as already pointed out, does not implicate (9), for the
qualification 'free-grazing' is not made to exclude stall-fed sheep, but because it was
the subject of the question made in (8).
(8) Is alms-tax due upon free-grazing sheep?
(9) Yes, alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
A similar example may be quoted from Levinson:
Suppose that in order to get the lavish subsidy under the EEC Cow
Subsidy Scheme one must have three cows, and the inspector asks John's
neighbour the following question:
[10] I: Has John really got the requisite number of cows?
N: Oh sure, he's got three cows all right.4
^THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 4/23; see Ali's Translation, 4/23.
2Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 272; al-Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/273.
3 Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, 'Adud, 2/174; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 174; Ibn Taymiyyah,
Fatawa, 31/138; al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-TalwIh, 2/34; al-Mahalli, 1/246; Ibn al-
Malik, p. 548; al-'Ansari, 1/414; Muhammad. Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence, p. 134.
^Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 115-116.
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In such a situation, (10) does not implicate (11) "because it is clear from the
context that all the information that is required is whether John's herd passes the
threshold for subsidy payment, not the exact number of cows he might in fact have".1
(11) John has only three cows and no more.
iv- There is no supposition that the speaker is ignorant of the rule of the
unmentioned, otherwise the hearer may think that the speaker has left the unmentioned
out because of his ignorance of its rule.2
It may be helpful here to adopt Leech's distinction between the 'positive version'
and the 'neutral version' of an implicature.
"The neutral version is: '5 does not believe that P is true, nor does s
believe that P is false'. This would be the conclusion if s simply did not
have enough evidence to decide, as in:
[12] Jill ate SOME of the biscuits (but I don't know whether she ate all
of them).3
According to Leech, determining whether an implicature is positive or neutral
depends on contextual information. "One context will suggest that s has withheld the
information because of lack of knowledge, and another that s has withheld it because
of a definite belief to the contrary".4
These are some of the conditions mentioned by Muslim legal theorists for the
validity of counter implicatures. Both the proponents and opponents of counter
implicature agree that counter implicature is invalid when any of the constraints
obtains, but the proponents say that they are definite in number and that the hearer will
be able to detect them. So, if there is no contextual evidence that any of them exists,
the hearer will take the counter implicature to be valid. The opponents of counter
1Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 116.
^Ibn al-Hajib, 2/173, "Adud, 2/174; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tasiqih, p. 174; al-Taftazanl,
Hashiyat al-Talwih, 2/34; al-Mahalli, 1/246; al-'Ansari, 1/414; Muhammad. Hashim
Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 133.
^Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics, p. 86.
4Ibid.
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implicatures, on the other hand, hold that the constraints are indefinite and it is not in
the capacity of the addressee to come to the conclusion that none of them exists.
Therefore, he will not be able to infer whether or not a particular counter implicature is
an integral part of the speaker's message. This view is rejected on the grounds that
counter implicature is calculable and probabilistic, and based on the addressee's
supposition that there is no evidence to the contrary.1
5.3.3.1.2.5. Types of counter implicature
Although Muslim legal theorists distinguish several types of counter implicature,
there is no general agreement among them on the number of these types. However, it
is generally accepted that each of these types can be looked upon as an inference
arising from the use of one of different kinds of premodifiers and post-modifiers such
as conditions, qualifiers and quantifiers. In this section, I will sketch out the most
distinctive types of this kind of implicature:
(I) Mafhum al-laqab (The implicature of a Designation). This is an implicature
derived from the attribution of a particular rule to a proper name or a common noun.
Only a handful of Muslim scholars, notably Abu Bakr al-Daqqaq (d. 392/1001),
assume the validity of this type of counter implicature for the formulation of the law,
while the overwhelming majority strongly controvert that.2 Those who assume the
validity of the implicature of a Designation say that (1) gives rise to implicatures like
(2) and (3). Moreover, they argue that if one says (4) to his adversary, he will be
implicating (5), and this is the only reason why great jurists like Malik Ibn 'Anas (d.
179/795) and 'Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) hold that anyone who says an
' Sec Hasan al-Fanari, Hashiyah 'ala Hashiyat al-Talwih 'ala Sharh al-Tawdlh 'ala
l-Tanqlh, 2/38; al-Bannani, 1/247; al-Sharbinl, 1/246.
^For arguments against this kind of counter-implicature, see al-Basrl, 1/148-149; al-
Bajl, 2/448; al-ShlrazI, Sharh al-Luma', 1/435-437; al-Shlrazi, al-Tabsirah; pp. 222-
223; al-Juwaynl, 1/471-472; al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/193; Ibn al-Halabl, p. 549.
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utterance like (4) should be charged with qadhf (defamation) for accusing his
adversary's mother of fornication.
(1) Alms-tax is due upon sheep
(2) Alms-tax is not due upon cattle
(3) Alms-tax is not due upon camels.
(4) My mother is not a fornicator.
(5) Your mother is a fornicator.
The opponents of this kind of implicature say that (5) does not follow from the
saying of (4) alone but with the help of the situational contexts (the fact that the
participants are being engaged in a quarrel with the presumption that people do intend
to insult each other in such situations). So it cannot be subsumed under the type of
counter implicature which arises from the linguistically apparent meaning of the
expression (alladhl yakunu 1-lafzv zahiran flhi 1 ughatan).1 To put it in modern
terms, this is a particularised rather than generalised implicature since its generation is
sensitive to context and dependent on observing the maxim of relevance. Genuine
examples of counter implicature, in contrast, are valid irrespective of the context in
which they are uttered and are worked out with recourse to the Maxim of Quantity.
And the reason why this particular example does not lend itself to the Maxim of
Quantity relates, as indicated earlier, to the fact that there is no presumption that the
speaker has 'descended' from a general concept to a specific one, and consequently no
intention of 'indicating contrast' (mukhalafah) is involved.2 However, there are some
borderline cases where it is hard, for the lack of evidence, to judge whether or not the
speaker has departed from a general concept to a specific one, and since it is not clear
whether or not the saying of (1) involves a descent (in al-ShlrazI's sense of the term)
from the general concept na'am (livestock) to the specific ghanam (sheep), it follows
that (1) could be one of these borderline cases.
^Ibn al-Hajib, 2/182, 'Adud, 2/182.
^See al-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma\ 1/436; al-Shirazi, al-Tabsirah; pp. 222-223.
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(II) Mafhum al-sifah (The implicature of a Restrictive Attribute). The term
'Restrictive Attribute' is extended here to cover more categorises than is covered by
sifah or nci 't (adjective) in Arabic Grammar. It covers such grammatical categories as
adverbs of time ((6) +> (i.e. implicates) (7)), adverbs of place ((8) +> (9)), adverbs
of manner ((10) +> (11)), as well as post-adjectives ((12) +> (13) and (14) +> (15)),
pre-adjectives ((16) +> (17) and (18) +> (19)) and controversially adjectives without
nouns ((20) +> (21)).1
(6) Travel on Friday
(7) Do not travel on any day other than Friday.
(8) Sit in front of him.
(9) Do not sit behind him (or in anyplace other than the one specified).
(10) He has read the story quickly.
(11) He has not read it slowly.
(12) fi l-ghanami l-sa'imati zakah.
(13) laysa fighayri l-ghanami l-sa'imati zakah.
(14) Send all the cars available.
(15) You do not have to send cars which are not available.
(16) fi sa'imati l-ghanami zakah.
(17) laysa fi sa 'imati l-ghanami zakah.
(18) Alms-tax is due upon free-grazing sheep.
(19) Alms-tax is not due upon sheep which are not free-grazing
(20) Alms-tax is due upon the free-ranging (al-sa'imah).
(21) Alms-tax is not due upon the non-free-ranging.
However, not any attribute is relevant here but only those which are intended to
restrict and identify the noun (al-wasfu -llaclhi yakvnu li-l-takhsisi 'ay naqsi 1-
1 See Taj al-DIn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Subki, Matn Jam' al-Jawami", 1/250-251; al-
Subkis, al-'Ibhaj, 1/203; al-Mahalli, 1/250-251; al-Bannani, 1/250-251; Hasan al-
Fanarl, Hashiyah 'ala Hashiyat al-Talwih 'ala. Sharh al-Tawdih 'ala 1-Tanqih,
2/31.
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shuyu'i wa-taqllli 1-ishtirak) (i.e. restrictive attributes and defining relative clauses).
So the mentioning of attributes which have no restrictive function but are mentioned
for other purposes such as 'praise' (thana') in (22), 'condemn' (dhamm) in (23),
emphasis (ta'kid) in (24) does not give rise to counter implicatures.1
(22) "In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful".2
(23) "We have guarded them from every evil spirit accursed".3
(24) 'amsi 1-dabiru la ya 'ud (Yesterday gone by will not come again).
Another kind of attribute which is not regarded as restrictive, and consequently not
indicative of counter implicature, is what is called sifat ittifaqiyyah (accidental
attribute) such as habashl 'aswad (a black Negro), the relative clause "who bowed (as
in Islam) to God'sWill" in the Qur'anic verse (25) and the relative clause "that flies on
its wings" in the Qur'asiic verse (26).4
(25) "It was We who revealed
The Law (to Moses): therein
Was guidance and light.
By its standard have been judged
The Jews, by the Prophets
Who bowed (as In Islam)
To God'sWill, By the Rabbis
And the Doctors of Law".5
(26) "There is not an animal (that lives) on the earth, nor a bird that flies
on its wings, but (forms part of) communities like you".6
(Ill) Mafhum al-shart (The Implicature of a Condition). By this kind of
implicature, a conditional statement "ifp, then q" is interpreted as a biconditional one,
which is typically represented in English by "if and only ifp, then q\ The Implicature
of a Condition is a subject of considerable controversy in PF. Before we commence
ISee Sadr al-Shan'ah, 2/32-33; al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/174;
al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-TalwIh, 2/34-35; al-Subkls, al-'Ibhaj, 1/378; Bannani,
1/250-251.
-Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 1/1.
^Ibid., 15/17.
4/lbn al-Malik, p 563; al-RuhawI, p 563.
5Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 5/47.
6THE HOLY QUR 'AN, 6/38; see Ali's Translation, 6/38.
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our discussion of this controversy, it is important to point out that conditionals come
in two varieties: causal and real. By a causal conditional, I mean a conditional
formula which expresses a causal connection between two clauses, no matter whether
the antecedent (al-muqaddam) (or the first clause) is the cause and the consequent (al-
tall) (or the second clause) is the effect like (27) or vice versa as in (28).1
(27) If the sun is shining, it is a daytime
(28) If it is a daytime, the sun is shining.
'Cause' is defined here as "that whose existence implies the existence of
something else and non-existence implies the non-existence of that thing" (ma
yalzamu min wujudihi 1-wujud wa-min 'adamihi l-'adam).2 In other words,/? is a
cause for q if and only if (i) when p occurs q necessarily follows and (ii) q does not
occur when there is no p. So, 'cause' is interpreted here as a 'sufficient condition' or,
as al-Jurjanl calls it, 'the complete cause' (al-sabab al-tamm).3
By a real conditional, I mean a conditional formula which expresses no causal
connection between the antecedent and the consequent. What I am trying to suggest
by the term 'real', therefore, is that real conditions are compatible with the very nature
of conditions as defined by Muslim legal theorists. According to al-Qarafi, condition
(al-shart) is "that whose non-existence implies the non-existence of something else
but its existence does not imply the existence nor the non-existence of that thing"4
That is to say, p is a condition for q if and only if when there is no p there is no q no
matter whether q occurs or does not occur when there is p. So, 'condition' is
interpreted here as 'necessary condition' or, as al-Jurjanl calls it, 'the incomplete
cause' (al-sabab al-gbayr al-tamm).5
^See al-Ruhawi, pp 563-564.
2Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 81.
3Al-Sharif al-Jurjanl, al-Ta'rifat, p. 62
4Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 82.
^Al-Sharlf al-Jurjani, al-Ta'rifat, p. 62
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It should not be understood from the word 'real' in this context that real
conditionals are more common or more frequent in communication than causal
conditionals. In fact, the converse is true, 'linguistic conditions (al-shurut al-
lughawiyyah), according to al-Qarafi, are of the causal type.1 Some legal theorists,
however, prefer to say most, rather than all, of linguistic conditions are of the causal
type in order, I assume, to include utterances such as (29) where there is no causal
relationship in the above sense of the term between the antecedent (being human) and
the consequent (being an animal).2
(29) If Zayd is a human, he is an animal.
'Linguistic conditions' are usually contrasted with 'non-linguistic conditions'. By
the former, (also called syntactic conditions (al-shurut al-nahwiyyah) are meant
conditional statements expressed in the language by the syntactic form "ifp, then q "
(or similar forms). By the latter are meant "rational conditions like living for learning,
legal conditions, like purification for performing prayer, and normal conditions like
nutrition for remaining alive".3 On the surface, the distinction between linguistic and
non-linguistic conditions are implausible since each of the so-called non-linguistic
conditions can be expressed by the syntactic form "if p, then q", but what the legal
theorists seem to mean is this: a non-linguistic condition in its nature, and before
being expressed by the language, can be a sufficient or necessary one, but once it is
put in the syntactic form "if p, then q" by a given speaker in a given communicative
situation, the addressee will understand that the speaker implies that p is a sufficient
condition, and consequently the syntactic form "ifp, then q" will be interpreted as "if
and only if p, then q".4 The addressee will probably reason as follows: if there had
been any other condition, the speaker would have said so, but since he did not
1Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih, p. 85.
^See, e.g., 'Adud, 2/181.
3Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 85.
^See ibid. It should be noted, however, that the opponents of this kind of implicature
deny that the syntactic condition is interpreted as "if and only if p, then q'. See al-
'Amidl (1986), 3/100; Ibn al-Malik, pp. 563-564.
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mention any other condition, it follows that there is probably no other condition.1
However, there could be situations where the speaker sets two or more conditions in
one conditional statement either by disjunction as in (30), or by conjunction as in (31),
but such cases still fall under causal conditions.2
(30) If you open the window or switch the light on, you can read the book.
(31) If you open the window and switch the light on, you can read the book.
Thus, there is no doubt that the basis for the generation of 'The Implicature of a
Condition' is not logical but conversational, but the question is which maxim gives
rise to it? According to Levinson, this kind of implicature
is working in the opposite direction from ordinary Quantity inferences:
normally by Quantity if I say a weaker statement where a stronger one
would have been relevant, I implicate that I am not in a position to make the
stronger one. Here on the other hand by making the weaker statement [34]
I implicate the stronger one [35].3
This, however, does not seem to be a plausible account. In fact, 'The Implicature
of a Condition' is an ordinary Quantity inference, where the speaker is assumed, by
virtue of the Maxim of Quantity, to have descended from the general (because he
believes it to be false) to the specific. For example, the Qur'anic verse in (32), which
concerns divorced women, gives rise to (33) because the general (i.e. (36)) has
deliberately been left out to indicate (33).
(32) "And if they carry (life
In their wombs), then
Spend (your substance) on them
Until they deliver".4
(33) If they are not pregnant, you do not have to spend for them.
(34) Spend for them if they are pregnant.
(35) Spend for them if and only if they are pregnant.
1 See al-Basri, 1/144-145; 'Adud, 2/181; al-Taftazam, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud,
2/181; al-RuhawI, p. 564..
^See al-Basri, 1/141.
^Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 146.
^Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 65/6.
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(36) Spend for them whether they are pregnant or not.
However, the opponents of the Implicature of a Condition advance few arguments
against its validity, only one of which appears to be powerful. I will discuss this
powerful argument soon, but before that I should point out that part of the confusion
about the validity of the Implicature of a Condition seems to come from the use of
improper examples, which is in turn due to the fact that the term 'condition' in Arabic
grammar is misleading. Most, if not all, of the traditional Arab grammarians consider
utterances such as (37), (38), (39) and (40) as conditional statements. Some legal
theorists take this view for granted and use such utterances, accordingly, as counter¬
examples to the notion of the Implicature of a Condition. Al-Baji, for instance, says
that if someone says (37), it is understood that he clearly states that 'whoever comes
must be given a Dirham', but he says nothing about the non-coming.1
37) man ja'aka fa-'a'tihi dirhaman (Whoever comes to you, give him a
Dirham).
38) 'aynama tadhhab 'adhhab ma'ak (Wherever you go, I'll go with you).
39) mata tadhhab 'adhhab ma'ak (Whenever you go, I'll go with you.
40) mahma taf'al fl 1-dunya sa-tarahu fi l-'akhirah (Whatever you do in this
life, you will see it in the hereafter).
Although one may be tempted to include such utterances under counter
implicature, possibly under the implicature of a Designation, this, however, does not
seem to be as strong an inference as the advocates of the Implicature of a Condition
would think it to be.
However, the most serious objection directed to the Implicature of a Condition is
that in utterances like (41) where the antecedent is more general than (i.e. entails) the
consequent, it would be paradoxical to infer counter implicature.2 Thus, (41) does not
iAl-Bajl, 2/452.
^See al-'Ansari, 1/422; Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i, Sullam al-Wusul li Sharh
Nihayat al-Sul, 2/217.
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implicate (42), because (42) contradicts the very self-evident fact that not all animals
are human.
(41) If Zayd is a human, he is an animal.
(42) If Zayd is not a human, he is not an animal
One possible escape from this objection is to say that (42) is invalid because, as
already stated, the connection between the antecedent (Zayd is a human) and the
consequent (he is an animal) is not of a causal nature. Granted that (41) is not a casual
conditional, the question arises here as to whether it is true that this kind of implicature
is based, as mentioned above, on the assumption that the speaker in saying an
utterance like (41), with this particular form "if p, then q", is assuming a causal
connection between the antecedent and the consequent. In dealing with this issue, we
would point out the following: it is essential here to recognise that we are dealing with
two separate issues: (i) whether (41) fails to give rise to (42); and (ii) whether (42) is
a valid logical inference. It is arguable that both (i) and (ii) are false, but their
falsehood is due to different reasons. With respect to (i), it is false because (41) by
virtue of the Maxim of Quantity and its underlying principle, that is, the Principle of
Co-operation, the speaker in saying (41) is implicating (42), otherwise he will be
regarded as uncooperative and misleading. As for (ii), it is false because it conflicts
with the logical fact that some animals are not human. Accordingly, it is reasonable to
say that the speaker of (41) is implicating (42) but the hearer would not take (42) to be
an intended communicative intention of the speaker, owing to a diverting context,
which is the fact that not all animals are human. In our discussion of the
circumstances in which diverting contexts eliminate irrelevant interpretations (cf.
3.5.1.4), we pointed out that an interpretation is discarded if it contradicts logical or
customary facts. 1 In the case of the signification of 'what is said', when the literal
interpretation is recognised to be nonsense, unlikely or impossible, the addressee
^See al-'Ansari, 1/221.
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eliminates it and searches for an ulterior one (cf. 3.5). In the case of implicature,
there is no literal or non literal interpretation; instead, there are two possibilities: either
to take the implicature to be valid (when there is no diverting context) or to take it to be
invalid (when it is cancelled by a diverting context as in (42)). The difference between
the two cases has to do with the Principle of 'I'mal, which stipulates that, in the case
of the signification of 'what is said', if there is evidence that expressions are not being
used in their literal meanings "they must be interpreted figuratively in order to avoid
the cancellation of the utterance and leaving the expression without intention" 1 (cf.
3.5.1.3). This is obviously inapplicable to implicatures since they can easily be
cancelled in communication.
However, modern logicians, semanticians and pragmatists distinguish between
what they call 'material implication', which is represented by "ifp, then q" from that
called 'equivalence', which is represented by "if and only ifp, then q" in terms of their
truth-conditions.2 In the case of material implication, the conditional sentence must be
false only if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. So, from a strictly
logical viewpoint, the saying of (43) commits the speaker to the falsity of (46) only (as
it contradicts the propositional content of what he explicitly stated) but not to that of
(44) and (45).3
(43) If you fail the exam, you will be punished.
(44) If you do not fail the exam, you will be punished
(45) If you do not fail the exam, you will not be punished
(46) If you fail the exam, you will not be punished
The saying of (47), in contrast, commits the speaker not only to the falsity of (50)
but also to the falsity of (48), and consequently to the truth of (49).
1Al-Taftazani, Hashiyat al-Talwih, P.l/322.
^See John Lyons, Semantics, 1/144-145.
3See John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction, p 167.
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(47) If and only if you fail the exam, you will be punished.
(48) If you do not fail the exam, you will be punished
(49) If you do not fail the exam, you will not be punished
(50) If you fail the exam, you will not be punished
Compare the following two tables:1
Truth table for material implication
p q p -----> q examples
(the antecedent) (the consequent)
true true true (43)
true false false (46)
false true true (44)
false false true (45)
Truth table for equivalence
P q p ----> q examples
(the antecedent) (the consequent)
true true true (47)
true false false (50)
false true false (48)
false false true (49)
(IV) Mafhum al-ghayah (The implicature of a Time Limit). When the speaker
connects the rule with a time limit, he will be taken, according to the advocates of
counter implicature, to be (i) explicitly stating that the rule is confined to that limit, and
(ii) implicating that the rule of the unmentioned (i.e. the time beyond the limit) is
opposite to the rule of the unmentioned. The opponents of the implicature of a Time
^See Ronnie Cann, Formal Semantics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), pp. 70-74.
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Limit, on the other hand accept (i) but reject (ii).1 Thus, (51a), according to the
advocates of counter implicature, implicates (52), and (53) implicates (54).
(51a) "Keep away from women
In their courses, and do not
Approach them until
They are clean."2
(52) You may (or it is permissible for you to) approach women when they are
clean.
(53) The lecture will continue till midday.
(54) The lecture will not continue after midday.
The proponents of the Implicature of a Time Limit say that the mentioning of a
time limit is a proclamation on the part of the speaker that the rule will lapse when the
time limit is reached. If the time after that limit was given the same rule, there would
be no point of setting that limit and the speaker' utterance would be deemed nonsense
(laghw), something which is avoidable in communication.3 Furthermore, it is
inappropriate for the hearer of the utterance (53) to ask the question in (55) since the
answer is already available in (53) .4
(55) Will the lecture continue aftermidday?
As we saw earlier, the appropriateness of enquiry is one of the widely recognised
tests applied in the PF (as in the above example) to check whether or not an utterance
gives rise to a particular inference; it is used by some legal theorists, with objections
from others, to ascertain whether a given inference is derived from what is said or by
implication.
!See al-Baji, 2/453-455, al-Basri, 1/145-146.
^Ali's Translation of THE HOLY QUR 'AN, 2/222.
3See al-Baji, 2/454, 456; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/208; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/181, 'Adud,
2/181.
4See al-Baji, 2/455; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/208.
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The opponents of this kind of implicature, on the other hand, say that in utterances
like (53), the speaker is, in actual fact, silent about the situation after the time limit.1
For example, the speaker of (53) said nothing about whether or not the lecture will
continue after midday. It is only for this reason, continues the argument, that there are
many Qur'amc and non-Qur'amc texts in which the rule of the unmentioned is clearly
not meant to be contrasted to the rule of the mentioned. To take one example, the
Qur'amc verse (51a) does not implicate (52), for there is another condition that should
be fulfilled before men can approach their wives, that is, 'women should purify
themselves'.2 This condition is understood from the rest of the verse (51b):
(51b) "But when they have
Purified themselves,
Ye may approach them
In any manner, time, or place
Ordained for you by God"3
The simple answer to such an argument is to say that this is an instance in which
an implicature is cancelled by a stronger indicator. In other words, (51a) implicates
(52) but this inference is cancelled by the context (i.e., the rest of the verse cited
above).
(V) Mafhum al- 'adad (the Implicature of a Stated Numeral). The controversy
concerning the validity of counter implicature here takes the form of whether or not
specifying a particular number implies that the rule of the higher and lower numbers is
different from that of the stated number. Before we begin our discussion of this
controversy, it should be remarked that it is quite relevant to this discussion to realise
that there is a difference between the relation between a general (or universal) and
specific (or particular) concept on the one hand, and the relation between a higher and
lower number on the other, in terms of the effect of the assertion of any of the two
^See al-Baji, 2/454-455; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/208.
2See al-Baji, 2/454-455.
^Ali's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 2/222.
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pairs to its assertion to its partner, and the negation of any of the two pairs to its
negation with respect to its partner.
In the case of the former, as explained earlier, logically speaking,
(i) the assertion of the specific entails the assertion of the general (e.g.. (56)
entails (57)).1
(ii) the negation of the general entails the negation of the specific (e.g. (58) entails
(59)).2
(iii) the assertion of the general does not necessarily entail the assertion of the
specific (e.g. (57) does not entail (56)).3
(iv) the negation of the specific does not entail the negation of the general (e.g.
(59) does not entail (58)).4
(56) There is a 'man' in the house
(57) There is a human in the house
(58) there is no human in the house.
(59) there is no man in the house.
In the case of the latter, the rules, at least in some examples, are different:
(i) the assertion of a rule to the lower may or may not entail its assertion to the
higher, so (60) entails (61), but (62) does not entail (63).
(60) Three thousand pounds are enough (or too much) for the car.
(61) Four thousand pounds are enough (or too much) for the car.
(62) Zayd has three children.
(63) Zayd has four children.
ISee al-Qarafi, Sharh Tasiqlh, pp. 96-97.




(ii) the negation of a rule with respect to the higher may or may not entail its
negation with respect to the lower, so (64) entails (65), but (66) does not entail (67).
(64) Four thousand pounds are not enough (or too much) for the car.
(65) Three thousand pounds are not enough (or too much) for the car.
(66) Zayd has not four children.
(67) Zayd has not three children.
(iii) the assertion of a rule to the higher may or may not entail its assertion to the
lower, so (63) entails (62), but (61) does not entail (60).
(iv) the negation of a rule with respect to the lower may or may not entail its
negation with respect to the higher, so (67) entails (66), but (65) does not entail (64).
According to al-Basrl, whether the assertion of a given rule to a particular number
entails or does not entail its assertion to the higher number depends on whether the
utterance is obligation, prohibition or permission.
(i) In the case of obligation, the lower does not entail the higher, so (69) does not
entail (68).
(68) Give him a hundred pounds.
(69) Give him fifty pounds.
(ii) In the case of permission, the lower may entail the higher, thus (73) entails
(72), and may not entail it, so (71) does not entail (70).
(70) You may give him a hundred pounds.
(71) You may give him fifty pounds.
(72) You may base your judgement on the testimony of two witnesses.
(73) You may base your judgement on the testimony of one witness.
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(iii) In the case of prohibition, the lower, according to al-Basri, entails the higher,
so (75) entails (74), but, I would argue, there are some cases in which the lower may
not entail the higher, so (77) does not entail (76).1
(74) Do not give him a hundred pounds.
(75) Do not give him fifty pounds.
(76) Do not base your judgement on the testimony of two witnesses.
(77) Do not base your judgement on the testimony of one witness.
Similarly, whether the assertion of a given rule to a particular number entails or
does not entail its assertion to the lower number depends on whether the utterance is
obligation, prohibition or permission.
(i) In the case of obligation, the higher, according to 'Abu 1-Husayn al-Basri,
entails the lower, so (68) entails (69), but again, I would assume, there are some cases
in which the higher may not entail the lower, so (78) does not entail (79). In fact,
utterances like (78) implies (77) which represents the falsity of (79), and this is one of
three cases which are admitted by 'Abd Allah al-Basri to be instances of counter
implicatures.2
(78) Base your judgement on the testimony of two witnesses.
(79) Base your judgement on the testimony of one witness.
(ii) In the case of permission, the higher may entail the lower, thus (70) entails
(71), and may not entail it, so (72) does not entail (73).
(iii) In the case of prohibition, the higher does not entail the lower, so (74) does
not entail (75).3
ISee al-Basri, 1/146.
2See al-'Amidi (1986), 3/80-81; 'Adud, 2/175.
^See al-Basri, 1/146-147; al-'AsnawI, 2/222-223.
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However, as far as counter implicature is concerned, the advocates of this kind of
implicature hold that the saying of (80) implicates that (81) and (82) are true, while the
opponents deny that.1
(80) Zayd has three children.
(81) Zayd has not only (or exactly) two children.
(82) Zayd has not four children.
To explain this, we should point out that, for the proponents of the implicature of
a Stated Numeral, there are three possible interpretations for specifying a certain
number in terms of counter implicature:
(i) at least (i.e. no less than) p, which requires that the rule of the lower number,
must be the opposite (e.g. the Prophetic saying in (83));
(83) Five sucks makes the sucker an unmarriageable person (khamsu rada (atin
yuharrimnn).
(ii) at most (i.e. no more than) p, which requires that the rule of the higher
number must be the opposite (e.g. the Qur'amc verse in (84));2 and
(84) "If thou ask seventy times
For their forgiveness, God
Will not forgive them".3
(iii) exactly (i.e. no less or more than) p, which requires that the rule of both the
lower and the higher number must be the opposite (e.g. the Qur'anic verse in (85)).
All the above interpretations are rejected by the opponents of the Implicature of a
Stated Numeral.
!See al-Basri, 1/146-148; al-'Amidi (1986), 3/103-104; al-'Asnawi, 2/221-223.
^Modern semanticists and pragmatists hold that The Browns have two daughters "will
normal implicate that the Browns have only (i.e., no more than) two daughters". John
Lyons, Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction, P. 288; Harnish, Robert M. Harnish,
"Logical Form and Implicature", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader, p. 341;
Francois Recanati, "The Pragmatics of What Is Said", in Steven Davis (ed.),
Pragmatics: A Reader, p. 115; Robyan Carston, "Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-
Theoretic Semantics", in Steven Davis (ed.), Pragmatics/ A Reader, p. 46; Stephen C.
Levinson, Pragmatics, p. 106; Geoffrey N. Leech, Principles ofPragmatics, p. 88.
3aH's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 9/80.
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(85) "And those who launch
A charge against chaste women,
And produce not four witnesses
(to support their allegations)
Flog them with eighty stripes;
And reject their evidence".1
With respect to (83) the advocates of counter implicature argue that if four (or less)
sucks were enough to make the sucker an unmarriageable person, then it would imply
that the fifth suck is not the decisive one and is consequently dispensable. For if the
prohibition already obtained before the fifth, it would be impossible to obtain by the
fifth, a conclusion which leads to the cancellation of what is said.2
With respect to (84), the advocates say that when this verse was revealed, the
Prophet said "la-'azidanna 'ala 1-sab'in" (I will exceed seventy), which means that
what exceeds seventy would make difference.3
Among the counter-arguments developed by the opponents of the implicature of a
Stated Numeral to reject this conclusion are the following: the mentioning of 'seventy'
in the above verse is intended not to be taken in its literal sense, but to express
exaggeration.4 And the reason why the Prophet said 'I will exceed seventy' could be
just to express good intention towards them in order to attract them to the religion.5
As to (85), the opponents say that the negation of the higher number is not due to
counter implicature, but to the absence of evidence. And when there is no evidence to
the contrary, a past state should be maintained.6
1All's Translation of THEHOLY QUR 'AN, 24/4.
^See al-'Amidl (1986), 3/88-89; 'Adud, 2/179; al-Shirazi, Sharb al-Luma1/433-
434.
^See al-Baji, 2/450; al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/195; al-'Amidl (1986), 3/82; Ibn al-
Hajib, 2/176; 'Adud, 2/177-178.
^See Ibn al-Hajib, 2/176; 'Adud, 2/178.
^See al-'Amidi (1986), 3/82.
^See al-Muti'I, op. cit., 2/221-222.
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Finally, it should be pointed out that all the above cases in which a higher number
entails a lower number (as between (68)-(69), (70)-(71)) or vice versa (as between
(75)-(74)) can be regarded as instances of congruent implicature at least in one of the
two senses of the term.
(VI) Mafhum al-istithna' (the Implicature of an Exception). According to this
type of implicature, (86) gives rise to (87).
(86) Nobody is generous except Zayd.
(87) Zayd is generous.
This kind of inference differs from the typical types of counter implicature which
have been dealt with so far in that it is not so clear whether the implicit inference (i.e.,
(87)) is an integral part of the conventional propositional content of the utterance (i.e.,
(86)) or implicated by it. Al-Qarafi, who wrote a book of more than six hundred
pages on 'exception', holds that an inference indicating the rule of the thing excepted
(e.g., (87)) is derived from the implicational rather than equivalent signification of an
utterance containing the exception (e.g., (86)). He argues that 'exception particles' are
'established' exclusively for the exclusion from the general term. Giving the thing
excepted a rule opposite to that of the general term, on the other hand, is not a
conventional, but rational, issue. It is an issue based on the theorem that contradiction
involves only two parties, the exclusion from either of which necessarily implies the
inclusion in the other, which represents the exact opposite. So, supposing that
contradiction involved more than two parties, the exclusion from one party would not
necessitate the inclusion in the opposite.1 Therefore, what we are dealing with here is
a special kind of counter implicature which, for being determinate, cannot be cancelled
without contradiction.
^See Shihab al-Din 'Ahmad b. 'Idns al-Qarafi, al-Istighna' fi 1-Istithna', ed.
Muhammad 'Abd af-Qadir 'Ata, pp. 472-473; al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqlh, p. 56.
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(VII) Mafhum al-hasr (the Implicature of Confinement). This kind of
implicatures is said to arise in utterances in which the subject is intensionally more
general than the predicate. In other words, when the subject potentially denotes more
individuals than the predicate does.1 For example, when there is no evidence that the
phrase 'the scholar' is being used referentially, (88) gives rise to (89).
(88) The scholar in the town is Zayd.
(89) There is only one scholar in the town.
There is, however, a considerable amount of controversy about whether this kind
of reference is derived from 'what is said, drawn by counter implicature or drawn by
the departure from the natural order usually used for predication.2
There are three possibilities of dealing with (89): either
(i) to take it to have been asserted (by the speaker of (88)), or
(ii) to take it to have been presupposed, or
(iii) to take it to have been implicated.
To put it another way, we may either equate, roughly speaking, (89) with (89a),
(89b) or (89c).
(89a) I assert that there is only one scholar in the town.
(89b) I presuppose that there is only one scholar in the town.
(89c) I implicate that there is only one scholar in the town.
Obviously, it is very unlikely, if at all, that (89a) is an accurate interpretation of
(88), because if (89) was asserted by (88), the truth-condition of both propositions
would have the same effect if (88) is negated, but it is very clear that the negation of
(88) (which is expressed in (90)) will have no effect on the truth-condition of (89).
That is to say, (90) still engenders (89).
1 See al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/183.
2Ibn al-Hajib, 2/183, 'Adud, 2/183-185.
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(90) The scholar in the town is not Zayd.
So, there remain two valid possibilities: (89b) and (89c). The advocates of the
Implicature of Confinement opt for (89c),1 but, I would argue that (89b) is more
plausible, on account of two reasons: first, counter implicature, like any other
conversational implicature is cancellable without contradiction, but (89) is not; and
second, as explained earlier (cf. 5.2.1.1), it is a characteristic feature of
presuppositions that if an utterance p presupposes q, and p is false, presupposition
requires that q must be true, and this is exactly the case with the relationship between
(88) and (89).
Those who say that the inference (94), to take another example, is engendered by
flouting the natural order hold that it is more natural to say 'Zayd is my friend' than to
say (93), but if the speaker reverses this order, by saying (93) he would probably be
taken to indicate (94).2
(93) My friend is Zayd.
(94) I have no friend other than Zayd.
The rationale behind the belief that 'Zayd is my friend' is the natural order, for
predication has to do with the widely held rule that predicates must be either as general
as or more general than subjects,3 which means that (95) is an acceptable utterance,
but (96) is not. In order to maintain this rule, the subject is always interpreted as
either equal or less general than the predicate, thus, since 'Zayd' is particular, then
'friend' must be so; that is, the speaker of (93) must have only one friend, namely
Zayd.
(95) Zayd is a human being.
(96) A human being is Zayd.
ISee al-Taftazani, Hashiyah 'ala Sharh al-'Adud, 2/183.
^Al-Juwayni, 1/479-481; al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 2/207; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/183, 'Adud,
2/183-185.
^See al-Ghazall, al-Mustasfa, 2/207; Ibn al-Hajib, 2/183, 'Adud, 2/183-185. For a
similar notion, see David Cooper, Philosophy and the Nature of Language, (London:
Longman, 1973), pp. 95, 98.
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Conclusion
There is a common belief among researchers in communication and pragmatics
that only recently has verbal communication been viewed as involving both coding and
inferential processes. According to Sperber and Wilson, "From Aristotle through to
modern semiotics, all theories of communication were based on a single model which
[they] call the code model"} They claim that in recent years "Several philosophers,
noticeably Paul Grice and David Lewis, have proposed a quite different model" which
Sperber and Wilson call "the inferential model", according to which "communication
is achieved by producing and interpreting evidence".2 The present study has shown
this to be untrue. The Sunni Muslim legal theorists developed at least two pragmatic
models of textual communication centuries ago. These are the mainstream model and
the salafite one. Both presuppose that successful communication cannot be achieved
by merely "encoding and decoding messages".
Within the mainstream framework, there is a controversy concerning whether
expressions are designations for extra-mental entities or for the mental representations
of these entities. Both views assume that the language of the late generations are
established and determined by the early generations. However, the two views differ
as to how a particular utterance produced by a given speaker relates to wad'. The
former view assumes that each produced utterance is based by way of analogy on a
similar utterance used by the establisher. The latter view, on the other hand, assumes
that the establisher has 'established' the lexicon and the grammatical systems of the
language in a universal manner. This includes the derivational rules of word
formation and the syntactic rules of sentence-generation. So each utterance used by a
speaker is taken to be a realisation of a set of pre-established universal rules, patterns
' Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, p. 2;
see also Adrian Akmajian, Richard A.Demers, and Robert M.Harnish, Linguistics:
An Introduction to Language and Communication, pp. 392-400.
2Ibid
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and facts. Since speakers do not always speak literally and because of the problematic
features inherent in the language, the recovery of intention of the speaker depends on
the context. Thus, literal meanings are determined and understood by reference to
wad', whereas the intentions of the speakers are recoverable by the context. One of
the fundamental assumptions of this conceptual view, which is far more dominant in
Islamic thought than its rival, is the tacit claim that knowledge of the subsumptive
wad' can enable the speaker to generate an infinite number of utterances from each
abstract construction. Each generated utterance is viewed as a manifestation of a
primordially established pattern. The peculiarity of a particular generated utterance
derives from its being selected to express the speaker's intention. So each utterance
used in a given communicative situation pertains partly to wad' and partly to use.
What belongs to wad' is the lexical items and the grammatical patterns being used in
the utterance. What pertains to use, on the other hand, is the speaker's selection of the
very particular lexical items as well as the selection of the very particular grammatical
patterns, and the way the lexical and grammatical units are constructed, organised and
related to the communicative situation. Thus, the judgement that an utterance is not
well-formed is ascribed to its being incompatible with the common constructional
patterns of the language, whereas the judgement that an utterance is true or false,
conceivable or inconceivable, is ascribed to the speakers' proposition encapsulated in
the selected sentence.
As for personal pronouns and definite nouns in general, which have received a
special treatment by the legal theorists, we may conclude from our discussion of al-
Qarafi that their universal signification is determined by virtue of wad' while their
particular reference is governed by use.
The third component of the mainstream communication model (the first two being
wad' and use) is al-haml (interpretation), which is defined as the hearer's own
understanding of the speaker's intention. Muslim legal theorists presume that
285
interlocutors follow certain norms in communication processes. Their model of
communication involves a set of 'usul. I have distinguished between two kinds of
'asl. The first, which I call bases are designed to describe discourse in its ideal form
(which is in conformity with wad'). The second, which I call principles are intended
to describe the behaviour of the interlocutors during the communicative process. The
violation of the bases may generate some rhetorical intentions. The violation of the
principles, on the other hand, leads to problems in communication. For example, if
the speaker flouts the 'literalness' base (i.e. 'the base' is the literal use ), his utterance
will be taken as figurative in nature, but if he infringes the principle of truthfulness,
his utterance will be taken to be false, leading to the breakdown of communication.
The reason is that in violating the base, the speaker sets up a context which indicates
the violation, thus making his intention manifest. In the case of violating the principle,
the speaker, by contrast, intends to mislead the addressee. Five principles govern
successful communication:
i) The Principle of Istishab (i.e. the presumption of the status quo), by virtue of
which each base is maintained until evidence to the contrary is made manifest.
ii) The Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest. In
order for the speaker to be said to have applied this principle, he ought to intend his
discourse to be taken in its ostensive interpretation, otherwise the speaker would be
intending something which his discourse does not signify. Thus, the speaker has
either to use his utterance in accordance with wad' or to indicate his departure from it
by contextual evidence. In other words, he ought to conform to the bases or to
introduce a valid context to show the addressee that he has violated one or more bases.
So, in the case of violating the literalness base, the speaker has to provide the hearer
with two kinds of context:
(a) diverting context to indicate his departure from the original meaning; and
(b) guiding context to pinpoint the intended meaning.
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iii) The Principe of the Speaker's Truthfulness. The Muslim legal theorists point
out that in the case of apparently false statement if it is known or presumed that the
speaker is not telling a lie, it will be known that the utterance is intended to be taken
non-literally. Conversely, if the hearer presumes that the speaker is lying, he will halt
the process of 'i'mal (i.e. making sense of the expressions). Thus, in order for
language to function properly, we have to take the speaker's statement to be true
unless there is evidence to the contrary.
iv) The Principle of 'I'mal. According to this principle, which is based on the
assumption that interlocutors have mutual interest in communicating with each other,
the hearer tends to make the received discourse and the relevant contexts operate by
exploiting them to their maximum capability as they are the clue to the speaker's
intention. If there is evidence that the expressions are not being used in their literal
meanings, they must be interpreted figuratively in order to avoid the cancellation of the
utterance and leaving the expressions without intention.
v) The Principle of Immediacy. Immediacy (tabadur) is regarded as the primary
criterion on which the addressee bases himself in his selection of the proper
interpretation. It is commonly held that the first interpretation that occurs to the hearer
is the one which is most likely to represent the speaker's intention. The immediate
interpretation is usually
(a) the one in accordance with bases;
(b) the one in accordance with wad
(c) the most expected one; and/or
(d) the literal or the nearest to the literal meaning.
Within the salafite framework, Ibn Taymiyyah advances some scattered, but
powerful, arguments against what can be called atomism and foundationalism as
developed by the adherents of the notion wad', in favour of a well-developed version
of compositionalism and contextualism. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that since language is
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used as a means to express the contents of the external world, there must be a
correspondence between the structure of reality and the use of language in a way that
the structure of reality is reflected in the language. Consequently, since there is no
abstract thing in the external world but all entities are conceived to be qualified in some
way, it follows that there would be no unqualified expressions in the language to
signify it. There is no such thing as an unqualified expression or an unqualified
meaning other than the mental representations of real expressions and meanings,
which are in effect nothing but abstract constructs having no reality in the external
world. So a plausible inquiry can be achieved only by an empirical approach which
takes the overall communicative situation into account. His opponents'
misconception, says Ibn Taymiyyah, is due to a confusion between the world per se
and their assumptions about the world. They incorrectly think that what they construct
in their minds represents the external reality, although their mental representations are
decontextualised and divested of the individual variations of the external entities which
are generated by their individuation and which, he believes, is the sign of their real
existence in the physical world. Ibn Taymiyyah holds the view that actual utterances
have a chronologically prior existence to the unobservable and abstracted structure of
utterances (i.e. sentences). This position contrasts with the Platonic realist's doctrine
according to which sentences as universals exist prior to utterances as particulars. It is
also in contrast with the mainstream conceptual view of wad' which presupposes that
expressions are 'established' for the mental representations of the external entities.
Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes quite clearly between mentioning a word without
the intention of communicating a certain proposition and the process in which the
user intends to convey a particular massage to the hearer. It is only the latter case
that can, in his view, be said to pertain to the use of language. This distinction is
very useful for understanding his conception of meaningfulness and his rejection of
the distinction between haqlqah (literal meaning) and majaz (non-literal meaning),
where he claims that words such as 'lion' taken in isolation from every context
288
would never be meaningful, let alone characterised as haqiqah. It should be noted,
however, that Ibn Taymiyyah does not deny the existence of relationships holding
between literal and figurative meanings or the possibility that one meaning is
chronologically prior to the other(s), but what he disputes is the possibility of
finding reliable tests by which one can judge that a particular meaning is haqiqah or
majaz. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the fact that a particular meaning of a multi-
meaning expression tends to occur to the mind prior to the others does not justify
the distinction between haqiqah and majaz. For the meanings of some haqlqah-
expressions may also tend to occur to the mind prior to others. There is no constant
immediate meaning attached to each word in the language, but the context in which
the word is processed determines which interpretation is most likely to be the first
to occur to the hearer's mind. The essence of his argument is that the etymological
and diachronic account of majaz is invalid since it is founded upon non-
demonstrable assumptions. According to Ibn Taymiyyah's account of majaz, each
pair of the so-called haqlqah-oxpression and ma/az-expression represents two
variants of a wider unqualified expression. Thus, instead of saying that 'the bird's
wing' is a haqlqah-expression, and 'the wing of humility' is a ma/az-expression,
the Salafls would say that both 'the bird's wing' and the wing of humility' are two
different variants of 'wing', which only has mental, not actual, existence. In other
words, just as the mushakkik-expression 'white', given the appropriate context, is
capable of referring to the whiteness of ice and the whiteness of milk, the
mutawatl-expression 'man' refers equally to Zayd and 'Umar, and the mushtarak-
expression 'al-mushtarl' is applicable to a 'buyer' and 'Jupiter', in the same way
that the personal pronoun 'I' can refer to different speakers in different situations;
thus the expression 'wing' can be applied equally to 'a bird's wing' and 'the wing
of humility', subject to the condition that identifying which one of them is the
intended meaning will depend on context.
289
There is a consistent correlation, in his view, between qualification and
meaningfulness, i.e. the more restricted the expression the more meaningful it is, and
vice versa. The absolute is, thus, nothing but a mental image that has no existence in
the external world. In order to maintain consistency in his claim that expressions
cannot be used without contextual qualifications, Ibn Taymiyyah introduces the notion
'non-existential signification'.
His rejection of the notion wad in its folk sense according to which expressions
are 'established' in isolation from context leads to the neutralisation of the
differentiation between meaning and intention. One consequence of conflating the two
ideas, i.e. meaning and intention is to entail that conventional meaning is trivialised to
the advantage of contextual meaning.
Compared with the mainstream model, the Sala/Is' model of interpretation
appears to be more straightforward. The Salafls appeal to the Principle of
Immediacy rather than that of Istishab, because it is consistent with their belief that
valid interpretations are not obtainable in isolation from communicative situations.
Furthermore, the Salafls believe that the Principle of Istishab is incompatible with
the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest, which
forms with the Principle of Immediacy the cardinal postulates in their model of
interpretation. They defend this position in this regard by pointing out that in
recovering the signification of an utterance the hearer does not have to move from a
literal-base meaning to a non-literal subsidiary or derivative one. In fact, the
intended meaning strikes the hearer directly by virtue of the Principle of the
Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest and the Principle of
Immediacy. In other words, the hearer's mind goes directly to the intention of the
speaker without the need for mediating meanings, simply because it is the
appropriate context, not the context-independent meaning, of the expression which
provides the effective guide to the speaker's intention.
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The main difference between the mainstream model and Ibn Taymiyyah's
model of interpretation is that the mainstream model presupposes that the hearer
examines the interpretation in accordance with 'usul, and only if it is ruled out by a
diverting context that the hearer looks for other interpretations until a proper one is
found, while Ibn Taymiyyah's model presupposes that the hearer goes directly to
the contextually relevant interpretation. As a result, the mainstream model can be
characterised as indeterminate since it leaves the way open for other possible
interpretations whereas Ibn Taymiyyah's model is determinate.
It is widely accepted that an act of ta'wll involves a departure from the most
immediate interpretation to the hearer's mind, which presupposes the assumption
that the speaker is not co-operating sufficiently in communication. This assumption
attracts strong criticism from the Salafis on the grounds that it is not in harmony
with the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to Make his Intention Manifest,
which is regarded by all parties as the primary principle behind any process of
successful communication.
Moreover, the Salafls and the PF mainstream disagree concerning what kind
of expression is liable to ta'wll. The PF mainstream hold that ta'wll is applicable
to any zain'r-expression, provided that there is a contextual indicator that the
apparent meaning is not the meaning intended by the speaker. For the Salafis, this
is not necessarily true. They confine ta'wll to those zahir-expressions whose
signification in a particular context appears, as Ibn al-Qayyim puts it, to be different
from its equivalents (kharijan 'asi naza'irih). To put it another way, if the hearer
notices that the apparent meaning of the utterance is not in conformity with what the
speaker habitually means by such an utterance in such a situation, then he has to
interpret it in line with the speaker's own lexicon and his consistent habit. Thus, the
Salafis'' main contention is that if the hearer knows that the speaker is able and
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willing to make his intention manifest, it would be wise to think that he intends his
utterance to be taken in its apparent meaning.
The fourth component of the mainstream model of communication is
signification. Muslim legal theorists discuss two different models of significational
classification: the first is semiotic; the other is a text-based one. Within the semiotic
classification, they distinguish two types of signification: verbal and non-verbal.
Each type is subdivided into further types: verbal signification is classified into wad'-
based (wad 'iyyah), rational ('aqliyyah) and natural (tab!'iyyah). Non-verbal
signification, on the other hand, is classified into wad '-based and rational types. For
the linguists and legal theorists wad'-based verbal signification (or linguistic
signification) is the most important type of signification.
The meaning of an utterance is not determined by the wad '-based signification of
that utterance alone, since non-wad '-based components such as the context, are
ultimately the determining factor for recovering the intention of the speaker. However,
there is a disagreement among Muslim thinkers as to whether or not signification can
operate without intention. Generally speaking, linguists tend to make intention as a
necessary condition for signification, since signification, in their view, is the
understanding of intention, not meaning in its unqualified sense. Logicians, on the
other hand, believe that signification is the understanding of meaning whether it is
intended by the speaker or not. As for the legal theorists, the Salafls strongly deny
that signification is obtainable in isolation of a particular communicative situation,
while most scholars hold that there are some meanings which can be abstracted from
actual utterances and identified as wad '-based.
Following Muslim logicians, the legal theorists distinguish between three types of
the wad'-based signification: 'equivalence-signification' (dalalat mutabaqah),
'incorporational signification' (dalalat tadammun) and 'implicational signification'
(dalalat iltizam). If the expression rajul (man), for example, is used to refer to an
292
'adult human male', the expression is said to be used to signify its equivalent meaning,
since this is the meaning to which the expression is assigned. In addition to this
meaning, the legal theorists say that the word rajul 'incorporationally signifies' each
one of the following features: 'adult', 'male' and 'human'. Incorporational
signification' is widely seen as a relationship between the specific and the general,
where the specific word incorporates (tatadamman) the general one. Implicational
signification, on the other hand, is loosely defined as the process in which an
expression signifies its implication (dalalatu 1-lafzi 'ala lazimih). The notion of
implication (iltizam) is intended to cover all that which is excluded from equivalence
and incorporational signification.
In PF, there are two common proposals for what I have called 'text-based
classification of signification': the majority proposal known as the Shafi'I method of
dividing signification and the Hanafi one.
The Hanafi scholars distinguish four types of meaning at the textual level:
(i) the express meaning ('ibarat al-nass). Broadly speaking, this is the meaning
which is taken to be the main import the speaker intends to convey by his utterance.
To put it more literally, the meaning "at which the utterance is driven" (al-masuqv lahu
1-kalam).
(ii) the alluded meaning ('isharat al-nass). This term is used to refer to the
meaning conveyed by the linguistic construction of the utterance, but does not
represent the intention of the speaker at which the text is driven.
(iii) the inferred meaning (dalalac al-nass). Inferred meaning is a special case of
analogical reasoning in which an unstated meaning is derived on 'all-the-more-reason
basis' from a stated meaning by virtue of the consideration of the context and the
speaker's illocutionary import.
(iv) the required meaning (iqtida' al-nass). This term is commonly used to
refer to the semantic content of ellipted parts of an utterance which is believed to be
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essential to the meaningfulness of the whole utterance. The legal theorists
distinguish three types of required meaning:
(a) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the speaker's
truthfulness;
(b) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the rationality
of the text (al-sihhah al- 'aqliyyah)\ and
(c) what is assumed to have been omitted for the preservation of the legal validity
of the text (al-sihhah al-shar'iyyah).
Compared with the Hanafi, the Shafi T classification involves the following
types:
(i) the signification of 'what is said' (dalalat al-mantuq) (the equivalent of (i) in
the Hanafi classification);
(ii) 'alluded signification' (dalalat al-'isharah) (the equivalent of (ii) in the
Hanafi classification);
(iii) required signification (dalalat al-iqtida') (the equivalent of (iv) in the
Hanafi classification);
(iv) indicated signification (dalalat al-tanbih wa-l-'Ima'). This type of
signification, which has no equivalent in the Hanafi classification arises from
implicitly connecting a particular rule with a particular quality in a way suggesting the
involvement of a causal relationship; and
(v) implicated signification (dalalat al-mafhum), which is divided into:
(a) congruent implicature (mafhum al-muwafaqah) (the equivalent of (iii) in the
Hanafi classification); and
(b) counter-implicature (mafhum al-mukhalafah). Most of the Hanafls say that
counter implicature is a weak source to rely on for the formulation of the law, though it
can be used as a valid inference in non-legal discourse.
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The important thing to note in most versions of the Shafi 'I classification, is the
distinction between the meaning of 'what is said' and the meaning of 'what is
implicated'. Unlike many other Muslim legal theorists and modern pragmatists who
attempt similar distinctions, al-Juwaynl has a clear, though not necessarily accurate,
picture of the difference between stated and implicated propositions. Any inferred
proposition which represents either the analogue or the opposite of what is said would
be characterised, according to al-Juwayni's classification, as an implicated
proposition. Any other proposition would, in contrast, be seen as either an explicitly
or implicitly stated meaning.
The notion of counter-implicature is highly relevant to what is called in
contemporary pragmatics 'scalar implicature'. The insights developed by Muslim
legal theorists and their approach to the subject may contribute considerably to the
development of 'scalar implicature'. In particular, they may, at least, lead to
expanding the notion to cover all the types regarded by the legal theorists as types of
'counter-implicature'.
The Maxim of Quantity, among Grice's co-operative maxims, seems to play
the essential role in generating counter-implicatures. However, other principles,
such as the Principle of Relevance and the Principle of the Speaker's Disposition to
Make his Intention Manifest are also important. Furthermore, different scholars
place emphasis on different principles.
Muslim legal theorists distinguish several types of counter-implicature. Some
of these types are
(I) Mafhum al-laqab (The Implicature of a Designation).
(II) Mafhum al-sifah (The Implicature of a Restrictive Attribute).
(III) Mafhum al-shart (The Implicature of a Condition).
(IV) Mafhum al-ghayah (The Implicature of a Time Limit).
(V) Mafhum al- 'adad (the Implicature of a Stated Numeral).
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(VI) Mafhum al-istithna (the Implicature of an Exception).
(VII) Mafhum al-hasr (the Implicature of Confinement).
Finally, I would not claim that this study is accurate or comprehensive enough to
exclude criticism and objections. In fact, there remains a great deal of work to be done
so as to reach a precise account of the Muslim legal theorists' pragmatic models of
textual communication. In particular, the principles and bases of communication, and
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